The unwritten rules of the game : a case study of European funding distribution in Wales by Rumbul, Rebecca Anne
Open Research Online
The Open University’s repository of research publications
and other research outputs
The unwritten rules of the game : a case study of
European funding distribution in Wales
Thesis
How to cite:
Rumbul, Rebecca Anne (2012). The unwritten rules of the game : a case study of European funding distribution in
Wales. PhD thesis The Open University.
For guidance on citations see FAQs.
c© 2012 The Author
Version: Version of Record
Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright
owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies
page.
oro.open.ac.uk
The Unwritten Rules of the Game: A CaseStudy of European Funding
Distribution in Wales
Rebecca Rumbul
Ph.D
Doctor of Philosophy for the Open University Business School
Open University
2012
Abstract
This thesis examines the process of European Union funding programme and its
implementation within a network context, and asks how institutional and network factors
influence which organisations acquire funding. It is a case study which focuses on one
Europeanprogramme and one project partnership that was successfulin gaining funds, and
details the processesand influences that determined the way in which such programmes
are developed and funds are distributed. Multi-Level Governance (MLG) is evident in the
overarching structures supporting the interactions between Wales and the European
Commission. The study critically analyses the significant pressures upon the development
of funding instruments, and identifies the outcomes those pressures produce in terms of
the focus and accessibility of programme funding. It demonstrates that in the
implementation of such funding instruments, organisations that are structurally embedded
within a network and institutional environment will prove to be more successfulin forming
partnerships and gaining funding. The methodological approach is qualitative and relies
upon semi-structured interviews, documentary evidence and observations in offering an
account of the process of funding development, implementation and distribution. This
study rejects the use of a single theory in understanding resource distribution and
demonstrates the need for a multi-faceted approach that encompassesthe institutional
environment in which funds originate. The processof programme development within the
main governing institution demonstrates the pressures of institutional values and
bureaucratic norms upon the frameworks, providing evidence for the perpetuation of
norms and the need for legitimacy as stronger influences upon programme design than the
achievement of policy goals. The implementation of programmes and subsequent
development of projects demonstrates the structurally embedded nature of successful
organisations and the influence of governing institutions in the development of successful
project bids.
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CHAPTER ONE
Funding programmes - From the EU to the Regions
This thesis examines the issues raised by the use of funding instruments, and how these
instruments impact upon the landscape of voluntary and statutory sector organisations and
their activities. This chapter will define the research problem and the research question to
be explored in this thesis, and will outline the contribution to knowledge made in this
study. Finally, this chapter will provide an outline of the thesis structure.
The academic literature concerning the funding of the voluntary sector commonly holds
that resources such as funds are scarce and must be competed for (Benson, 1975; Peteraf,
1993; Yuchtman & Seashore, 1967). This concept of a field in which organisations compete
for resources encompasses theories ranging from network analysis (Klijn, 2008), to resource
dependency (Oliver, 1991) and to social capital (Bourdieu, 1985) to name but a few
concepts and models that have been applied to the voluntary and statutory sector
environment. Another body of literature demonstrates the linkages between the state and
the voluntary sector (Carmel & Harlock, 2008; Lewis, 2005; Saidel, 1989), particularly in
terms of service delivery and procurement, and considers themes such as transaction cost
economics and bounded rationality (Carroll & Teece, 1999; Simon, 1997; Williamson, 1989
& 1981) as well as models of state delivery, such as New Public Management (Dunleavy &
Hood, 1994; Lane, 2000; Osborne, 2006). Further literature discusses the structure and
behaviour of the state (du Gay, 2000; Hall, 1993; Parsons, 1968; Weber, 1989), and its
ability to implement policy goals through engaging external delivery agents (Hodgson,
2004). These individual bodies of literature are able to effectively scrutinise different
elements of the process of funding distribution, looking closely at the individual steps in the
process, such as negotiation of policy, bureaucratic development of programmes, or
collaborative activities. Whilst it is necessary to look closely at these individual steps, the
-9-
scrutiny of individual processes prevents a coherent picture of the whole process being
formed. This study shows that these individual activities do not fit together in a tidy
sequence, rather they overlap and influence events later in the chain of activity.
There are few examples in the literature that have pulled together themes of power,
institution, network and structural embeddedness to explore the process of resource
distribution by governing organisations to achieve policy goals as a single, complete course
of activity (as illustrated in Figure 1.1). This gap in the literature highlights ~a lack of
understanding of how individual steps in a resourcedistribution processfit together and, as
a whole, create specific conditions in which only certain organisations are able to engage
with a programme. This study attempts to fill this gap by using a case study to illuminate
how this works in practice.
The processof resource distribution begins in policy determination at government or supra-
national organisational level, and progressesfrom there through to the task of designing
the funding structures. This activity includes setting criteria suchas organisational eligibility,
determining what requirements or terms and conditions will be attached to the funds,
project composition and project value. When the programme structures are fully agreed
within the governing entity, the processenters the implementation phase.At this point the
programmes are opened to application from the network and organisations must either,
depending upon programme criteria, compete or collaborate in order to secure funding.
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Figure 1.1 Funding Cascade
State/EU Commission determines policy aims and allocates a budget
"<..7
State or contracted agent designs the implementation programme
~7
Delivery agents design suitable projects for implementation. Where necessary,
delivery agents collaborate in order to design attractive or eligible projects
'S..Z .-
Delivery agents compete to gain funds from the implementation programme
"'7
Programme funding is awarded to successful organisations to deliver policy aims
The purpose of this thesis is to fully explore this flow of funding, and to use a case study to
demonstrate how institutional factors and the network context combine to determine the
final destination of funding originating from governing organisations.
In selecting a case to explore the research problem, consideration was given to the
contemporary and significant funding streams operating in the UK at the time of the
research period that had substantial impact in the policy or geographic area in which they
were situated. Considered to be of particular consequence were the European Social Funds
(ESF), of which Wales had been awarded well over £1 billion during the programming
period 2007-2013 alone, accounting for approximately 3% of GDP (or 0.55% of estimated
GDP annually for the 6 year funding period). From this fund a significant portion of funding
would be awarded to a range of voluntary and statutory sector organisations to reduce
social and economic disadvantage. Further consideration of this particular case and the
environment in which it was situated refined the research question and focused the study
to reflect on the additional influence of supra-national bodies upon funding instruments.
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1.1 The research question
Several questions were raised in the review of the literature, and these concerned themes
of power, networks, resource dependency, embeddedness and bureaucracy. The European
dimension added another layer of questions relating to institutional environments and
MLG, as ESFhas been shown to have more stringent requirements and an additional layer
of bureaucracy (Bachtler & Taylor, 2003; McCabe et at, 2010) compared to funding
programmes devised solely by national bodies. In order to encompass both institutional
and network contexts that dominated the literature concerning funding distribution, the
research question developed was:
'How do institutional factors and network context affect funding distribution and the
composition of partnerships? How can this be demonstrated using ESFin Wales as a
CaseStudy?'
This question assumed that no single theory would uncover the full process of the
development and distribution of the funding instruments and the consequent effects these
actions have in the field. From this question, four key research questions were developed
to provide structure to the study and to produce the information with which to answer the
main research question. These key research questions were:
1. How did institutions and power relations shape the structures of the Welsh ESF
programmes?
2. What kinds of relationships exist between governing entities and the network and
how do they operate?
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3. How do decision-making processesin networks influence how organisations are
selectedfor funding?
4. How does organisational dominance in the network shape the distribution of
funding?
Consideration of these questions shaped the literature review within the next chapter, and
formed the basic structure for the theoretical framework described in chapter three. They
also guided the analysis of the information collected. In addition to these questions, the
concluding chapter also reflects upon the relative importance of the influences deemed to
be acting upon the process. In asking these four questions, sufficient information was
gathered to answer the overarching researchquestion.
The contribution to knowledge that this thesis makes is the demonstration that the
distribution of funding from governing organisations is affected by both institutional factors
and the network context, and that there is no single theory evident in the literature to
explain how funding distribution truly operates. These institutional and network factors
frame the structures designed by a governing entity for distribution of the funds and this
thesis proposesthat the institutional influence creates conditions in which only a small pool
of structurally embedded organisations are genuinely able to compete to enter into
partnership projects to apply for and secure funds. The thesis demonstrates that these
factors shape the course of the funds from the time they are budgeted for a specific policy
aim, through to the interpretation and structuring of those goals by distributing
organisations, and finally to their implementation in the network. They do this by orienting
the focus of funding programmes towards increasing the governing organisations power
and legitimacy, and confining the scope of the programmes to reduce eligibility in the
voluntary sector. Further, the implications of this influence are that funds can be directed
- 13 -
towards a specific type of organisation that is better placed to compete for funds, and the
process will exclude others, regardless of their capability to achieve policy goals.
This thesis illuminates a significant gap in the application of existing theories to explain
complex, multi-step processes such as funding distribution, and demonstrates that a
layered, multi-theory approach is superior to the use of a single theory in understanding
these processes.
1.2 Why ask this question?
The subject of European funding in Wales has been considered by several authors. Royles
(2006), Entwistle et 01 (2007) and Bristow et 01 (2008) have been among those to consider
the multi-level and civil society aspects of the funds, whereas the Welsh Government and
the European Commission (EC) itself have carried out extensive monitoring and evaluation
of the end-level outcomes for service users which can be found in the Welsh Government's
own publications. There is, however, an apparent lack of other studies that have addressed
this process of funding design and distribution into the network as one whole activity.
Rather, studies have been broken down to look at distinct aspects of the process, such as
the design of the structures that channel the funds into certain organisations, the factors
that shape their relationships and the wider network, from both differing perspectives of
the institutions that design the programmes and the resulting effects on the network
members that are expected to deliver the desired outcomes. This process is of great
significance for both the recipients of services delivered and the organisations that gain
funding to deliver those services, as it can determine organisational survival and affect their
wider contribution to their local communities. This case study of the whole course of
funding provides a unique insight into how decisions taken several steps removed from the
network determine the successes and failures of organisations engaging in ESF funded
projects. In particular, this thesis directs a spotlight towards the way in which a model of
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MLGallowed relationships, processesand attitudes to institutionalise, and is critical of the
orientation the Welsh Government developed towards this institutionalising activity with
the Ee, at the expenseof developing accessibleand policy-effective funding instruments.
Themesof power and institution emerged strongly in this study, illuminating structures that
directed funding to organisations already in positions of relative power within the network.
These same structures served to exclude organisations not in positions of power or with
sufficient capacity or standardised processes to respond to the requirements of the
governing institutions.
The findings of this research demonstrate a clear lack of meaningful inclusivity of the
voluntary sector in the delivery of ESFfunded outcomes. Whilst inclusivity is not necessarily
fundamentally linked to success in achieving the outcomes desired, it is a key theme
running through the ESFprogramme requirements and through the Welsh Government's
rhetoric on engaging the voluntary sector (Bristow et al, 2008). As such, the lack of
evidence for meaningful inclusivity of the voluntary sector uncovered by this research
demonstrates a clear difference between the Welsh Government's commitment to being
inclusive of the sector, and its actions in engaging the sector in delivering ESFfunded
outcomes.
1.3 Thesis structure
The thesis begins by broadly reviewing and critically appraising the literature relevant to
this field of interest, and this review is primarily concerned with the development of
funding and policy instruments by governing bodies, and the activities involved in the
funding of service delivery organisations. This review covers themes of power, institution,
bureaucracy, competition, games and networks. An awareness of such,relevant themes
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provides a sound basisfor the research,and will highlight and explain areasof interest. This
review identifies and appraises historic and contemporary academic thought in these
themes. It examines a range of ideas, concepts and theories that have previously been
employed to uncover the varying successesof voluntary sector organisations in gaining
funding, and the influence of institutional and bureaucratic norms and values on those
funding processes.
Building on the literature review, the third chapter narrows the field of llteratare, and
focuses more closely on the relevant theoretical considerations that structured the
research and that were used to explain the caseunder the microscope. This chapter looks
at theories of the institution, of power and of the network, and creates a framework for
analysingthe evidence collected.
In order to gain a deeper contextual knowledge of the specific environment in which this
case study takes place, a consideration of Welsh institutions, politics and network
operations is provided in the fourth chapter. A working knowledge of the Welsh voluntary
and statutory sector environment is necessary in order to identify the main actors, to
understand the financial and political pressuresaffecting organisations, and to understand
the structures governing the bureaucracy at the heart of the network. This contextual
discussionwill provide an overview of the political and operational structures applicable to
Wales, from the ECto the Welsh Government and its relevant departments. It will also
highlight the financial pressures that may influence voluntary sector organisations and the
complex relationships between the voluntary and statutory sectors, and will provide
sufficient detail on the requirements of the ESFprogrammes in Wales to understand the
concernsof the participants involved in this study.
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The fifth chapter will detail the research methods used, and the practical aspects of this
study. This chapter provides a clear rationale for the use of the case study method to
explore the researchquestion chosen, and demonstrates why this choicewas the one most
suited to the question. This chapter also provides information on the research activities
involved in this case study, and will describe the information gathered, how this
information collection activity was conducted and the basis of the analytical process. An
ethical discussion is included within this chapter to reflect on any aspects of the casethat
may be sensitive or that could be identified as unfair or biased, and will examine the
researchersubjectivity to the casein question.
The analysis of this case study is split into two chapters. These are integrated visually in
diagrams at the beginning of each chapter, and theoretically through bridging themes such
as structural embeddedness, governance and strategic bridging. The first, chapter six, uses
the concepts of institution, power relations and bureaucracy and the theoretical structure
set out in the theory chapter to analyse the behaviours of the governing administrations
that shaped the development of the ESFinstruments. The second analysischapter, chapter
seven, focuses on the network environment in Wales and analyses how organisations
positioned themselves to elicit the greatest benefit from statutory sources. This chapter
also considers the concept of power within the network context and the analysis shows
how those organisations that were most central and structurally embedded benefitted
from the ESF funding programmes disproportionately to those organisations on the
periphery of the network.
The concluding chapter provides a summary of the study, details the limitations of this
study, and considers alternative and contrary views that could question the findings of this
research. The implications of the findings of the research are explored, with reference to
the Welsh Government's focus on both its perceived status in .Europe and on
- 17 -
institutionalising links with the Ee, and with regard to the way both the statutory and
voluntary sectors engage in policy delivery through funding programmes. Within this
chapter the potential for further researchthat would build upon the findings of this thesis is
also considered.Appendices, a glossaryand a bibliography are provided to the rear.
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CHAPTER TWO
The Complexity of the Funding Environment
This study will look closely at the processesinvolved in the development and distribution of
European Social Funds (ESF)in Wales, and as such, this chapter will explore a range of
literature relevant to the study of funding programme design. Mindful of the overwhelming
volume of literature that could be considered relevant to the study of a European funding
development and distribution process, the review is confined to the scope of the
overarching research question and the key sub-questions. This chapter aims to draw
together and make sense of the range of literature relevant to answering the research
questions, and uses the literature reviewed to highlight the key themes in understanding
funding programmes. Institutional and bureaucratic environments, voluntary and statutory
sector partnership working, governance and the network environment are of specific use
and interest to this study The funding process studied in this thesis can be considered as
both a bottom-up process, in which network factors affect organisational ability to engage,
and a top-down process, in which institutional and MLG factors define the programme
structures that dictate organisational eligibility. As such, the review will use literature that
will illuminate the processfrom both the institutional and network angles, drawing heavily
on the work of Klijn (2000, 2008) in the study of networks, of North (1993) and Fukuyama
(1999) in institutions, and Hoogheand Marks (2001), in MLG.
The chapter will begin with an overview of the environments within Wales in which this
study is located, namely the public and voluntary sector spheres, and the funding
instruments that affect them. Literature on the voluntary sector in the UK (Kendall &
Knapp, 1996; Kendall, 2003), and in Wales (Hodgson, 2004) situates the network
environment for the study (with more specific Welsh and European contextualisation in
Chapter 4). The chapter then reviews the literature on the network environment (e.g.,
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Ansell, 2000; Klijn, 2008), and the web of relationships and interdependency that
characterise it (e.g., Benson,1975; Glaskiewicz,1985;Oliver, 1997).
The discussion of the network context identifies the influence that policy and governing
bodies have with regard to funding entering the network, and therefore the chapter
progresses to look closely at the literature on governing organisations and their use of
funding instruments to achieve social outcomes. Many of the issuesexperienced in the field
and concerning partnership link back to the organisations from which the -fundlng
originates. This discussionalso touches in the notion of strategic bridging, which is distinct
from governance, and is a more intrusive interface between governing organisations and
network organisations.
Throughout the review of the literature, power emerges as a common thread running
through the research.Whilst this study does not seek to specifically investigate power itself
as a concepti, the study usespower to analyse interactions and demonstrate how systems
and institutions are structured. The literature on theories of power therefore frames the
information in questioning how funding is structured and distributed, how organisations
appear to be more successful than others, and how this affects the project partnerships
developed in line with these requirements.
The literature reviewed reinforces the belief set out in this thesis that both network and
institutional factors are relevant in shaping the funding distribution process, and in
particular the institutional factors that impact the network environment. Importantly, the
literature helps to refine the research questions in identifying key themes such as
legitimacy and structural embeddedness, and highlights the importance of institutional
factors that impact on the network environment. This chapter demonstrates that the
1That is, it is not the intention of this study to research themes or models of power
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network environment in general is extremely sensitive to the decisions taken within
governing organisations with regard to the development and implementation of funding
programmes, and this review focused research questions 1 and 2 towards understanding
the institutional pressures on the network. The literature reveals that the influence of the
institutions involved shapes the activities of organisations within the network, and that
certain organisations gain success in securing funds through the use of power and
relationships.
2.1 The Context of the Welsh Voluntary Sector
The voluntary sector hasbeen shown to be a key deliverer of servicesfor the state (Kendall,
2003) and the literature presented in this section shows that over the last 100 years, the
sector has become embedded as a partner into the formulation, management and delivery
of state policy goals. A large sum of ESFfunding was dispersed into the voluntary sector in
the 2000-2006 programmes in Wales, and an understanding of the sector is relevant to
understand what this funding means to it. The literature reveals both areasof weakness in
the Welsh voluntary sector, and the structural support put in place by the state to support
its role in policy development and delivery.
The voluntary sector, often referred to as the third sector or civil society (Alcock, 2009;
Royles, 2006), occupies the space between formal government and the individual's own
sphere, where groups of individuals are able to form independently and voluntarily
(Hodgson,2004). The contemporary view of the sector is one defined in normative terms
as a set of organisations that carry out the process of promoting and demonstrating the
morals and values that enable social cohesion (Etzioni, 1996).This sector has,since the is"
century, been used as a tool by the state to achieve ends it could not meet acting
independently. The relationships between state and voluntary sector have shifted over
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time (Lewis, 1999). Some areas of the voluntary sector have become more formalised
institutionalised extensions of the state, such as educational establishments, and some
have become informally institutionalised extensions of the state, such as clubs and
associationssponsored by government. Other voluntary sector organisations have asserted
a more independent role, such ascampaigning organisations (Kendall& Knapp,1996).
Lewis (1999) noted that the evolution of the voluntary sector as a separately defined
sphere of activity arose during the is" century, during which period it was seen as
desirable to minimise government and central bureaucracy. This was also a time when
prevailing religious beliefs encouraged the individual practice of voluntarily providing time
and resources to helping those in need. The belief in personal obligation to contribute to
voluntary charity activities as a core part of a democratic society persisted, and was re-
invigorated in the post-war periods, becoming more organised, more formalised, and
developing specific expertise. This evolution of the sector prompted a closer relationship
between the voluntary sector and the state, and between 1960-1990 the state gradually
took a more pluralist view on the procurement of services for the (welfare state', enlisting
multiple agenciesto deliver services. This integration of an organised and professionalised
voluntary sector into state service delivery then fed the shift in prevailing public opinion to
expect the state to provide increasingly complex servicesfor citizens (Lewis,1999).
There is, therefore, an established expectation by the public to receive a range of state-
funded services, often supplied through voluntary sector agents. This practice and
expectation of the voluntary sector as a state deliverer consolidates the importance of
researchquestion 2 in uncovering the links between state funding and servicedelivery, and
the organisational factors that mould the relationships between the two.
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The principles of New Public Management", represent a departure in public governance
over the last 25 years (Lane, 2000), impacted significantly on the voluntary sector. This
changegenerated growth in the voluntary sector and encouraged competition (Leat, 1995),
and government actively promoted the voluntary sector as a favourable alternative to
provision by the state (Kendall & Knapp, 1996). Sincethe mid-1990's, the voluntary sector
hasbeen increasingly incorporated into the policy and delivery activities of UKgovernment,
engaging in consultation, the design of interventions and practising a new and inclusive
approach to social policy (Alcock,2009), and this hasbeen against the backdrop of the New
Labour governments of 1997-2010. Tony Blair, former British Prime Minister,' stated that
government is limited in its social sphere, and that the 'Third Way' promoted by the New
Labourgovernment accommodated this limitation and the strengths of the voluntary sector
in bridging this gap (Blair & Schroeder, 1999).
New Labour moved away from the market-orientated language of the previous
Conservative government and adopted an approach that, on the surface, appeared more
inclusive, usingterms such as 'partnership' and 'collaboration' in reference to businesswith
the voluntary sector (Alcock, 2009; lewis, 1999). This new inclusiveness became part of
New Labour rhetoric, with policy discussionsmoving towards 'mixed economies of welfare'
and redefining the state (Giddens, 2000; Hodgson, 2004). There was a key difference
between the New Labour and the previous Conservativegovernment's approach to the use
of the voluntary sector in policy delivery. This centred around New Labour's increased
emphasis on partnership between the voluntary sector and the state. The Conservative
governments of Margaret Thatcher and John Major allowed for a competitive market
approach to engaging the voluntary sector, which was primarily contract based. The
government put out a tender, the market competed to deliver it, and there was little
2 The term 'New Pubic Management' (NPM) refers to the modernisation of government pollees
since the ;1980's to create a more effective public sector. This NPM in its early form looked to
market-based, competitive approached to service delivery that would reduce costs and increase
efficiency. Discussed in detail in section 2.8.3 .'
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consultation between the two organisations in the policy requirement or method of
delivery. The New Labour approach continued to utilise the private and voluntary sectors to
deliver its policies, but couched its relationship with the voluntary sector in terms of
partnership, with the state and civil society working together to facilitate policy outcomes
and to act ascontrolling influences upon eachother (Giddens, 1998; Hodgson,2004).
An important feature of the voluntary sector that increasesits appeal to government is the
level of public trust invested in it compared to the public sector (Hodgson, 2004). The
values associated with the voluntary sector are seen by the public as very different from
those of the state or market, and as such the statutory sector is able to utilise this to
further its own programmes (Hodgson, 2004). This has possibly, however, as argued by
Hodgson (2004), resulted in an idealisation of the voluntary sector and has increased the
burden upon voluntary sector organisations to be involved in policy making and service
delivery on behalf of the state. The New Labour administration recognised that the Third
Way had the potential to stifle the voluntary sector in this way, and that care needed to be
taken to avoid this occurrence (Blair & Schroeder, 1999). However, there is little evidence
that in practice the statutory sector has taken any measures to avoid 'policy overload'
(Paton, 2006 p75) or 'partnership fatigue' (Douglas,2009 p16) in the voluntary sector.
The voluntary sector in the UK has been shown to have become a key player in policy
development and delivery. Indeed, this status has been shown to be potentially
burdensome (Douglas, 2009; Paton, 2006). The UK sector as a whole, however, has
different charactertstics to the Welsh voluntary sector, and it is this environment which
needsfurther scrutiny.
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2.1.1 The Welsh voluntary sector
Wales certainly has an engaged voluntary sector (Bache & Bristow, 2003; Royles, 2006) that
delivers policy outcomes for the state. There is, however, very little evidence that the
sector has the maturity, expertise and independence to scrutinise and engage with the
state effectively. In the early days of the Assembly Day (2000) noted the perceived
weakness of civil society in Wales, compared to England and Scotland, and noted a lack of
distinctive 'Welsh' identity in much of Welsh civil society. later, Nicholl (2010) reflecting on
a decade of civil society growth, argued that civil society required further development and
strengthening in Wales, in particular if a 'yes' vote in the 2011 referendum was achieved 3.
Wales has often been grouped with England for research purposes (Day, 2006) and this has
led to a lack of data on the voluntary sector in Wales individually. This is due to the fact that
Wales and England have historically had a close legislative and regulatory union, and as
such, many Welsh organisations have grown up as regional branches of their English big
brothers rather than as independently constituted organisations. The process of devolution
from 1999 has however, begun a process of policy divergence for Wales (Rees & Chaney,
2011), and several authors have since carried out research into the voluntary and statutory
sector environment in Wales and how these sectors interact, e.g. Bache & Bristow (2003),
Entwistle et 01 (2007) and Royles (2006).
Concern has been raised at the comparative weakness of the Welsh voluntary sector to the
English and Scottish sectors (Day, 2006) and this concern suggests that this weakness
prevented civil society engagement in the devolution process. Indeed, the very perceived
3
In March 2011 a referendum was held in Wales on the law-making powers of the National
Assembly for Wales (NAfW). The question was Do you want the Assembly now to be able to make
laws on all matters in the 20 subject areas it has powers for? 63.5% of people voted yes in the
referendym. The Assembly can now make laws for Wales on subjects for which the Assembly and
the Welsh Assembly Government are already responsible, without needing permlsslon from the UK
Parliament first.
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lack of a vibrant and experienced voluntary sector has been argued to have provided ripe
opportunity for the young Welsh Government to 'manufacture' civil society and therefore
to exert significant control over the sector through mandate and state sponsored social
actors (Hodgson, 2004). Hodgson described manufactured civil society as groups or
partnerships of organisations formed and funded, at least initially, through state initiative
and statutory sources (Hodgson, 2004).
Kendall (2003) argued that the voluntary sector requires support from the state to exist and
continue to be relevant and useful to the state, and that such support is structured through
vertical policy intervention for specific policy items and horizontal interventions, which
provide support for the sector as a whole (Reid & Mordaunt, 2009). Some of these support
structures can be seen in the relationship the Welsh Government has with the voluntary
sector. The 1998 Government of Wales Act contained a statutory obligation for the Welsh
Government to promote the interests of voluntary organisations across all its functions.
These commitments are set out in the Voluntary Sector Scheme which was first introduced
in 1999 and later enshrined in the Government of Wales Act 2006. Alcock (2009) argued
that this work by the Welsh Government to mandate its support of the voluntary sector still
does not provide the same quality of support for the sector as in England or Scotland, and
he has suggested that as a result, the voluntary sector in Wales is more dependent upon
statutory grant funds than similar organisations in England. There is therefore an
assumption within this research that some voluntary sector organisations have developed a
certain level of dependency upon the established system of grant funding from the Welsh
Government as described by Alcock (2009) and Royles (2006). This has an institutional
implication, as this suggests a deep commitment by government to its established systems,
and also suggests that dependency may have facilitated and accommodated both
relationships and links b~tween government and individual organisations.
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This brief examination of voluntary sector literature has revealed the evolution of the
voluntary sector asstate deliverer, and that this relationship has become lessdetached and
business-like and more of a partnership with the state since New labour took office in
1997. In Wales, support for the sector is mandated. Stronger ties have developed between
the state and the voluntary sector, and have perhaps in certain areas increased the state's
dependence upon the voluntary sector to deliver for it. Similarly, some voluntary sector
organisations have developed a dependence upon state funds, which has created a level of
interdependency between these statutory and voluntary organisations. Whilst there is a
paucity of data on the Welsh voluntary sector (with the exception of small amounts of data
collected by the Wales Council for Voluntary Action), the literature has suggested that
Welsh voluntary sector organisations have developed a dependence upon Welsh state
funding. Conceptually, this is important in understanding where power lies within this
interdependence. The state may be dependent upon the sector as a whole, however the
plurality of the sector affords it power over individual organisational fate. Should one
provider become difficult or unappealing to work with, another in the network would surely
rise to take its place.
2.2 Organisational Networks
The processes affecting the eventual dispersion of funds to the statutory and voluntary
sector through state-governed structures is the focus of this study, and assuch, the context
of the network in which organisations operate are linked and attempt to gain funding from
governing institutions provides essential understanding of how funding decisions are
made. This provides contextual support in refining and answering research questions 2, 3
and 4 through highlighting relational and organisational barriers to engagingwith funding
programmes.
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The study of networks evolved from separate disciplines, mainly economics, political
science, social sciences and public administration and the much older inter-organisational
tradition. However, from these different origins there has been a level of convergence that
has brought these strands together (Klijn, 2008). Networks were recognised to span these
academic disciplines, and in practice, organisations and individuals in these networks were
seen to have cross-cutting roles which encompassed policy, political and administrative
activities.
Despite this convergence, different network traditions distinguish between different types
of networks, with some authors favouring the method of breaking networks down into
smaller and more defined sub-networks, such as policy or service delivery networks
described by Klijn (2008), while others take a broader view of networks that encompass a
range of activities and priorities (Ansell, 2000). The approach taken will often depend on
the scale and level at which the research is conducted, with very specific, thematic studies
focusing on smaller sub-networks, and studies encompassing multiple environments or
levels using a broader view that accounts for horizontal and well as vertical linkages.
The recognition of how networks operate in society, in particular in the interactions
between the state, voluntary and private sectors, is key to understanding the
interdependence of organisations that work to achieve complex and cross-cutting social
goals (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). The multiple and overlapping boundaries of the public
domain are set out in Figure 2.1 below. Although Drache is addressing the concept of global
governance, this is scalable to the national and sub-national levels and provides an
overview of the relationships explored in this study.
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Figure 2.1 The overlapping and multiple boundaries of the public domain
Social Capital-
networks of trust
and reciprocity
Public services - health,
education, social welfare
and human security
Public goods -
public
need/market
failure
Public space, places,
debate and meeting
places
Public culture - signs,
language, gesture and
accents
Interconnected but
separate worlds of the
market, civic society, family
and counterpublics
Source: Drache (1999)
Actors attempting to address so-called 'wicked issues' that cut across several policy areas
are generally dependent upon the resources of other organisations to achieve their goals,
and this results in clusters of interactions between organisations around specific policy
issues (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). Over time, these relationships become institutionalised,
rules and values" governing behaviour emerge, and the level of trust organisations have
with one another increases (Fukuyama, 1999), which leads to further diversification of
collaborative activities (Biermann, 2008). This is because organisations that have a history
of successful collaboration and that have trust are more likely to choose to work together
again, rather than seek out other potential partners with whom they have no history or
established level of trust (Teisman & Klijn, 2002; Sherlock et at, 2004).
Networks, therefore, generally create a structured environment in which interactions
occur. This environment can have a certain fluidity and can accommodate competitive
4 Rules refer to the structures and requirements of interaction and social relation in the given
environment. Values consist of a core set of principles deemed to be desirable by others within the
same sphere of activity, and will be derived from membership of it. .
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action, but it can also be subject to institutionalisation. The network is a field of play, and
within this field, further themes such as resource dependency, competition and
collaboration are relevant to understanding and answering the research questions.
2.3 Competing for Resources
Within discussions that include an element of competitive funding, the themes of resource
and resource dependency emerge in a range of literature (Benson, 1975; Galaskiewicz,
1985; Oliver, 1997; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1974). This has echoes of the power-dependence
relations proposed by Emerson in 1962. This concept is relevant to voluntary sector
organisations, in particular those that source the majority of their funding from the state, as
it demonstrates how these organisations can come to be focused on state policy goals and
management and delivery of programmes.
Resource dependency theory first attracted interest in the 1970's and 80's, and it seeks to
explain organisational and inter-organisational behaviour with regard to critical resources
which any organisation must have in order to survive and function. This theory shows that
an organisation will orient itself towards the source(s) of the resources it requires, and will
become dependent on those organisations that control those resources. Their orientation
towards the source of their funding is perpetuated by repetition of receipts from that one
source, and this results in institutionalised relationships between the two organisations, as
actions are repeated and assigned ceremonial and financial value.
The dependence organisations develop on the source of their resources constrains and
controls organisational behaviour, as the necessity for resource overrides other
considerations (Alexander, 2000). At the public sector level, this could manifest in a
governing body or its department becoming focused in a particular area of policy
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development and delivery, as resources they acquire from external sources, such as
Europe, have overarching policy goals attached to them. In order to acquire the large
resource, policy is therefore focused in the area directed by the funding. Similarly, at a
voluntary sector network level, organisations oriented towards state policy delivery may
choose to avoid diversifying into areas which would not attract funding from the state.
Others may choose to respond positively to policy consultation, even where they have
negative feelings about it, for fear of biting the hand that feeds.
The dependence organisations have upon the origin of their funding is argued to drive their
inter-organisational behaviour in times of resource scarcity, as organisations compete with
each other for available resources. The literature suggests that any organisation will
attempt to preserve organisational autonomy (Galaskiewicz, 1985), and as such will use a
variety of strategies to manage their constraints and dependencies and to compete for
available resources.
Whilst 'resource' in this section has referred mainly to funding, for which organisations
compete, expertise can also be presented as a resource. This particular resource relies
much more on interdependence between organisations, as expertise occurs outside
organisational boundaries and is dispersed within a network (Quintas, 2002). As such,
games must be played with regard to the acquisition of not only financial, but other vital
resources.
Critics of solely resource-based approaches argue that it is at this point of strategizing and
inter-organisational relations that the theory falls down (Oliver, 1997). Decisions taken by
organisations in developing their strategies are often not based solely on acquisition of
resource, but are influenced by a strong network and social dimension. The development of
trust or the historic institutionalisation of relationships between organisatlons discussed in
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the previous section is not fully taken into account by the resource dependency model, and
further scrutiny of the variables involved in organisational strategies within the network is
required to understand how those develop.
Resourcedependency illustrates clearly how organisations become dependent upon single
sources of funding, such as the state, and become oriented towards those funders. It
remains, however, to determine how competition evolves into cooperation and how
activity then becomes institutionalised.
2.4 A game-theoretic approach
As the previous section has shown, resource limits will prompt the occurrence of
competition between organisations to acquire the resourcesavailable (Benson, 1975). This
section will show that competition in a network is not so much a series of one-off
competitions, but more a web of linked interactions. Where competition occurs, each
organisation is likely to strategize in order to maximise their chance of success (Benson,
1975; Oliveri 1997). As such, a consideration here of the literature on 'games' and game
theory describes the motivations and actions of organisations studied for this research in
competing for ESFfunds.
Game theory asks how rational but self-interested individuals can come to mutually
beneficial arrangements for a community asa whole whilst they are at the same time being
tempted to abandon cooperation in the hope of achieving greater individual benefits
(Davis, 1997; Myerson, 1991; Fukuyama, 1999). The classic problem in game theory, the
Prisoner's Dilemma, demonstrates the strategy available to individuals, and the perceived
benefits tempting individuals away from cooperative outcomes that would be mutually
beneficial (Rapoport & Chammah, 1965).Table 2.1 illustrates the classicgame,
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Table 2.2 The Prisoners Dilemma
Prisoner A
Prisoner B
Co-operate Defect
Co-operate Both rewarded for mutual Prisoner A goes free
co-operation Prisoner B is punished
Defect Prisoner A is punished Both punished for mutual
Prisoner B goes free defection
Whilst in a one-off game the 'Nash equilibrium' (named after the Nobel prize-winner John
NashS) suggests that individuals will take the self-interested option based on others choices
in order to receive the greatest reward, Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) demonstrated that
repeated simulated games resulted in increasing trust between individuals, stability in
interactions and gradual acceptance of cooperative strategies as the best course of action.
Within a network environment in which organisations are interdependent, competition for
resources will emerge if resource scarcity occurs (Benson, 1975). Competition will
therefore, prompt the occurrence of games within the network, however recurrence of
games has been shown by Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) to increase cooperation, and this
may increase the likelihood of partnership and collaboration between organisations bidding
for funding.
The concept of 'games' has emerged in a range of the network based literature (Allison,
1971; Kenis & Schneider, 1991; Klijn, 2008; Klijn & Teisman, 1997; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004;
Lynn, 1982; van Bueren et al, 2003) and these authors propose that within any network
there will be individual and simultaneous games in play in which different actors are
competing for resources. This has some echoes of the resource dependency literature that
gained popularity in the 1970's and argued that all interactions between organisations were
based upon the fluid possession of the scarce resources of power and funding (Aldrich,
1979; Cook, 1977; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Van de Ven & Walker, 1984). However, game
theory discussions that built on this early work within the network literature recognise
5
The Nash equilibrium occurs when, in a game of two or more players, no individuals player is able
to achieve a more positive result by unilaterally changing their strategy
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interdependence as a far more significant base for interaction, and these take into account
a wider range of factors than resource alone (Thorelli, 1986).
Game theory sets out outcomes of interactions in a game setting, rather than addressing
the underlying assumptions that drive organisational strategy in a multi-game environment
on an uneven playing field, such as the network environment in Wales. As such, this
literature should be supplemented with considerations of extra-game factors to understand
how funding is distributed within a network environment.
2.5 Managing the Network
In order for the state to have a collaborative relationship with the voluntary sector, and for
multiple games to be operating within the network, the state would be acting in an
authoritative role (Benson, 1975). In this role, the literature reveals how the state can
mould activity, and this is relevant to understanding in this study how the state had the
authority and freedom to manoeuvre and decide which organisations would gain funding.
Depending upon the manner in which the network is categorised, it has the potential to be
large and unwieldy, and may not have defined boundaries or members. As such, several
authors have proposed that many networks are to some extent managed by a network
manager (Agranoff & MacGuire, 2003; Kickert & Koppenjan, 1997; Koppenjan & Klijn,
2004). Klijn & Koppenjan (2000) proposed that network management is a process of
mediating and co-ordinating inter-organisational policy making. Mandell (2001) concurred,
adding that it is also an integral part of the manager's role to select appropriate actors,
develop ways to cope with inter-organisational and operational complexity and minimise
obstacles to cooperation. Koppenjan & Klijn (2004) have suggested that a network manager
is not necessarily recruited, nor tasked with managing the network, and that there could be
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any number of network managersoperating simultaneously around different issuesor from
different locations within the network. Rather, these individuals are responsible for
facilitating and stimulating interaction as actors performing duties for their employer,
bringing organisations together to achieve the goals that their organisation has tasked
them with achieving. Meyer (1972) observed this processof network management within
large organisations, occurring where decentralisation processes caused an increase in
interdependence between differing sections of the organisation and identified that this
prompted a need for a coordinating function.·
Similar tendencies were noted by Huxham and Vangen (2005) for the potential for
collaborations or partnerships of organisations drawn from a network to be led by the
structures or processesdesigned by external agenciesor government. This imposition of
external structures on a partnership removes significant power from the members and
places it in the handsof the administrative or regulatory body in which civil servants will be
operating to different organisational valuesand priorities (Huxham& Vangen,2005).
Within this study, the distribution activities of governing organisations could haveextended
to network manager activities to shape projects to which funding is directed, and this
would have involved a level of management or mediation within the network. This activity
of network management at the institutional level has been referred to as governance (de
Bruijn & ten Heuvelhof, 1997) and this provides for the institutional influence to exert itself
beyond its defined organisational boundaries, drawing network organisations into the
centre and furtherinstitutionalising relationships and ties. Fukuyama (1999) argued that
this kind of hierarchical and organised structure imposed upon the network is actually very
necessary in order to ensure institutionalisation, where the network actors develop
appropriate norms and values that will benefit the network, rather than de-stabilise it. This
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is an interesting juxtaposition between Huxham & Vangen's (2005) arguments and
Fukuyama's (1999).
A more participative method of network management is that of strategic bridging or central
brokering, in which dispersed organisations require an organisation to bridge the gaps
between them in order to collaborate for the purposes of achieving goals that individual
organisations cannot achieve acting alone (Brown, 1983; Gray, 1989; lawrence & Hardy,
1999; North, 1993; Waddell & Brown, 1997~ Westley & Vredenburg, 1991). The strategic
bridge behaves in a similar fashion to the network manager, however is more directed at
specific outcomes, becomes more involved in developing the framework for action, and
recognises the distance between organisations as a barrier to successful engagement of the
right organisations for the job.
This contrasts with network management, in which the literature suggests the aim of the
network manager is to achieve policy aims in the most efficient and economic manner,
which can be to the exclusion of peripheral organisations or organisations that do not have
any historical links with the network manager. With regard to the focus of this thesis, which
is understanding funding distribution by governing organisations, the support of a strategic
bridging organisation rather than the efficiency of a network manager would enable the
organisation to wield significantly more influence over the final destination of the funds, as
this body would ultimately act as a gatekeeper.
2.6 Partnership as concept and practice
It has been written that 'partnership' is one of the most over-used terms in the regional
policy making field, and that it is in danger of moving into the realms of banality (Morgan &
Mungham, 2000). All organisations require resources in order to operate. Such resources
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can occasionally be acquired from private individuals, however in the case of the voluntary
sector, much of the resources needed are drawn from other organisations (Perucci & Lewis,
1989) in particular, statutory organisations. Partnership is, however, a complex endeavour,
and this section explores a number of issues raised by this activity.
Partnership working has been a pragmatic and expedient method of inclusivity and co-
operation, used by the statutory sector both within sectors, and cross-sectorally. It can
deliver outcomes with greater efficiency arid effectiveness than singular solutions; and
enables more significant integration and coherence of service delivery (Mackintosh, 1992;
Huxham & Vangen, 2005). It provides links which increase the contacts and information
sharing channels between organisations, strengthens networks through increasing contact,
co-operation and trust, and suggests it can achieve outcomes greater than those achievable
by the sum of its parts. Partnership adds additional social benefit above that which is
achieved by organisations acting independently (Mackintosh, 1992). Partnerships can
provide valuable financial and operational stability for third sector organisations, and open
up access to statutory departments and to the benefits of access, such as gaining tips on
how to secure larger grants, 'hearing useful information on the grapevine' and inclusion in
email distribution lists. This is a process of institutionalisation, from developing informal
links between organisations, to establishing new rules and values that govern the working
environment and structure further interactions.
Under the New Labour government in 1997, partnership working and collaboration was
further supported as the future of relations with the voluntary sector (Chaney, 2002). As
well as the interdependence recognised between organisations as a cause for partnership,
organisation theorists posit that collaboration is a logical and necessary response to
turbulent conditions (Emery & Trist, 1965; Astley & Fombrun, 1983). Under turbulent
conditions such as resource scarcity or policy change, organisations become highly
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interdependent with others in unexpected but consequential ways (Emery & Trist, 1965;
Wildavsky, 1983). In the face of turbulence the ability of any single organisation to
accurately plan for its future is limited by the unpredictable consequencesof actions taken
by seemingly unrelated organisations, and therefore aligning and collaborating with other
organisations mitigates the risksthat are heightened by uncertainty.
Whilst it has been shown that Wales had possibly one of the strongest commitments to
partnership working in the UK,especially with the voluntary sector as a result of the Third
Sector Scheme and the 'three-thirds' partnership principle on committee membership
(Bristow et 01,2008), there have been mentions in the literature of this being more paper
than practice based. Morgan & Mungham (2000) noted that in the early years of the
Assembly (around the year 1999) its commitment to partnership in the context of European
funding may have been wanting, and was accused of 'raj-style' management by local
statutory agencies. These early preoccupations with partnership and the further
commitments made by the National Assembly for Wales (NAfW) towards solidifying
partnership arrangements in the first five years of the NAfW's existence would inevltablv
filter through to its principles of programme development such as the development of the
ESF2007-2013 programmes.
Based on information presented in the annual reports and accounts of larger voluntary
sector organisations in Wales, the majority of these organisations have working
relationships with statutory bodies, and have staff members named in cross sector
partnerships. A typical example of this is the Sure Start programme studied by Hodgson
(2004), which brings together a wide range of voluntary and statutory organisations to
address cross-cutting social issues. Hodgson's paper shows how funding programmes are
driven by the statutory machine, and that representation of the voluntary sector's interests
in these programmes is the responsibility of the sector itself. Many organisatlcns will have
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differences in their capacity to represent their or their sectors interests, and so umbrella
organisations often come into play in these situations. They are, however, not above
scrutiny in their representations, and not without complaints concerning their ability to
fully represent the breadth of interests held by the voluntary sector (Chaney, 2002).
In Wales, the umbrella body is the Wales Council for Voluntary Action (WCVA). Chaney
(2002) commented on previous issues relating to the representation of the voluntary sector
by the WCVA to the Welsh Government:
'Doubt centred on the role of the sector's representative body the WCVA. Fears
were expressed about its ability ta successfully stand for the diverse views of all
the country's voluntary organizations. Such reservations are still being voiced.'
(2002, p12)
This is in contrast with Cook (2004) who claims:
'The danger with this [voluntary sector compact] is that the voluntary sector,
and its voice the Welsh Council for Voluntary Action is seen as civil society and
other sections excluded'. (2004, p9)
There is, therefore, concern that the representative body for the voluntary sector is not
able to represent the full range of interests held. Neither is there complete confidence that
the government or NAfW seeks to consult beyond the remit of the WCVA, and this presents
the issue of lack of real engagement of organisations outside of the accepted and usual
norm.
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Entwistle (2006) looked closely at the distinctiveness of the Welsh partnership agenda, and
commented on the increasing volume of partnerships and collaborative programmes that
have been established in Wales. He noted that private and third sector organisations are
engaged by the statutory sector by virtue of their political stakeholder status, rather than
with an interest in their involvement in service delivery.
This subtlety in the statutory sector's attitude to engagement can be lost when individuals
try to penetrate the sheer volume and remit of the many partnerships in existence irfWales
in order to understand how appointments to committees or partnerships occur. It is
frequently a frustration for third sector organisations attempting to address their concerns
about policy or service delivery issues to the correct forum, when the membership and
ownership of partnerships is seemingly unknown or closed. Indeed, at local authority level,
Entwistle states that local authorities themselves 'are struggling to get a handle on the
number and complexity of the partnerships operating in their patch' and that 'there are
high levels of confusion about [the partnership's] form and function, a situation not helped
by the tendency of partnership advocates to oversell their virtues' (Entwistle, 2006 p228).
Similar to the Welsh context, the EU funding environment in Ireland prompted some
researchers to consider the partnership structures associated with ESFfunding, however
even here, the literature is patchy and investigation focuses largely on issues within ready-
formed partnerships rather than at the processes involved in determining which
organisations would be part of those partnerships. One of the few authors to take note of
the process of voluntary/statutory partnership formation in the context of ESFfunding was
Shortall (2004) who identified the operational difficulty in delivering partnership projects
where the frameworks have been created in isolation from the very issues they are meant
to address. Shortall noted that these partnerships were of dubious democratic legitimacy,
and that the top-down approach taken by the state actors controlling the funds dictated
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partnership make-up. Shortall's research is of significance to this study, as her findings
clearly identify the power and influence of the state as drivers for partnership composition
and directors of funding distribution.
Another aspect of partnership working that should be considered is that of the cost of
partnership to member organisations. Partnerships generally rely on their member
organisations to employ people to work on the project, to spend, and to be accountable for
public money (Entwistle, 2006). There is therefore, an implied cost to becoming a' member
of a partnership. Casey (2004) touched on the organisational considerations of participation
in collaboration, and highlights the importance of third sector organisations having the
capacity to participate fully with the statutory sector. Costs to membership organisations
for participating in partnerships are often unseen, and frequently not eligible to be claimed
as part of the management cost of any project. When considering the time spent
researching relevant partnerships, having preliminary meetings, reading papers and
drafting responses, plans or position statements, some organisations may be sacrificing a
significant percentage of a single employee's time to be members. This inevitably leaves the
third sector organisation at a financial and operational loss, even though other future
resources may be secured as a result.
This consideration of the hidden costs of partnership leads into the sphere of transaction
cost economics, in which all exchanges are judged by the full cost of making the transaction
happen (Coase, 1937; Fukuyama, 1999; Williamson, 1985). North (1993) suggested that the
formation of institutions has a basis in the costliness of information processing, but that the
very development of institutions to structure exchanges of information results in market
imperfection as a result of divergence in institutional development. As such, the very
rational basis for institutionalising systems to achieve efficiency may ultimately lead at a
later date to costliness in interacting with similarly institutionalised external systems.
- 41 -
Coase (1937) argued that hierarchies exist because transaction costs prohibit a model in
which a large market of small organisations contract for each component. Large, vertically
integrated hierarchies remove the costs associated with procurement (Fukuyama, 1999) as
they have broader scope, and can take advantage of economies of scale. Therefore, large
organisations that are able to deliver whole services have an advantage over organisations
that would need to enlist significant numbers of partners to achieve the same result. This
means that larger voluntary sector 'organlsations already experienced in ··conducting
transactions with the state would have two advantages over organisations that did not
have a relationship with the state. Firstly, they would possess the expertise to understand
the procedures involved in conducting business with the state, and secondly, they would be
large enough to absorb economies of scale in doing so, something that smaller
organisations would lack. This leads to lower transaction costs through learning, and
amassing information and expertise.
The literature indicates that a divide may exist in a network between those who have
resources/access to partnership opportunities, and those who don't. In other words, there
are 'insiders' and 'outsiders'. With regard to the focus of this thesis, this suggests that
research questions 2, 3 and 4 require an understanding of this imbalance to be answered
fully and uncover why decision-making, dominance and relationships cause this.
2.7 Insiders and Outsiders
There is a volume of work that cites having the right partners as integral to the success of
any partnership or collaborative (Brinkerhoff, 2003; Huxham, 1996; Huxham & Vangen,
2000). The eventual success of partnerships in the statutory and voluntary sectors could,
therefore, be argued to be rooted in the partnership formation activity and initial
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facilitation of partners. This partnership building processmay exhibit elements of structural
embeddedness in the choice of partners, as it has been shown that organisations often
choose to work with other organisations that are known to them or their partners
(Fukuyama,1999).
This calls into question the 'fairness' of the project partnership process,as it increasesthe
likelihood that the sameorganisations will work together over and over again and provides
more evidence for the basis of institutionalisation of relationships. The 'haves' remain
together to the exclusion of the 'have-nets', regardless of ultimate suitability for the
position. EvenShortall (2004), appears resigned to the questionability in the membership
process, who in the conclusion of the research stated, 'There are groups that are rarely
represented, and an exercise of power is evident in the very construction of the
partnership' Shortall (2004, pl17).
This disparity between organisations that are able or unable to engage in policy-making
processeshas been has been broken down into two groups by Grant (2004) in a study of
the 'Insiders' and the 'Outsiders' in policy development networks. Grant describes the
characteristicsof the Insidersas:
'First, they were recognised by the government as legitimate spokespersons for
particular causes or interests. To gain this, they needed to deploy certain
political skills. In particular, they needed to talk the language of the
government and civil servants in particular, the latter involving understatement
and comments made in deep code. Second, having gained recognition, they
were allowed to engage in a dialogue on issues of concern to them. For
example, they would normally be included in formal consultation process, but
more informal consultations were often more slgnif~cant. Third they implicitly
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agree to abide by certain rules of the game. Failure could ultimately lead to
political exclusion'. (Grant, 2004 p408)
This profile of an 'insider' could be applied to any number of visible individuals in the
network, however this profile does not go far enough in unpicking the process of becoming
an 'insider'. Furthermore, the discussion of the 'outsider' category in Grant's paper fails to
show definitive characteristics, with those groups being described as either outsiders by
necessity (wanting to be insiders but lacking the expertise or access) or outsiders by choice
(refusing to be drawn into the government's political game), and he does not touch on the
structures or institutions that can perpetuate the status of organisations as insiders. This
identification of outsiders by choice or necessity does make the important distinction,
however, that there are groups that want to engage with the statutory sector and are
excluded from doing so, and Grant notes that issues such as education and access to
resources will inevitably mean that some Outsiders are unable to make the transition to
Insider.
This discussion mirrors that by Fukuyama (1999, p201) in his references to the 'old-boy and
patronage networks' that are somewhat invisible and overlay the more obvious but less
powerful visible networks. Fukuyama recognises that the old-boy networks are frequently
based on family, social class, friendship, and these patronage networks are problematic
within organisations and networks, as 'their structure is not clear to those outside of them,
and they often subvert formal authority relationships' (1999, p201).
Grant's (2004) study is limited to looking at formal and information consultation processes,
however it does bear on this research in terms of highlighting the gulf between the image
of transparent and all-inclusive access to government that is often presented by the
statutory sector, and the reality of meaningful engagement with statutory bodies remaining
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with the privileged few. He noted that some groups, largely traditional Insiders, will be
treated more seriously than others (Grant, 2004 p412) and whilst the paper goes on to
explain this is in order to relieve pressure on smaller voluntary sector organisations to
engage in policy processes, it serves to exclude the very organisations that have first-hand
operational experience of issues, favouring the priorities of umbrella bodies and large
multi-service organisations.
This concept of insiders and outsiders is echoed by Alcock (2009), who voicedconcerns that
the current method of inclusion of the voluntary sector actually only includes a proportion
of organisations to the exclusion of others that lack the resources or the connections to
receive the same opportunities. There is, therefore, a clear indication that political
knowledge and 'access' are important in gaining access and a platform from which to
influence the course of funding and success in receiving it.
In light of the literature discussing relevant elements of partnership selection, an activity
which directly influences the final destination of funds which is the focus of this study, it is
important to note that in some cases, organisations are simply not aware of every player in
the field of operation. Studies by Galaskiewicz (1985), Boje & Whetten (1981) and Van de
Ven & Ferry (1980) have all shown that not all organisations know about all of their
prospective partners. In these instances, organisations have chosen only to interact with
those organisations of whom they are aware, and will avoid searching out new partners.
The organisations known to the state through repeated delivery of policy outputs become
institutionalised in those delivery processes. This demonstrates a principle of structural
embedded ness which will be discussed further in chapter 3. Whilst the state's default use
of the same agencies over and over again would demonstrate a failure to act in accordance
with its own commitments to working with the voluntary sector, it may be that the Welsh
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Government, faced with a decision concerning organisations to fund, chose those
organisations it had the strongest existing ties with.
Consideration of the state and its bureaucratic organisations, is, therefore, necessary to
understand the interactions that exist between it and the network. Conceptual
considerations such as bureaucratic organisation and themes of structure and legitimacy
are vital in refining and addressing research questions 1, 2 and 3, and in answering the
overarching researchquestion.
2.8 The State of Bureaucracy
Programme development and funding is carried out by governing entities such as the state
and public sector bodies, and these organisations determine policy and structure
programmes to target areas of interest. Governing entitles, in particular state and
governing organisations, are often large bureaucracies, as shown in studies by the
traditional, early authors on bureaucracy, Max Weber and Talcott Parsons,aswell asmore
contemporary authors such as du Gay (2000). Given the state's role in the development of
the ESFprogrammes in Wales, a review of the literature surrounding bureaucracy was
necessaryto bring into focus the importance of norms and values in shaping the course of
programme development. Bureaucracy also emerges as a consideration in issues of
management and accountability, and these will also be shown to influence the processesof
policy implementation.
Weber claimed in the is" century that the modern state was 'absolutely dependent upon a
bureaucratic basis' (Gerth & Wright-Mills, 1948 p211) and that rational, hierarchical
authority in the form of bureaucracy is a demonstration of modernity. Bureaucraciesare
debatably the most technically superior method of organising (du Gay,2000; Parsons,1968;
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Gerth & Wright-Mills, 1948) and this is attested to by the use of this system globally,
although not universally, to achieve state goals. Weber (Gerth & Wright-Mills, 1948) noted
that the characteristics of a bureaucracy include the principle of fixed areas of jurisdiction
structured by rules, the structured distribution of authority to give commands that are
required for the performance of duties and the methodical provision of suitable conditions
in which to execute official functions. Parsons (1968) elaborated on this, noting that
bureaucracy involves an organisation devoted to an impersonal end, and is based on
division of labour which involves 'specialisation and where individual officers observe clear
cut distinctions between their professional and personal life. Above all, Parsons notes,
bureaucracy involves dlsclpllne. Weber's and Parson's views of bureaucracy are strictly
hierarchical and characterised by the performance of administrative tasks. Programme
development in bureaucracies would therefore be subject to the same reverence for
hierarchy and process. However, critics of Weber's bureaucracy argue that it is a response
to Marx's views, and that Weber saw bureaucracy more as a system of domination, rather
than asan ideal system for organisation (e.g.Weiss, 1983)
Weber (Gerth & Wright-Mills, 1948) noted that bureaucracy is a structure that is extremely
difficult to destroy once established, and Fukuyama (1999) recognised that inefficient or
counterproductive norms can persist in suchsystemsbecauseof the influence of transition,
socialisation and culture within organisations. Indeed, Fukuyamanoted that 'traditions are
critical to understanding norms becausepeople frequently act on the basisof habit rather
than anything resembling rational choice" (1999, p219) and within this study, the
persistence of bureaucratic norms and values will be key in understanding the influences
shaping the distribution of funding.
6 Rational choice theory states that an individual will act in a manner suggesting they are balancing
costs and benefits to deduce the best strategy for achieving the biggest gain (Friedman, 1953)
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Weber (Gerth & Wright-Mills, 1948) also noted that bureaucracy is essentially a power
instrument, the perpetuation of which is in the interests of the civil servants and other
related stakeholders whose power it reinforces. Contemporary bureaucracy in the more
fragmented state of the twenty-first century is perhaps even harder to destroy, with the
distance between politicians and many individual quasi-independent bureaucracies
increasing (Pollitt, 2005). Bauman however, recognised the relative fluidity of 'the game of
life' (Bauman, 1994 p12) and the fact that neither jobs nor organisations are likely to be
eternal any more, in contrast to jobs markets of the 60's and 70's when many individuals
could expect to work for one organisation for the whole of their careers. He noted that
there has been a processof fragmentation in governing organisations that is changing the
once singular and centralised state machine that Weber studied.
Du Gay (2000) also recognised the changes in the structure of state bureaucracy and the
shift in delivery of services, noting the emergence of a government-induced, quasi-market
that exists outside of the state structure but that is very exposed to any changes in
government policy or decision-making. This quasi-market is composed of the voluntary
sector and a private sector catering exclusively for the state, and makes up the network in
which ESFfunds are dispersed. Basedon du Gay'sassertions then, this quasi-market would
be very vulnerable to any changes to established mechanismsof distributing funding into
the market which would in turn, impact the organisationswithin the network.
Bureaucracieshave been likened to machines (Gerth & Wright-Mills, 1948) in which each
individual agent is a cog that has very little influence over the overall operation of the
mechanism.This maywell be true of the influence each cog hasover the organisation it sits
within, however these individual agents do exert great power over the fates of external
individual and organisations, and it is at this interface between bureaucracy and the
external network that friction can occur. In particular, hierarchy, ~hich will normally occur
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within bureaucracy, can causesignificant friction internally and externally. Critics of Weber
and Parsons' bureaucratic models suggest that the scant attention paid to the horizontal
dimension excludes examination of the genuine working of a bureaucracy, and is a source
of frustration both within and external to the organisation (Landsberger, 1961).
Landsberger's research, as well as Dalton's study (1959), highlights the importance at a
practical level of internal communication between hierarchical silos.
Often, the very characteristics that embody a 'good' bureaucracy,such as hierarchy, are the
characteristics that frustrate the external individual (du Gay, 2000) and the interface
between bureaucracy and the network is one of the areas in which organisational norms
and values have a significant influence over which organisations engage with funding
programmes. Another issue arises when individuals have ambitions outside of their
assigned position in the bureaucracy. Rudolph and Rudolph (1979) rejected Weber's
assertion on a bureaucracy being able to completely control its participants, and argued
that individuals and small groups within bureaucracies whose personal goals are not
aligned with the organisation can cause significant disruption. This brings into focus the
question of how participants of a bureaucracy reconcile their personal and professional
views.
Much has been made of the ethical or moral dimension to the operation of bureaucracies,
from Weber writing in the 19th century to Harmon (1974), Bauman (1994), and du Gay
(2000), with the debate centring over the ability of bureaucrats to perform their tasks with
a rational organisational focus that potentially defies their pre-developed moral processes
being argued from both sides. Bauman(1994) referred to this as procedural rationality, and
exhibited a negative view of this requirement for complete procedural conformity by
individual bureaucrats, which is in keeping with Bauman's generally dim view of
bureaucracy. Du Gay (2000) was more favourable,interpreting organisational morality in a
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more forgiving manner, and argued that this procedural rationality could be reconciled with
individual morals under the overall banner of public service, although this argument does of
course assume the focus of the service being performed is indeed compatible with the
individual's conception of the public good.
Meyer (1972) noted that procedural, or as he terms it, functional, rationality can be
performed in the pursuit of irrational ends, and this echoes Mannheim (1941) who claimed
that functional rationality deprives individuals of thought and responslbllitv, so that they
exist in a place where responsibility for their actions lies with those that decide the
direction of their tasks. In researching a process in which the organisation governing the
funding programmes wished to appear 'fair and transparent' in its choice of delivery agents,
some consideration of how individual civil servants assessed project criteria in line with
their personal view of what was 'right' and what was bureaucratically 'right' should be
carried out. However this issue of organisational morality is not necessarily a question that
needs to be explored in depth for the purposes of this research. It should suffice to note
that individual bureaucrats are exposed to conflicting rationalisations of their duties on
occasion, and with their personal and professional moral codes in conflict, there is scope for
decisions to be taken that influence programme implementation and funding distribution
to depart from completely rational structures.
Such rational structures do however, govern much of the processes carried out within the
public sector, and the development of those structures certainly influenced the way in
which the state purchased services. Within this case study this provides the potential for
incremental, rational decision-making becoming oriented towards bureaucratic, rather than
policy, goals. Thus, addressing research questions 1 and 2.
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2.8.1 The influence of New Public Management
Over the past 20 years British institutions have implemented what scholars have termed
'New Public Management' (NPM) which gained ideological purchase in the 1980's (Hood,
1995). New Public Management relates to the increased emphasis placed on public sector
accountability for results, and to the move away from uniform service delivery across the
country to more competitive and cross-cutting approach to social services. It was initially
implemented through the notion of reinvented government, which sai; the procurement of
digital technology as solutions to the problems of the public sector. Hood (1995) argued
that in the 1980's politicians were recognised as being policy makers, rather than service
delivery managers, and so the move away from direct state service delivery was
implemented to remove ministerial responsibility for these items and place responsibility
with the organisations that were now contracted to deliver them. This is reiterated by Budd
(2007) who stated that one of the major principles of NPM is the separation of state
functions of procurer and provider of services. This division separates the state from the
expertise in delivering services, and with regard to funding or commissioning outcomes,
this separation could arguably lead to dysfunction in programme design and programme
delivery.
Barzelay (2001) suggested that increasing disillusionment with government amongst the
public was one of the key factors in the move to NPM. Pollitt (2004) argued that this move
to New Public Management was a mainly Anglo-Saxon phenomenon that was championed
by Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher for the purposes of slimming down government.
However, Hood (1995) disagreed with this, citing common shifts in a number of OECD
countries towards greater accountability and shrinking state service delivery.
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Key features of the NPM that impact upon the development and implementation of funding
programmes are shown in table 2.3.
Table 2.3 Features of NPM
NPM Feature Example
The break-up of the centralised public sector Establishment of Commissioners for specific
into subject specific and quasi-independent areas such as Data Protection
organisations which could focus
activity/blame
The increase in procurement, which was NHS National Programme for IT
viewed as key in stimulating competition
and driving down prices
A shift in management practice to more Redesign of employee monitoring and
private sector style policies that were appraisal schemes
proven to address performance
A general need to cut costs where possible Competitive tendering and outsourcing of
and reduce waste services to the public sector such as IT,
Maintenance, Human Resources
Formalised measures of performance and Improvements in business planning and
success and a focus on outputs monitoring of outcomes
General moves towards improving the The introduction of the Freedom of
legitimacy of government Information Act 2000
The production of transparent budgets and The active publication online of budgets and
accounts accounts
List compiled from: Aucoin et 01 (1995); Barzelay (2001); Budd (2007); Hood (1995); Pollitt
(2004)
These principles of NPM have been cited to suggest that states implementing NPM are
moving towards a more post-bureaucratic system. This model favours a more horizontal
structure, a citizen-centred and individualistic approach to service delivery, and views
further decentralisation as key to increasing quality in services (Kernaghan, 2000). Indeed,
the NPM drive towards procurement of services, and the inevitable network dimension to
the competitive environment this creates, prompts questions over whether this facilitates
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the development of what has been termed post-bureaucracy (Budd, 2007; Klijn &
Koppenjan, 2000).
Kernaghan (2000) described post-bureaucracy as rooted in accountability and inclusivity,
with partnership being a central value and method of achieving goals. However, tools for
accountability conflict with the principles of post-bureaucracy' (Budd, 2007) as they
constrict the ability of organisations to act in a truly decentralised fashion. One can
question whether the post-bureaucratic state exists as an inclusive and individualised
model, or indeed if it is something of a mirage, exerting a subtle form of hierarchical control
that is in fact simply bureaucracy at work, this time under the banner of 'governance'.
Fukuyama counselled against the post-bureaucratic horizontal and decentralised model,
citing 'the craze for decentralisation, organisational flattening and networks that swept
through American management circles in the 1990's' as a 'naive reinvention of the wheel'
(Fukuyama, 1999 p22S). He also pointed out that it is the general nature of human beings
to gravitate towards hierarchical systems, given the benefits to the individuals that are able
to situate themselves at the top of such organisations (Fukuyama, 1999). This has echoes of
the work of Meyer (1972) who observed that wherever within an organisation
decentralisation took place, policies, procedures and other mechanisms of control needed
to be developed and implemented to ensure fairness and standards were maintained. Once
established, these rules and mechanisms became recognised as authoritative, providing
authority to those enforcing them, and became bureaucratic norms that constrained the
very process they were implemented to facilitate, namely decentralisation.
7 Post-bureaucracy refers to conscious organisational reduction in traditional bureaucratic norms.
Key principles include "the reduction of formal levels of hierarchy, an emphasis on flexibility, rather
than rule-following and the creation of a more permeable boundary between the inside and outside
of organizations - as denoted by the increased use of sub-contracting, temporary working and
consultants rather than permanent and/or in-house expertise" (Grey & Garsten, 2001, p230)
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2.8.2 The challenges 0/ accountability
A key concept across both NPM and post-bureaucracy is that of accountability. Government
accountability for its actions, its expenditure and its processes is key, not only in achieving
good performance, but, also in maintaining legitimacy (Bovens, 2005). To be accountable is
'to have to answer for one's actions or inaction' (Oakerson, 1989 pl14) and to be
responsible for the resulting consequences.
The existence of accountability measures within the state administration demonstrates that
decision-makers are not completely autonomous (Held & Koenig-Archibugi, 2005). Within
this study, accountability emerges in structuring the programmes and awarding the funds,
and in the behaviours of public sector organisations creating and leading the project
partnerships. In these instances, because accountability and transparency are noted to
confer legitimacy, governing bodies are expected to behave in a manner compatible with
this. Therefore, there the state would be expected to act fairly and transparently, and make
the funding programmes accessible to those organisations that wished to engage with
them. It is, however, noted in the literature that network or historic working relations
increase trust and cooperation between organisations, and this has the potential to muddy
processes that have been promoted as fair and transparent (Irwin, 2006). Fukuyama (1999)
possibly summarised the conflict between the state and organisations within the network
possessing trusting relationships best, noting:
'An Informal norm that has evolved through the repeated interaction of
individuals within a community will necessarily lack transparency, particularly
when viewed by outsiders ... The lack of transparency of informal norms often
serves to disguise their origins in involuntary power relationships'. (1999, p218)
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This suggeststhat however fair or accountable the processesdesigned and implemented by
governing bodies are promoted to be, the departments that create and lead projects may
possibly expose themselves to accusations of unfairness if they chose to collaborate with
trusted organisations.
This literature demonstrates the ability of bureaucratic procedures to creep into state
structures, even where those structures were designed to reduce bureaucracy in the first
place. Bureaucracy is also clearly linked to institutional ising systems, which in turn impacts
upon transaction costs in determining the competitiveness of a given organisation and its
product. Basedon the literature examined in this section, it is clear bureaucracy cannot be
reduced in one organisation or one process, so long as those processes are dependent
upon, funded by or regulated by, other organisations. Bureaucracy is also resistant to
change, and where one system is altered, bureaucracy soon characterises its replacement.
Bureaucracy clearly endures whether programmes are decentralised or not, or whether
responsibility is displaced or not, and this is very relevant to this study in analysing the
bureaucratic motivations behind the changes made to the 2007-2012 programmes.
Bureaucratic motivation may be incompatible with policy goals, and therefore, would
distort the distribution of funding which could in turn affect those organisations ultimately
able to securefunds.
2.9 Funding Programmes as an Instrument of State Policy
Authors have noted that organisations, and those involved in economic policy-making in
particular, demonstrate surprising continuity, even in the face of political change
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008; North, 1990b, Heclo and Wildavsky, 1961). Some firmly
established practices within governing bodies include the policy that gained popularity
during the 1980's of procuring services and outcomes from external agencies (Seidenstat,
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1999) as per New Public Management. This section looks further at how funding is
dispersed by governing entities into the network in order to achieve state-developed policy
goals, as this reveals the nature of influence the state has over network activities.
Rhodes (1994) noted that in many developed countries, the state has followed a process of
increasingly procuring services from external organisations rather than delivering services
itself. He coined the term 'the hollowing-out of the state' to refer to the process of
increasing procurement, and argued that this meant that the state was being stripped of its
skills and knowledge, and that only the higher tiers of policy and procurement remained
intact. This prompted other writers to examine the phenomenon, and whilst some have
concurred with Rhodes (Holliday, 2002; Jessop, 2004) there are others who argue that it is
instead, a 'filling-in' of the state that is occurring (Jones et 01 2005; Taylor, 2000). In this
'filling-in' process, the state extends its reach and influence beyond the boundaries of its
own hierarchy and is able to exert its will subtly over a great number of organisations that
become increasingly dependent upon it for the continuation of their funding. The funding
stream at the centre of this particular case study is the European Social Fund, which in
Wales, is administered by the Welsh Government. This, therefore, is a tool that the state
may use to further exert its influence through the 'filling-in' theory.
Funding programmes, such as the European Social Fund, which are governed by a supra-
national organisation and negotiated by nation states, are inevitably influenced by political
and administrative concerns outside of the focus of the funding itself. The use of European
structural funds has historically been very different between regions. Some regions have
been held up as excellent examples of how these funds have been used to create and
support economic development, Ireland being a good example, whilst others have
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appeared to struggle, such as Campanla" (Morgan & Mungharn, 2000). Funds such as the
ESFhowever, have had key priorities for organisations to address, and these are common
across member states and influence the activity of the voluntary sector, directing ESFand
its match funding towards the ECand member state goals.
Funding has often been used as a tool of the state by which to influence the activities of
external agencies and to direct them toward favoured policy goals. Benson (1975) referred
to this as an 'authoritative strategy', where a powerful organisation, such as the state,
which is the main or significant funder to organisations in the network, would periodically
alter the rules of the game in order to refocus the activities of the network to achieve its
own policy goals (Benson, 1975). One such influence caused by funding requirements and
noted by Geddes (2000) is the EU funding requirement for partnerships to achieve social
outcomes. The requirement to deliver outcomes as a partnership rather than as an
individual organisation has a number of implications not only for the organisations bidding
to receive funds, but for the state as well. Partnerships are higher risk and have a number
of variables affecting their success (Huxham & Vangen, 2005), and so all organisations
involved are required to think seriously about participation in a programme with such a
requirement.
The majority of voluntary organisations are primarily oriented towards their own survival
(Meyer & Zucker, 1989; Morrill and Mckee, 1993; Powell, 1991) and they will therefore,
orient themselves towards the most reliable sources of funding to ensure that survival. This
will potentially exacerbate the insider-outsider problem, as individual organisations pursue
the best course of action for themselves to the exclusion of others. Guo (2007) identified
the public sector as a significant, if not the most significant, of the donors to the voluntary
sector, suggesting that voluntary sector organisations could not operate without the
8 Campania has been shown to have experienced difficulties due to weaknesses in its Operational
Programme for ESFduring Objective 1 programming periods (Polverari, 2011)
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support of the state. This reliance on state funding programmes hasserious implications for
voluntary sector organisations, as it places them in a position where they are no longer
solely holding the state to account on behalf of the public, as initially proposed by de
Tocqueville in 1835 (Bevan & Kramnick, 2003). When funded by the state, these
organisations are acting as its agents and have an interest in conforming to its wishes in
order to continue receiving funding from it.
.,
It is possible that the state draws into itself through the 'filling-in' theory, those
organisations that would bring expertise and policy ideas under its influence, and at the
same time, these organisations would refrain from biting the hand that feeds them.
Funding can, therefore, be used as a state tool to increase influence over voluntary
organisations' actions. Organisationsorienting themselves towards the state asa significant
funder could develop and institutionalise links with the state over time asa result. This can
be most obviously manifested in staff links concerning administrative matters of the
funding and achievement of targets, however this dose alignment with the state also
emerges in other areas.
Guo (2007) has noted that the desire to influence policy and secure government funding
has led to reduced diversity in the management boards of voluntary sector organisations,
as these organisations offer trustee positions increasingly to individuals they believe will
help them acquire funds rather than to individuals that represent the communities the
organisation exists to serve. Guo (2007) also argued that the greater a voluntary
organisation's dependence upon government funding, the less direct power its board
would have over the organisation, as the power to determine goals and activities is
governed by the funding programmes designed by the state. This demonstrates a principal-
agent problem in transaction cost economics. If a number of organisations underwent this
process of alignment with the state, this would lead to a lack of diversity within the
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network and uniformity of services is the opposite of the pluralistic and competitive quasi-
market that constitutes a vibrant voluntary and statutory network.
The literature reviewed here demonstrates the power that state funding holds over
organisations. How then, can this apply to funding received from Europe? Surely it is
possible that European influences could further affect the course of funding, and therefore,
would emerge as key in answering the research questions.
2.10 The European Union and Multi-Level Governance
This section considers the issues associated with the multi-level dimension to the
distribution of ESFfunds, through three tiers of government - European Union (EU), the UK
and Wales, and further down to an organisation acting as project leader. Primarily, the
literature demonstrates how the devolution settlement in Wales, coupled with the UK's
membership of the EU, has allowed links between Wales and the EU that bypass the UK
government, to be developed and reinforced.
The increase in supra-national governing entities in the last 50 years has occurred due to
the need for nation states to communicate with each other, and to facilitate economic
exchange and growth (Hurrell, 2005) such as the development of the Free Trade Areas and
the growth of global trade and Foreign Direct Investment,. There was also a need for nation
states to do this with relative ease within a mandated supra-national structure (Gruber,
2000) as opposed to managing complex interactions with other states on an individual
basis. The scope and depth of policy making and the influence of the EU has increased
significantly during this period (Hooghe & Marks, 2001). The adoption of EU treaties has
implications for the context of ESF,as these treaties affect the power-relations of countries
and regions, and their principles and aims become embedded in the requirements attached
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to ESF programmes. The Maastricht Treaty (1993) provided the European Council with
powers of veto over certain types of legislation, the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) extended
areas of co-decision to the majority of EU policy decision areas, and the Treaty of Lisbon
(2009) increased further the powers of the EUParliament, and reduced the power of states
to veto certain policies",
There are two main conflicting models of EU-nation state interaction and operation which
.-
can be applied to explain how decisions taken in Europe filter down to national and
regional policy making and delivery. Authors such as Hall (1993) argue for a state-centric
model which places the state in the main position of power, retaining its sovereignty and
actively choosing to devolve limited authority to a supra-national power (the EU) to achieve
specific policy goals. Other authors (Marks and Hooghe, 2004; Bache, 1998; Gualini, 2004)
argue for an MLG model, in which decision-making abilities are shared by a range of actors
at different levels, supra-national, national and regional, and taken across different
governing entities. The MLG models do not discount the importance of the state, but
propose that policy decisions may be made without its direct authority, and acknowledges
the power and influence of other actors in the policy making field that may subtract from
the nation state's influence.
Conventionally two types of MLG are distinguished:
1. Akin to federalism, this consists of limited and non-overlapping jurisdictions
within a restricted number of territorial levels. The focus is on specific
governmental purposes rather than a set of policies or issues;
9 The principles of the Lisbon treaty are now clearly visible in the Europe 2020 Strategy
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2. Is a more complex and fluid type that consists of a larger number of
overlapping and flexible jurisdictions. The focus is much more on specific
policy sectors and issues....... Like most governance structures there is a
tendency to instability as the policy environment alters, but it is designed
to seek optimal decision-making (Hooghe and Marks, 2004).
The state-centric model has at its core a proposition that there is a clear separation
between domestic and international politics, rejecting the interconnectedness of political
arenas. The MLG models oppose this assertion, and place greater power with the supra and
sub-national actors. These conflicting views on the EU-nation state relationships may well
differ between nation states and the times at which these models were conceived.
Certain states are often considered very state-centric, the UK during the 1980's and early
1990's could be considered a good example of a very centralised nation state with a euro-
sceptic attitude. However, the UK has experienced significant regional development over
the last 15 years, moving from a centralised government to a regionalised and devolved
model, and this environment now reflects the MLG model in which sub-national actors
wield significant power and influence within the EU independently of their nation state
representatives and vice versa. However, this development has been restricted to Wales,
Scotland Northern Ireland and London [partially].
2.10.1 Future-proofing policy
The influence of the EU at the implementation level of policy can be seen most clearly in
the EU's cohesion poliCY, which comprises approximately one-third of the EU's budget and
which is spent through regional development programmes such as the European Social
Fund. These funding programmes involve regional and local government actors at every
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stage of the policy process, including the definition of priorities, the choice of programmes,
the allocation of funds and monitoring and adjustment of programmes (Hooghe & Marks,
2001). Hooghe and Marks also acknowledge the process of institutionalisation or
embedding of the relationships between regional actors as a result of this regional
involvement in the development funds, stating:
'Partnership is implemented unevenly across the EU, but just about everywhere
"
it institutionalises some form of direct contact between the Commission and
subnational governments. Such links break open the mould of the state, so that
multi-level governance encompasses actors beneath, as well as above, central
states.' Hooghe & Marks (2001 p2S)
It is perhaps a strange idea to think that nation states would shift decision making power
and responsibility away from themselves onto the shoulders of supra-national agencies
such as the EU, or downwards to devolved governments, however Moravcsik (2000) and
Gruber (2000) illustrated why a nation state would choose to decentralise certain aspects
of decision-making in order to reinforce central state power through increasing legitimacy.
Some governments wish to protect the policies they have put in place against parties that
may hold office after them that may wish to dismantle these programmes, and an effective
way of protecting those policies is to negotiate terms and then hand over authority for their
implementation to another authority (Moravcsik, 2000). Moravcsik (1994) proposed that
the enthusiasm demonstrated by some governmental actors to displace responsibility for
certain policies is a key driver of European integration. Once powers are formally handed
over to institutions such as the EU, it could be considered to be legally and politically much
more difficult to repatriate them.
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It appears in some of the literature (Gruber, 2000; Moravcsik, 1991) that states agree to
supra-national cooperation only when those individuals in power at the time of decision-
making are convinced that the co-operation will advance their underlying political and
policy-making goals. This surrender of power over a particular policy area effectively
'future-proofs' the policy. Other governments simply wish to displace responsibility onto
other governing entities because they do not want to suffer negative political fallout or
make unpopular decisions concerning policies or funding decisions (Alexander, 2000;
Townsend,1994).
2.10.2 Wales in Europe
In Wales, devolution followed similar processesto those that took place in Scotland and
Northern Ireland, and the devolution settlement in Wales allowed the then Labour
government to displace responsibility for Welsh affairs in general whilst retaining a share of
power over the Welsh environment centrally in Whitehall (Newman, 2001). This
fragmentation of power between Wales and the UK arguably opened the door for
significantly greater Welsh involvement in the development and implementation of the
European Structural Funds, and as proposed by Hooghe and Marks (2001) earlier in this
section, began a process of institutional ising direct relationships between Wales and the
EC,bypassingthe UKgovernment and increasing the power of the Welsh institutions.
Creating and perpetuating direct links to the ECthrough the receipt and implementation of
structural programmes is possibly one of the easiest routes for sub-national actors to
engage in European affairs. As a result of the 1988 reform of the structural funds,
partnership between the EC and regional authorities was strengthened and further
institutionalised, and this was a powerful tool used by the ECto break free of the static and
confined relationships it had up to that point experienced with nation states concerning the
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delivery of cohesion programmes and engagement with regional actors (Ansell et at, 1997;
Bache et 0/, 1996; Hooghe & Marks, 2001).
The evolution of cohesion policy in Europe fits the MLG model, and indeed the ECitself has
used this language to describe its activities, which alludes to a more equal partnership
between the EC, nation states and regional governments in policy development and
implementation. While the equality of this partnership concept is questionable, it would be
difficult to dispute the EU's influence over the changes in governance in Wales that have
brought the Welsh institutions closer to the EU. Cohesion policy varies spatially, and within
policy areas further variations occur (Boldrin et al, 2001). Cohesion policy is funded at the
European level, and it is also at this level that overarching policy aims are attached to the
funds. Recently, it has been acknowledged in the s" EESCCohesion Report that thematic
territorial co-operation and social innovation has suffered from the change in European
Funding, and this has affected outcomes in the regions. There is, however, significant
variation in the process of developing the detailed funding programmes at national or sub-
national level.
Hooghe and Marks (2001) suggested that negotiation of cohesion funds can be broken
down into three distinct phases of policy making activity shown in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4 Policy Making Process
1. Bargaining Member states actively negotiate the amount of funding they can
secure from the EC.
2. Creating an This process explains any pre-programming changes to the structural
institutional funds regulations and requires recipient governments to consider how
environment the funds will be used. Regional governments must submit their
programme plans.
3. Developing The structural programming phase which takes place at national or sub-
structural national level depending upon the recipient authority. It is at this point
programmes the core institutionalising process in EU-sub-nation relationships
occurs. This requires direct negotiation between administrators of the
funds and the ECin creating the final programmes
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The embedding of partnership principles into the structural fund development framework
meant that multilevel governance has been strengthened through upgrading the
connections that sub-national actors have to the EU.The 1988 reform of structural funds
ensured that, when responsibility for the funds was transferred to the Welsh devolved
government, it was able to take a full and active role in engaging with the ECas a direct
result of the partnership principles enshrined in the 1988 reforms. All three phases of
policy making activity listed in Table 2.4 are conducted with the direct involvement of
.,
Welsh Government and National Assembly for Wales officials. Through this repeated
involvement, direct relationships between Wales and the ECare likely to have become
more routine, and this perhaps marginalises to a certain extent the UK government's
influence over the use of ESFfunds in Wales. This has not always been to the favour of
national governments, and works by both Ansell et 01 (1997) and McAleavey (1993) detail
casesin which the sub-national actors have used this new found influence to enlist the ECs
help in resisting the will of national actors.
This literature on MlG and devolution has shown how the links between the Welsh
Government and the EChave been developed and strengthened through the devolution
settlement and the partnership principle for developing the structural fund programmes.As
a result of this, the Welsh Government is exposed to EC influence, and this influence
arguably impacted upon the way the final ESFprogrammes were structured. MlG is an
overarching concept that frames this thesis, and which impacts upon the more detailed
conceptual systemsthat emerge at the national and local levels. Type II MlG has particular
relevance to this thesis due to its overlapping jurisdictions and accommodation of differing
policy areas. This concept provides structure to the operation of different layers of
governance, and identifies the mid-layer, in this instance the Welsh governing bodies, as
subordinate to higher layers,suchasthe UKand EUgoverning bodies.
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At this point, given the breadth of discussion already conducted in this chapter involving
aspects of hierarchy, governance and strategy, it is necessary to examine the theme of
power asan overarching concept within this study.
2.11 Power's essential instruments
The concept of power runs through all of the topics covered in this literature review, in
--
particular the relationship between the two types of MLG,and this section provides a brief
overview of scholarly thought on the subject that relates to this study. Selected literature
on power is further explored and used to provide a theoretical basis for this research in
chapter three.
Vital to this study was an awarenessof power relationships between organisations and the
state, that were operating within an inter-organisational policy and delivery network in
Wales. This particular statutory environment was bound by legislation to engagewith the
voluntary sector (Government of Wales Act 2006 s74(1)), and this relationship between
state and public is integral to the legitimacy of the modern constitutional state (Clegg,
1989).
The study of power as a concept stretches back into history, framing it in terms of causes,
interests, capacities or abilities. With the exception of the early Greek and Roman
philosophers, Machiavelli (1532) and Hobbes (1839) are likely to be the most cited of the
very early thinkers on power, breaking from the traditions of their time in approaching
power empirically as a concept to be analysed, rather than approaching it from a religious
standpoint (Clegg,1989). These two differed in their assessmentof power. Hobbes took a
causalapproach to power where 'power and causeare the same thing' (Hobbes, 1839) and
all is bound into the institution of sovereignty. Machiavelli (1532) took a strategy-based
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approach to power within a wide arena. This could also be seen as a primary or historical
incarnation of the relational or 'pressure vs. resistance' approaches to power discussed
later in this chapter. It could be argued that the majority of modern thought on power
could trace at least some of its influence backto these individuals (Clegg,1989).
Despite the wealth of studies on power, e.g. Clegg(1989), Haugaard (2002), Lukes(2005),
Russell& Brittan (2004), Scott (2001), there is only the most basic and general consensus
on a definition. Dahl proposed a formal definition in his 1957 paper, setting out an intuitive
idea of how actors had power over others within defined parameters. However Dahl's
example of the individual and policeman commanding traffic to drive on a particular side of
the road illustrates how some definitions of power can be too broad, or indeed, too
prescriptive to suit complex social systems.This is becauseDahl's power model was direct
and overt, and could not accommodate the implied power or the overarching structural
power that some organisations or individuals were thought to wield.
Lukes (1974) expanded upon Dahl's thoughts, taking a hegemonic approach to power in
which authority is implied and the powerful agent rules without direct force. Instead, the
agent rules through controlling the social, political and professional structures to
perpetuate their own dominance and prevent upward mobility of others that could alter
the status quo. Lukescriticised Dahl's model as too simplistic, and inappropriate to explain
environments in which overt power is not used, but where power the shape the
environment to one's own advantage is employed. He argued that power is an exerciseof
control in which one can compel others to desire what one wants them to desire, and so
secure their compliance with ones wishes through this almost subconscious control. The
implication of Lukes' argument for this study is that the development of the ESFfunding
distribution structures was fundamentally predisposed to preferences that could not
meaningfully be uncovered and examined, and that individuals involved in the process
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assumed that the programmes they developed were genuine, original, and uninfluenced
pieces of work.
Moving from the concept of overarching hegemonic forms of power, the concept of power
as a constant balance between opposing forces of pressure and resistance is common in the
literature (Clegg, 1989; Russell & Brittan, 2004; Scott, 2001). The pressure points at which
organisations may be excluded or directed to a certain action could potentially occur at the
interface between bureaucracy and service delivery, or the incompatibility of values
between organisations. Norms and values of the public sector are unlikely to be the same
as those within the voluntary sector, and in a system where one is a significant funder of
the other, a certain level of tension between ideologies will likely exist. The state is likely to
attach conditions on delivery and organisational behaviour to any funding package, and
voluntary organisations may then push back to a certain extent where the funding
conditions constrain their ability to do the job as they wish.
Clegg (1989) asserted that any generally applicable theory of power would be inextricably
linked with a theory of organisation. This would encompass internally focused
organisational strategies of obedience and influence, where power would be used to obtain
obedience and punishment would act as a deterrent to disobedience. It would also
encompass external considerations of organisations existing within a larger field. Within
this theory, Clegg himself used the term 'agency' as a distinct concept identifying action and
actor, encompassing individual or collective, and argues that effective agency cannot be
achieved without good organisation. This has echoes of Ball (1978) and to a certain extent,
of Hobbes work (1839), in terms of separating organisation from agency, where the agent
has sufficient influence over another to cause them to act, and could be acting as, on behalf
of, or independently of, an organisation. Meyer (1972) noted that authority is the sense of
legitimisation of a particular actor to issue commands or obligations that are binding onto
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other actors in a situation. Given the network environment part of this study is situated in,
and the multiple relationships between individuals and organisations, the differences in
authority held between the individual and the organisation is an important aspect to
consider. In some instances, it may be the individual that possessessufficient power to
make things happen, in others, the individual may be incidental, and in this instance it is the
organisational brand that holds sway. The question of agency would therefore require
consideration alongsidethe possessionof power in organisations.
The governing bureaucracy's role in the subject of this study required a consideration of the
power features of the organisational entities involved. State bodies are often agreed to
have de facto political power, which is defined as power that is not allocated through
democratic means, but is possessed by groups that have an accumulation of wealth,
military forces or by those that possess a unique ability to organise collective action
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008). This would logically include those individuals in positions of
power within state bureaucracies. It has been argued that whilst democratically held
political power can be fluid and can change hands dependent upon election outcomes, as
long as those with de facto political power remain the same, there will be very little
structural change (Acemoglu & Robinson,2008). Acemoglu and Robinson(2008) even go as
far as to argue that elite influence over economic and policy making institutions is
reinforced by the very democratic political systems that are structured to widen access.
Hurrell (2005) suggested something similar, in that such hegemonic power allows
institutions to persist, and allows certain actors to gain power over others in order to retain
their co-operation and the legitimacy they afford to the supra-national forum. Hurrell
(2005) also suggested that much current research on power and practice in the supra-
national institutions is fairly Hobbesian, placing emphasis on the importance of power
whilst assuming a degree of rationality and co-operation. This has clear parallels with the
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earlier discussionon bureaucracy in this chapter in the use of authority to perpetuate and
consolidate power through norms and values.
This section has highlighted the historic thought on power and its relevance to the
bureaucracies and organisations within this study. The introduction of the individual
element into this discussion prompts a need to review the literature on power held by
individual actors, both in their capacity as representatives of organisations, but also in their
personal activities. It is this discussionto which we now turn.
2.12 Power and the Elite
The practice of political and policy-making organisations influencing the wider network has
in recent years, solidified into the notion of governance (Provan & Kenis, 2007). The
difference between government and governance lies in the lesser formality and rigidity of
the latter term, with government confined to structures and process, and governance
conducted beyond the state's traditional boundaries and in partnership with external
actors. Barnett & Duvall (2005) claimed that power and governance are inextricably linked,
primarily becausegovernance requires the involvement of rules, structures and institutions
that frame social life, and that the ability to structure social behaviour is therefore a
demonstration of power. This hasechoesof Fukuyama(1999), who argued that hierarchy is
inevitably layered over any horizontal organisation or network environment in order to
focus the norms and values of those in the network. At the top of hierarchies, an elite
group can be seen to be operating. The literature (Clegg, 1989; Etzioni-Halevv, 2003;
Perrucci & Potter, 1989) shows this elite as highly influential in decision-making, both in
bureaucracy and within the network.
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The concept of an elite that exists and exercises power is covered in a wide range of
literature, from very specific 'power elite' theory by Wright-Mills (1956), to more vague
perceptions such as Hunter (1953) described later in this section. This elite could arguably
be considered to be in the same position as the sovereign already discussed in the previous
section, however much of the literature appears to consider the elite as rather more
organised and purposeful than power associated with state or sovereignty. The Italian elite
advocate Mosca (1939) believed strongly that planning and organisation was necessary to
achieve social order, and that it was the role of the elite to carry out this function. These
elite groups form from a wider political community (Clegg, 1989) and take on roles of
organising and implementing, whether in positions of state or sovereignty, or privately in
business or non-profit. Wright-Mills (1956) noted that this power elite are composed of
men whose posltions enable them to transcend the ordinary environments of ordinary men
and women, and that their positions allow them to make far-reaching decisions.
Hunter's (1953) work on the community power elite is of particular interest to this
research, as this was a well-known study ratslng valid questions not significantly different to
this study, but perhaps in a rather primary fashion. Hunter's study relied on the reputations
of individuals and the perceptions of respondents to identify individuals that wield power
within a community. The 'reputational' approach to power taken by Hunter has significant
flaws already flagged in the literature (Clegg, 1989; Dahl, 1961), and the assumptions made
by his study prompt further consideration. Hunter's study assumed that there was indeed a
visible 'elite', and that there was a community in which it operated, however it was unclear
whether the community, and those who operated within the community were one and the
same, and there was no guarantee that all individuals would be known to each other
sufficiently to identity them and qualify their influence. The issue of individual perception
was also an inescapable flaw, as perception is fluid and may change dependent upon the
individual occupying the posltlon being interviewed. A particular problematic assumption
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was that individuals were the agents of power. This assumption disregarded factors suchas
the status of the employer, position within organisation or position within the community.
How, then, can consideration of power at the individual or positional level be reconciled
with power at the institutional level?
Grant's (2004) discussion of Insiders could be linked with elite theory, and indeed, this
model has been considered in terms of its potential application to this study. Grant's theory
recognised the multiple group membership that was a feature of Jordan's (1996) group
theory, and how elite members are frequently positioned as members of interlocking
groups or boards that wield power and that would not be open to 'normal' individuals or
employees. Perrucci & Lewis (1989) described these individuals who hold multiple
executive positions as inter-organisational leaders, rather than aselite individuals.
In their paper on inter-organisational relations, Perrucci & Lewis (1989) discussed the
possibility of inter-organisational ties at executive or board level being purposefully used to
mobilize resources, and further that these ties are solidified as each organisation tries to
control their environment through these ties. The research they carried out shows that
these individuals who hold multiple executive positions are considered more influential
within the field than those who hold none. Within a voluntary sector network where
multiple organisations engagewith eachother and with the state in various policy activities,
interlocking would potentially increase levels of trust and assuch, increasethe possibility of
collaborative activities.
It is possible to suggest that elite theory strictly enforced to identify only the truly global
agents of power lacks realistic application in lesser, but still influential, roles, at local or
regional levels. The concept of democratic elite theory, in which local and regional actors
are considered to constitute their own elite group, has perhaps in some aspects, more
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relevant comment upon the devolved governed environment. Etzioni-Halevy (2003) argued
that democratic elite theory would encompass those individuals who are part of smaller
elites on smaller scales, including government officials and mid-level civil servants that
command budgets, and would enable this model to explain how the network of relevant
actors is organised. This echoes the classic insider-outsider problem that emerges
throughout this thesis.
Whilst groups that could be considered elite for the purposes of this study would not fit,
Wright-Mills's power elite description, they would certainly be considered elite within their
domain, and would be carrying out the functions of the higher powers. The Power elite are
not solitary rulers, and the major institutional hierarchies are the tools or means of the
power elite (Wright-Mills, 1956). Indeed,Wright-Mills's model could be suggestedto havea
very early hint of what scholars now consider to be governance, in allowing for the
hierarchies of state to further shape lesser institutions to contribute more effectively to
state goals. For the purposes of this study, any discussionof an elite refers more generally
to influential individuals within the field of study, and so would technically fall into the
'democratic elite' description rather than the more widely accepted 'power elite'
description reservedfor more universally powerful individuals. The majority of those in civil
service positions are however also viewed as agents of the bureaucracy they serve before
any individual elite status.
Clegg (1989), in looking closely at the elite models such as Hunter's (1953) and pluralist
models such as Dahl's (1961), compared to these models what he termed the class-
dialectical model. This class dialectical model assumed that there is a certain level of
intentionality associated with the dominant class, in that the dominant class would
consciously act to preserve the institutions that reinforced this dominance. Power in this
sense is a subjective commodity and an external perception of an individual's or
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organisation's power may be very different to the perception of the agent itself. This class
conscious model proposes that the state serves the interests of the dominant class,
because it is the very dominant class that is able to manipulate the agents of the state to
their advantage. This draws parallels with Clegg (1989) and with Barnett & Duvall's (2005)
description of institutional power, and provides for the assertions of Acemoglu & Robinson
(2008) who also believed the structures that support de facto power persist and reinforce
the positions of those with that de facto power. In applying this concept to the Welsh
institutional environment, the bureaucracy would demonstrate some self-reinforcing
behaviours that excluded the possibility of significant change within the governing bodies
themselves. Looking then at the Welsh inter-organisational network, conscious action and
organisation by governing bodies or voluntary sector groups would certainly have been
expected where there was competition for resources, as suggested in network studies by
Klijn (2005 & 2008) or more historically in studies by Oliver (1990), Galaskiewicz (1985) and
Thorelli (1986).
The issue of power is embedded into the resource dependency perspectives briefly
discussed at the start of this chapter. The idea of power and money as resources that can
be used to obtain more resources is not new, and power as a 'circulatory media' was
discussed by Parsons in 1968. Habermas (1987) progressed from Parsons, and placed
greater emphasis on power as a resource than on money, arguing that currency could only
provide limited access to areas such as the market, whereas the holding of power would
put the resources of organisation at the agent's disposal.
Benson (1975) afforded legitimacy and financial resources equal status in his discussion of
the inter-organisational network as a political economy, and he emphasised the political
nature of the field, as well as the strategies employed in the tensions between pressure and
resistance between organisations. Clegg (1989) asserted that in an· imperfect market,
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means and resources would be distributed unevenly, and in such a marketplace, a
favourable outcome would be secured at the expense of another agency. This favourable
outcome would be secured as a result of utilising the means and resources already
available, thus perpetuating a cycle of havesand have-nots. Clegg(1989, p149) proclaimed
'power is about politics, not just in the formal sensebut more broadly, about the politics of
everyday life', and this politicised nature of everyday life permeates into the internal and
external organisation of individuals and agents within the field and in terms of hierarchy.
Any study of a market-place or network in which games are played requires a solid
grounding in considerations of power relationships and their implications for resource
distribution, and Clegg'sobservation that power is linked to everyday political strategizing
demonstrates that power in this study emerges both in institutional settings and in game-
playing network settings.
The models and thinking on power discussed in this section provided guidance and
discussionfor this research, in particular with reference to the more Machiavellian strategy
basedapproachesthat explained behaviours within the network. The consideration of elite
theory also served to highlight existing approaches to how hierarchical and often invisible
networks exert influence. Power is something of a slippery concept, and has been framed a
number of ways in the literature. For the purposes of this study, the discussionsof strategy,
pressure and manipulation of structures provided a basis for understanding how both
governing organisations and network organisations could approach ESFfunding processes.
2.13 Summary
The volume of literature that could be considered relevant to this particular study is
enormous, however relevant discussions above should prove sufficient to describe the
history and academic context within which this study takes place, to demonstrate relevant
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contemporary thought on the themes of power, network and institutional contexts, and to
highlight the issues and considerations necessary to unpick the process of programme
development and funding distribution by governing bodies. In particular, this chapter has
highlighted the main ideas around institutions, MLG and networks that explain specific
parts of the process studied. Network activity as a bottom-up process in engaging with
funding programmes is clearly a key consideration in organisational ability to engage,and
the literature explored in this chapter shaped the approach taken to constructing and
answering the third and fourth key research questions. The development of themes of
network and rationality will uncover how decision-making processes determine
organisational successand dominance in funding distribution.
Reflecting on the top-down process, institutionalised systems were clearly shown to
influence bureaucracy and the policy products it produced. The literature reviewed on
these institutional themes demonstrated that institutions and power could channel funding
as a result of bureaucratic and rational decision-making. This literature influenced the
phrasing of the first and second research questions in understanding who this would affect
organisations, and provided a basis for the creation of the theoretical framework. Setting
the context of this study within an MLG environment strengthens the importance of
institutional influences on the process, and the literature reviewed suggests that the
changes in the 2007-2013 programmes would prompt a certain amount of instability, but
that this could potentially be beneficial for the network and partnership in terms of
inclusive programme development.
This chapter hasdemonstrated that the network environment is vulnerable to the decisions
taken within governing bodies with regard to the development and implementation of
funding programmes. The literature reveals that institutions shape and solidify interactions
and relationships, and that power is a key element in achieving a favourable structural
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position. Uncertainty in resource availability prompts conscious action within organisations
to compete with their peers, and certain organisations therefore gain success in securing
funds through use of power and relationships. These key concepts will be explored in
further detail in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER THREE
Institutions, Power and Networks: A Theoretical Framework
3.1 Introduction
Building on the broad review of literature carried out in the previous chapter, this chapter
sets out the theoretical structure for the study. It seeks to explain how a range of factors
such as power, bureaucracy and network organisation combine to influence the route that
funds are channelled through, from government or European programmes through to
voluntary sector delivery organisations. This theoretical framework will structure the case
study to answer the research question 'How do institutional factors and network context
affect funding distribution and the composition of partnerships? How can this be
demonstrated using ESFin Wales as a Case Study?'
As set out in Chapter One, the research question was broken down further to address four
sub-questions that would guide and focus the study on relevant areas:
1. How did institutions and power shape the structures of the Welsh ESF
programmes?
2. What kind of relationships exist between governing entities and the network and
how do they operate?
3. How do decision-making processes in networks influence how organisations are
selected for funding?
4. How does organisational dominance in the network shape the distribution of
funding?
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Through using a dual institutional and network lens, this chapter will demonstrate how
these key questions were constructed on the basisof established theory relating to themes
of power, institutions, and the network context. It will also question the relative
importance of the institutional and network contexts in shaping the process studied, and
consider with reference to the researchquestions, which systemshave the greatest impact.
Firstly, the chapter will address the need for an approach that encompasses both
institutional and contextual network factors in uncovering how the processesgoverning the
distribution of funds occur, from development through to implementation, and how these
processesshapeproject partnerships and determine funding recipients.
Secondly, the chapter will address the institutional factors having influence over the
processesof partnership composition and resource distribution. This section will return to
the key institutional literature explored in chapter 2, and discuss the concepts of power,
bureaucracy and governance, which will be used to explain the institutional processes
associatedwith developing funding programmes, and developing and leading projects.
The theme of power is considered to be a common thread running through both
institutional and network environments, and will be discussedwith regard to relational
power in the institutional environment and with reference to the power wielded by
organisations through their level of structural embeddedness.This section will also consider
the themes of trusteeship and the role of government in instigating programmes to achieve
policy aims.
Finally, this chapter will consider the network context within which occur rationality, game
and negotiation activities that shape partnership composition and determine resource
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distribution. This section will consider the network environment itself, and how within this
environment competition for resources, bounded rationality, and the need for
collaboration and mediation may influence the success of organisations in seeking funding.
This section considers the theme of governance, and introduces the concept of strategic
bridging as a concept that is considered to go beyond traditional notions of governance, as
a possible alternative explanation for what occurs in this study.
3.2 The need for a dual approach - institutional and network considerations
The use of statutory and other funding such as the European Structural Funds by
government, in order to target key policy areas, has a long history in the UK (Kendall et al,
2006; Kennett, 2004; O'Halloran et al, 2008; Nugent, 2006; Rekart, 1994). Voluntary sector
organisations have been shown to be key service providers for policy aims (Geyer et ai,
2005; Kendall, 2003; Kendall et at, 2006), however there are observations in the literature
that certain organisations are more successful than others in gaining resources and
becoming members of partnerships that include benefits such as funding (Anheier & Seibel,
1990; Dollery & Wallis, 2003; Kendall, 2003; Palmer & Randall, 2001). Is it solely individual
organisational factors that affect this success, or are some funding programmes
fundamentally inaccessible to certain organisations? Chapter 2 demonstrated the insider-
outsider problem, and in the context of type II MLG and the uncertainty that in part
characterises it, it was likely that some organisations would simply not find the
programmes accessible.
The literature has covered a wide range of themes that go a certain distance in explaining
why certain organisations appear to be more successful than others in joining partnership
projects or securing funds, however, the majority of this literature is situated within one
dimension, focusing only upon one part of the process. Examples are the use of network
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theory to explore the process of partnership building within the network (Teisman & Klijn,
2002), the use of institutional theory to map how policy is developed and implemented
through procurement of services (Oliver, 1997), or the use of resource dependency theory
in viewing the relative dominance or legitimacy of an organisation as the key to securing
funding (Benson, 1975). In fact, the process of funding distribution is multi-dimensional. It
begins within governing organisations at the point of negotiating and developing the
budgets for programmes to be created, and the funds begin to be channelled by these
.,
bodies as soon as the programmes are developed and given policy focus, assigned goals
and plans to measure success, and application systems are structured to receive and assess
proposals to meet the policy aims stated. O'Toole et 01 (1997, p143) note that {it is an
unavoidable fact of political life that those who are responsible for the front line delivery of
public policy ... are in different organisations from those who set broad policy directives'
and this chasm between policy development and policy delivery is key to indicating a need
for two sides of funding programmes to be investigated, both from the side of the policy
maker, and the side of the policy deliverer.
The study of networks, which is also arguably set within an institutional environment (De
Bruijn & ten Heuvelhof, 1997), will cast further light on this process of integrated service
delivery through trans-organisational structures (Agranoff, 1990) from an over-arching
institutional level, down to the regional and local network level. O'Toole et 01 (1997)
identified the need to consider the institutional programme development dimension to
policy delivery when discussing the management of implementation processes, noting that
in order to understand what happens locally, the researcher must examine national or
international level factors {in so far as they appear to be relevant' (O'Toole et al, 1997
p144). It is not enough therefore, when querying why certain organisations are in receipt of
funding over others, to simply accept that a theory governing only half of the process will
produce a legitimate and valid conclusion.
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Programme structure dictates which kinds of organisations are eligible to gain funding
through explicit criteria. These criteria generally include features of projects such as their
geographical remit; their charitable, company or VAT registered status; or their capacity to
serve a certain volume of beneficiaries. Still further criteria can dictate whether
organisations should work alone or as part of a partnership. These features of programme
instruments developed and implemented through Welsh and European governing bodies
will have a significant impact upon organisational eligibility for ESF funding. The tension
.,
here between structure and agency therefore reduces the ability of organisations to engage
with the programmes. This is before the programmes are even released into the public
domain and organisations are able to consider their plans to acquire funding. It is only at
the point of a programme opening that the theories concerning network or resource
dependency fully come into play. Although there is scope for overlap when considering
contacts in the case of very embedded or dominant organisations that have good
relationships with funding distributors, this is not sufficient to cover the full story.
There is, therefore, a need to look both at the institutional processes that structure funding
programmes, the underlying relationships between organisations, as well as the network
aspects that allow organisations to compete for funds in order to understand the end-to-
end process. There is also a need to consider the relative importance of these factors in
shaping finding distribution. This study will knit together a number of theories to provide an
overview of the development and implementation process, and ask where the greatest
pressures upon the process occur. This is a complex undertaking, and particularly so within
the parameters of this study, however the research questions and the following theoretical
framework provide a clear path to producing a valid understanding of the systems at work.
In order to make sense of the overlapping themes raised in the preceding chapter, it was
necessary to divide the overarching themes between the 'top-down' institutional ideas, and
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the 'bottom-up' network themes. In constructing the theoretical approach, these were
overlaid onto the process of funding distribution, and this provided a base from which to
proceed. Figure 3.1 provides an illustrative example of how this study uses overlapping
theories to provide a comprehensive analysis of how the funds trickle down to the
voluntary and statutory sector network from the point of award by the EC.The central
column of the diagram displays the route of ESF funds from the EC to delivery
organisations. The right side of the diagram displays the institutional themes that were
.,
deemed to influence the final destination of ESFfunds, and the points at which these occur
and overlap. These factors are considered with a view to answering the first two key
research questions on governing bodies, power and institutionalised relationships. On the
left of the diagram, a number of network themes are shown to occur during the funding
route, and highlight how organisational ability to engagemight be determined. Thesewere
included to answer the third and fourth key research questions on decision-making and
organisational dominance in the network.
Figure3.1 highlights inevitable and inseparable areasof thematic overlap in this study" and
demonstrates that multiple theoretical ideas are relevant at any stage in the process.This
chapter further explores the relevant theoretical literature on institutional and network
environments, and fits the relevant themes together to provide a clear framework for the
study.
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3.3 Institutional Environments
Having established that consideration of the institutional dimension is vital to
understanding how any funds from governing organisations are distributed, this chapter
will first consider institutional and bureaucratic theories and their impact on the research,
as this is invaluable in uncovering the fundamental structure of programmes and how they
are implemented and presented to the delivery network.
An institution, as interpreted within this study, is a bounded and hierarchical system of
norms, rules and values carrying out related functions for the benefit and perpetuation of
the whole. Institutions are not necessarily individual organisational entities, nor do they
necessarilyencompassall individuals within a legally constituted organisation. This echoes
the work of North (1981), who defined institutions as the humanly devised constraints or
rules that shape human interaction, and this definition has been used to frame the view of
the institution in this study. Similarly, Hodgson (2006) defined institutions as systems of
established and prevalent social rules that structure social interactions. North (1981) also
made a clear distinction between institutions and organisations, proposing that institutions
create a web of rules, opportunities and constraints, whereas organisations are responses
to those opportunities and constraints.
There are a number of waystn which the concept of institution and institutionalisation have
been approached and explained, and at first consideration, it appeared that the
perspectives that had the greatest bearing on this discussion were those popularised by
authors such as the early work of Selznick (1949), which focused on the strands of
institutional theory and bureaucracy concerned with institutionalisation as a process of
creating reality and of institutions as distinct societal spheres, and the work of Eisenstadt
(1959). However, although they identified a process of institutionalisation, Selznick and
Eisenstadtfailed to fully account for why or how this processtakes place beyond a need to
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ensure the process's own survival. It became clear that theory concerned with
institutionalisation as a process of creating value, as discussed by Berger & Luckmann
(1966), Zucker (1983) and Scott (1987), was more relevant to this study in terms of
understanding how values dictate the actions of civil servants involved in programme
development.
Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966) argued that social order is based on a human
.,
construction of shared reality created through social interaction, and that social order only
exists as a product of habitualized human activity. In simple terms, social order emerges as
an individual takes action, interprets the action of others, and shares their interpretations
with others still. These interpretations are catalogued to enable the individual to respond
to further actions. The formalised repetition of actions and responses to similar stimuli can
therefore be described as institutionalisation. The repetition of actions and responses
within institutions can be considered to be a significant feature of such systems.
Meyer & Rowan (1977) argued that the institutionalised social reality is valid independently
of an individual's own views. This shared social reality is taken for granted as defining 'how
we do things around here' and hence perpetuates the embedded actions and responses.
This is an echo of Hughes' (1939, pp283) assertion that it is unavoidable for human beings
to get 'stuck in their ways' and that perpetuation of these ways often outlives the
understanding of their meaning. Often, value is assigned to these processes, which exceeds
the cost-benefit balance (Selznick, 1996). Meyer & Rowan (1977) also raised the point that
organisations conform to a set of institutionalised beliefs not only because they constitute
the shared reality but also because there is an advantage to doing so, such as increased
funding or legitimacy, an idea later echoed by Scott (1987). This links to the concept of
organisational isomorphism discussed in DiMaggio & Powell's research (1983L which
argues that organisations will emulate practices because they are perceived as a legitimate
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method of working rather than because they are genuinely efficient or effective, and this
supports the idea that organisations behave in such a way as to value societal rules and
expectations abovestructuring actions to fully maximise efficiency, production or profit.
A key feature of an institutionalised system is resistance to change (Hinich & Munger,
1993). North (1981) proposed that the evolution of institutions alongside organisational
arrangements would 'lock-in' actors benefitting from the institutionalised system. This
'lock-in' manifests as a strong resistance to change by those actors within the organisation,
and emerges from the incentive structure provided by the institution, such as funding or
legitimacy. How then, does changeoccur?
Zucker (1983) carried out several pieces of research into 'conformity' aspects of
institutional theory, and showed that self-interest and perceived legitimacy were the key
factors in prompting any kind of change in large bureaucracies such as municipal
governments. The institutions, therefore, persisted. The preservation of power and
legitimacy through organisational change in order to reinforce the institutional system's
dominance is an example of organisational agents of change at work. The changes occur
not at the institutional level, but at the organisational level, where arrangements, such as
administration, change to preserve the institutions. The hierarchy and agents in power,
remain. This is very relevant to this thesis, as changes in the 2007-2013 programme
requirements set by the ECchallenged the established order of funding distribution.
Organisations built around, or in furtherance of, institutions, require legitimacy in order to
function effectively. Logically, this means that an organisation would undertake activities
independently to Increaseor sustain its own legitimacy, and would also undertake activities
as a result of coercive or authoritative actions by more dominant bodies in order to further
increaseor sustain its legitimacy. Scott (1987) discussedinducement strategies such asthis,
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and this description clearly shows the dominant agent imposing its own structural
definition on the local organisation:
7ypically, the funding agent specifies conditions for remaining eligible for
continuation of funding or reimbursement for work petformed. Usually the
recipient organisation must provide detailed evidence concerning continuing
structural or procedural conformity to requirements - accounts of who
performed the work; how the work was performed; on whom the work was
performed - in the form of periodic reports.' (1987, p503)
Scott (1987) goes on to discuss the implications of this inducement strategy, noting that
these strategies contribute to increasedorganisational isomorphism, and points to research
by DiMaggio & Powell (1983) and Meyer et al (1987) demonstrating the extent to which
this takes place. The research Scott cites exhibits structural change as a result of
inducement at the intermediary and administrative levels.
Meadows (1967) argued that the perpetuation of norms and deference to hierarchy are key
drivers of organisational production. These two drivers come into conflict with each other
in situations where higher authority organisations attach criteria to the distribution of funds
by lesser organisations. Institutionalised activities in this case must be discarded by the
lesser organisation in deference to their position within the institution of governance.
Studies by Meyer et al (1987) and Scott (1987) have shown that inducement by higher
authority has produced change in institutions, and it is therefore likely that deference to
authority would override the commitment to the perpetuation of norms. Schubert & von
Wangenheim (2006) argue that individuals and organisations genuinely desire to bring their
behaviour in line with the expectations of higher authority, and it has been shown that in
caseswhere an external organisation is perceived to hold higher authority, there is an
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acceptance that this organisation is entitled to deference (Beetham, 1991; Tyler, 1990).
Given this evidence for organisational deference to senior organisations, within this case
study it was expected that in any conflict within the institutional environment between
organisational perpetuation of accepted norms and deference to a higher authority
attempting to alter those norms, deference to authority will triumph. Suchperpetuation of
position within the institutional structure would surely shape the development of funding
programmes in instanceswhere conflict and the option of deference could occur.
3.3.1 A bureaucraticbasis
Bureaucracy is often inextricably intertwined with institutional environments, especially in
the study of public organisations, and this case study is no exception. Bureaucracy is an
abstract form of organisation (Meier & O'Toole, 1996), and is designed to deliver its
master's goals efficiently. Indeed Bauman referred to bureaucracy being dispersed and
perpetuated by governing entities asa 'civilising process' (Bauman,1989 p28), although this
was within a broadly negative assessment of Weberian bureaucracy. From a more
complimentary standpoint, Parsons(1968) stated that:
'Bureaucracy is by far the most efficient known method of organisation of large
numbers of persons for the performance of complicated tasks of
administration and its spread is to a considerable extent accounted for by this
sheer superior efficiency.' (1968, pS07)
In looking closely at the organisational processesinvolved in this casestudy, bureaucratic
theory will frame many of these factors. Bureaucratic theory considers the relations
between organisational characteristics and administrative mentality, behaviour,
performance, and change. Key assumptions are that rationality, hierarchy and control are
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attributes of organisational structure and that organisational form can be deliberately
developed (Olsen, 2005). This theory encompasses issues of power and of rigidity, and
explains how logic within bureaucratic environments may differ significantly from externally
conceived logic. The importance of separating individual or private values from those of a
bureaucracy are stressedby du Gay (2000),who arguesthat the very frustrations causedto
external individuals or organisations by bureaucratic requirements are the details that
contribute to the operation of an effective bureaucratic organisation. This echoes the
original arguments of Weber (1989), which stress the inability of an individual to apply a
universal logic in all the areas of its life, as each area of life will have different and
conflicting value systems. Parsons(1968) later noted that bureaucracy can be dependent
upon particular social conditions for its success.
The bureaucratic values embedded within public organisations drive the perpetuation of
the activities and processesdiscussed earlier in this section, and in turn are likely to be
imprinted into any structured or unstructured contact between the organisation itself and
the external environment. The application and distribution structures created by the
bureaucratic programme development agent will therefore be likely to reflect its own
organisational culture and values (Alvesson,2002; Barney, 1986; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983),
and asa result may exhibit potentially frustrating and detailed requirements in the views of
external applicants. These in turn may cause difficulty to voluntary organisations with
completely different norms and values that may not possess the knowledge or
understanding of bureaucracy to successfullymeet these requirements.
In terms of the effect that the overarching governing entities have on this research, it is
clear that theory on institutions and bureaucracywill have a role to play in explaining issues
at the micro level that cannot be easily explained by looking only within the network.
Institutional and bureaucratic theory can help to explain the processof value creation and
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perpetuation with the structure of the 2007-2013 ESFprogrammes in Wales, how values
influenced the creation and perpetuation of those structures, and how in turn those
structures governed the selection of project partners and dictated the recipients of the
funding.
3.4 The Power to Shape the Environment
The concept of power forms an integral component of the institutional discussion, as it
does similarly later in this chapter in the consideration of the network context. Institutions
provide the conditions for organisations such as state organisations to form and operate
legitimately. The possession of power by an organisation can provide it with a certain
amount of influence both in creating the structural environment in which other
organisations operate, and in performing successfullywithin it. This structural environment
can constrain or shape basic institutions on which external organisational activities are
based. This research demonstrates that key institutions, as well as certain organisations
within the network, and at times, the network itself, holds and utilises power to influence
the structures governing funding that is distributed by governing bodies, and through this
influence determines how partnerships come to be configured.
Power in the bureaucratic and institutional domain is embedded in organisational structure
and organisational rules. It is considered to be a relational concept by Dahl (1957) who
stressed the need for a connection between entities when one holds power over the other.
Indeed, Dahl's definition of power states that:
"A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B
would not otherwise do." Dahl (1957, pp203)
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This definition of power was echoed by Emerson (1962), who asserts that power is not an
attribute of any given actor, but is a property of the social relation one actor has to
another. Dahl complements his definition with consideration of the scope of power an
individual would have, such as the baseor domain of individual power, the means used to
exert power, the extent of the power, and the range or scope of the individual's power.
These additional elements essentially provide detail, however the basic assertion remains
that power will influence any unbalanced relationship. Adding to this distributive view of
power, Parsons(1960) noted that power can be a collective concept, increasedby numbers.
However, the larger the numbers, the greater the need for a return to distributive power in
the administration of the collective (Mann, 1986). Criticism of Dahl by Lukes (1974)
suggests that Dahl was too influenced by bias in the political systems being investigated,
and Bachrach and Baratz (1962) stressed that Dahl's model lacked an appreciation of
situations in which decisions were not being taken by opposing sides, but by parties
attempting to collaborate or complement each other's output. Lukes refined Dahl's
definition of power to read:
":04 exercises power over 8 when A affects 8 in a manner contrary to 8's
interests" Lukes (1974, pp34)
Lukes' work on power suggeststhat A may exert power over 8 unconsciously, and that A's
means of control, manipulation or authority over 8 does not occur in a conflict situation,
rather in a consensualor collaborative relationship. Lukescites the subtlety of power in A's
ability to shape the preferences and plans of 8 in accepting their place in the established
order of things, viewing it asnatural or unchangeable,and reducing their ability to conceive
of a different system as a form of true power driven by the 'real interests' of actors. This
concept of power was similarly noted by Bachrachand Baratz (1962) who emphasised a
dimension of power that allows A to alter the structural conditions in which decisions or
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choices occur, limiting those decisions that can be taken. This has come to be known as
'agenda-setting' power (Berenskoetter, 2007) and indicates the power governing
organisations have over the network is a form of subtle unquestioned power, where the
network allows itself to be moulded by the processes developed by the governing
organisations becausethat is simply the order of things.
The regulations associatedwith government funding are to a certain extent contrary to the
interests of service delivery agents due to the necessityto carry out work additional to that
which would achieve the policy aims, such as monitoring or evaluative activities or the
observance of certain best practice models. Similarly, this model emerges within the
network context as an insider-outsider problem, where certain organisations will be
dominant service delivery agents and are able to influence the actions of smaller
organisations in situations where partnership or collaboration is necessary, where the
dominant organisations are able to develop and negotiate the structures, and the lesser
organisations must attempt to fit and insert themselves into gaps that are left for them
regardless of their compatibility. It is therefore likely that in this study, dominant
organisations will dictate the programme and project structures, and lesser organisations
will attempt to conform, evenwhere this is contrary to their interests
In terms of power operating through and within bureaucracies, it was possible that there
would be signs of commitment to rational process and ceremony at the expense of
considering compatibility with external network environments. While individuals within the
key organisations may in fact have possessed the power to change or influence
programmes, they may have been unlikely to do so given the certain bureaucratic
environment within which they operate. Bauman referred to this as a 'moral sleeping pill'
(Bauman, 1989, p29) and asserted that bureaucracy substitutes moral responsibility with
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technical responsibility, creating an environment in which bureaucrats are able to free
themselves of ethical considerations outside of those provided to them.
This incompatibility of personal morality and technical responsibility perpetuated by
individuals within the organisation causesfriction in achieving any policy goals required, as
organisations in the network find themselves unable to effectively engagewith the process
of gaining funds to deliver those outcomes. The power held by the governing organisations
-
is therefore, not absolute, and not sufficient to completely circumvent the restrictions of
bureaucracy in order to achieve overarching policy goals.This demonstrates a dependence
on those organisations in the network over which they exercise so much power. As noted
by Emerson (1962), power issuesoften occur in situations of mutual dependence, and this
can be exhibited at the interface between governing organisations and service delivery
organisations, where the governing organisations depend upon the network to deliver
services, and the network depends upon the governing organisations for resource and
legitimacy.
Whilst the definitions of power have been cited in similar terms within the literature (Dahl,
1957; Emerson, 1962; Lukes, 1974), even where those terms are interpreted differently,
methods of categorising or typifying that power have been more diverse. This case study
straddles the institutional and network environments, and as such, two different types of
power were identified in the literature to be very relevant to understanding how
programme development and implementation could be achieved. These two types of
power are authoritative and/or mandated, and dispersed and/or relational, and are
described in Table 3.2.
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Table 3.2 Features of Power
Authoritative or Mandated Power Dispersed/Relational Power in
the Network
Characteristics • Vertical/hierarchical relationships • Horizontal relationships
• Frequently associated with the • Frequently associated with
power held by bureaucracies such power held by different
as central government bodies and network organisations
departments • Held in situations where
• Held in situations where one one organisation holds
organisation holds resources resources desired by
desired by others, and this others, but not of a
provides those organisations with sufficient level to dictate
the power to dictate activities activities
• Commonly reinforced by statute, • Commonly reinforced by a
providing the organisation with combination of variables
legal obligations to administer such as expertise,
services and therefore endowing organisational
it with ultimate legitimacy in relationships, structural
decision-making and funding embedded ness, profile,
distribution within reason strength of brand
• Enables organisations to impose • Enables organisations to
their structures and policy goals cause disruption or
onto other organisations dysfunction in the network
Issues • Less influence over organisations • Potential cause for
that are not dependent upon stagnation in a network
resources from this source where no one organisation
holds sufficient power to
force action
Compiled from Barman (2002), Benson (1975), Huxham & Beech (2008), Kickert &
Koppenjan (1997)
Much of the early literature on power in a network environment has focused upon a
resource dependency model (Aldrich, 1979; Cook 1977; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Van de
Ven & Walker, 1984), and this literature is useful in drawing out patterns of behaviour or
strategy as individual organisational response to external conditions. This literature does
not, however, account for the externally imposed conditions on the network and how it
affects the network as a whole, rather it focuses on individual organisations.
The literature on pluralism (Gray, 1989; Dahlberg, 2005; McFarland, 2007) proposes the
possibility of all interested organisations acting out their own strategies and power being
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distributed, which bears some similarity to the resource dependency literature in its
acceptance of multiple actors competing for resources. However, organisations within a
network will be influenced by the authoritative and bureaucratic power of governing
bodies, and as such, it is likely that factors such as imperfect access and existing
relationships may uncover a more elitist model operating. Gray indicates that elitism occurs
where 'one party or a select group controls access to the decision- making forum ..
.decisions in this model are, at best, consultative'(Gray, 1989 ppl14) and this is basedupon
Wright-Mills' 'power elite' theory (1956). Rather than viewing the network within this case
study as a web of organisations operating in a purely pluralistic manner, this research is
mindful of the inequality of accessand opportunity that may exist in the network that
provide the conditions for elitism (Gray, 1989; McFarland, 2007) where the will of the few
in policy making circles can be authoritatively imposed on the wider network (Klein, 1974;
McFarland,2007).
This section on power has shown that the possessionof power by organisations can shape
organisational approaches to achieving goals, and in this pursuit, affect the fortunes of
others. Within this thesis, power will emerge at almost every level of action in the
development and delivery of ESFstructural fund programmes. Two main contrasting types
of power have been identified as key to affecting the environments in this study, and it is
the effects of the use of these types of power that will be shown to have shaped the
structural funds and the composition of partnerships instigated to gain funding.
3.5 The State and Trusteeship
The purpose of power held by statute or mandate is to entrust the state to provide
adequate services for the public good (Cowen & Shenton, 1996; Lodge, 2004). This study
views the role of the state governing bodies involved in this caseas an administrative one
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which is affected by, but not wholly relevant to, the political backdrop. It also considers the
role of state administration is to develop and deliver policy goals for the benefit of the
public. This role of the state to use its power to provide for the public good has been
referred to as 'trusteeship' (Cowen & Shenton, 1996) or 'fiduciary trusteeship' (Lodge,
2004), as the state essentially acts as a trustee for the public purse in this limited sense, just
as a trustee would act for a charity, school or private business. But as Cowen and Shenton
show, drawing on Saint-Simon's, view of the state as the underwriter of trusteeship.
Trusteeship has been described as the intent that is expressed by one agent to develop the
capacities of another (Cowen & Shenton, 1996) and was popularised by the followers of
Henri Saint-Simon (the Saint-Simonions) in the is" century. These early followers believed
that only those who had the capacity to utilise land, labour and capital should be entrusted
with them in order to use them to the greatest public good (Cowen & Shenton, 1996). In
the modern world, the delivery of services to the public is entrusted to the democratically-
elected government, who may in turn choose to entrust those responsibilities to expert
providers through procurement. The interests of the public should be paramount to the
trustee, and the trustee should understand the issues and manage the resources available
to provide the right policy activities for the public. This concept of trusteeship has been
argued to favour the centrality of decision-making for the public by the powerful
'paternalistic' state (Stirton & Lodge, 2001, p480), consolidating technocratic authority and
structuring public activity through hierarchy, legality and oversight. This is in contrast with
doctrine suggesting that the service user is best placed to make decisions on their services
which favours a bottom-up approach to policy and delivery (Stirton & Lodge, 2001), which
includes consultation and freedom of information, but which reduces the power of the
state to dictate which services and policies it judges most favourable, following models of
consumer sovereignty or citizen empowerment (Lodge, 2004).
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The requirement upon governing bodies to distribute funds in order to procure services
that will benefit the public, in line with the democratically elected government's policy
aims, demonstrates the trusteeship principle embedded in this study, and suggests that
funding programmes would be structured in such a way as to preserve and legitimise the
state's position as trustee. Lodge (2004) argued that according to the fiduciary trusteeship
doctrine, regulation of public services should be conducted in such a way as to safeguard
certainty in the decision-making process through reducing the potential for arbitrary
decision-making. He noted that, in this system, regulation is carried out by oversight by
technocratic experts, and that any sanctioned increase in choice or voice for the public
would not only compromise the perceived value of expert authority, but would undermine
overall authority through hyper-accountability. The state as a fiduciary trustee, in this
instance, would therefore centralise and retain the knowledge surrounding programme
development in order to reinforce its position, and this would manifest as a lack of
transparency in the award of funds, in the programme structures and in the limitation of
contact with external actors engaging in the process. The logic of this conclusion is that
paradoxically the state would undermine the role of general trusteeship it attributes to
intermediary organisations and networks.
In this case study, it was anticipated that governing organisations and their policy and
funding structures could exhibit strong features of trusteeship, and this would manifest asa
lackof transparency in the development and implementation of the funding programme.
3.6 The Challenge of Structural Embeddedness:
Power has been considered in a number of studies (Cross & Parker, 2004; Ibarra &
Andrews, 1993; Provan, 1983) to have a close relationship with social and professional
linkages.
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This study will take a structurally embedded view of organisations within a network
proposed by Burt (1976), Granovetter (1992) and Uzzi (1996) where the actor as an
organisational agent is woven into the operation of various organisations in the network.
Structural embeddednessviews individuals as embedded within a network of relationships
that influence their competitive behaviour. This is in contrast with resource dependency
views, which places individuals in a more competitive field of action only constrained by
their resource limitations. The structural embeddedness literature provides stronger
support for understanding the situation of powerful organisations, that form high quality
ties and maintain good relationships, and explains how the patterns of interaction between
these prominent or powerful actors are perpetuated, increasing the likelihood of their
organisations receiving positive partnership outcomes. The theory of structural
embeddedness emphasisesthe informational value of the structural positions agents have
within a network. This network theory encompassesnot only the direct relationships that
organisations and agents have but also the relationships organisations and agents have
with third parties and the quality of those ties (Granovetter, 1992; Mackinnon et ai, 2004).
The theory suggeststhat the greater the structural embeddednessof organisations within a
network, the greater their legitimacy, as more information about each is known. This
means it is more likely that this information can be used to gain positive benefits in
positioning and brokering relationships.
It has been suggestedthat organisations which are perceived asstructurally embedded are
also perceived to be more legitimate, and therefore these organisations are considered first
in instances of partnership working or relationship building (Kenis & Oerlemans, 2008).
Hageret al (2004) used this theory to show that organisations with low levels of structural
embeddednessare more likely to fail, in particular citing the relative age of an organisation
as an indicator of likelihood to fail. Usingthis logic, it is expected that the more structurally
embedded an organisation is considered to be, the more power it has over its own and its
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linked organisations acquisition of funds. In this way, ESFcould be a driver for the
structural embeddednessof organisations, especiallythose working in partnership with the
state.
The informational value of structural positions in the network is high where those
informational positions produce information on potential funding streams or business
opportunities. Therefore, the more structural positions held by an actor, the greater the
~
value of information is being harnessed. Some scholars, such as Kenis and Oerlemans
(2008) and Hager et al (2004), place great emphasis on the relationships between actors
within a 'social' network, where the network provides both opportunities and restrictions
(Kenis& Oerlemans,2008) and this affords some scopefor interlocking, where for instance,
employees of one organisation sit on the management board of another and also sit on a
government steering group. These influential individuals occupy key positions across the
inter-organisational network, which increasesthe level to which they are embedded within
the network and exert influence upon it.
The sizeof the inter-organisational and institutional environment will dictate the number of
individuals in such positions of power, however smaller political environments, such as
devolved nations, can exhibit a lower volume of structurally embedded individuals
potentially wielding a disproportionate level of power. Shortall (2004) in her research into
ESFfunded rural development programmes in Ireland noted that the same individuals
emerged again and again on different partnerships and steering groups, and that this
prompted her to question the legitimacy of individuals that were not democratically
elected developing a significant power basethat could deter wider civic inclusion.
This tentative question of the legitimacy of cross-sectoral partnerships demonstrating
multiple group membership was echoed by Entwistle et al (2007) in their research into ESF
- 100-
partnerships in Wales, and identified the embedded nature of certain actors in the policy
processwho, as a result of their embeddedness,wielded a lot more power and influence
than actors that were not involved in the network or policy processes.For this study, it was
necessaryto question how this power was being used, becausestructures put in place by
governing organisations to engage the network in consultation and service delivery could
potentially be excluding actors that are not structurally embedded. This echoes the earlier
issues raised in this chapter on the obligations of state bureaucracy for transparency and
~
accountability, and questions whether the state is fulfilling its duty to the public by
engagingwith the best actors to deliver policy aims or whether it is automatically engaging
structurally embedded ones as a result of its own institutions and the compatibility of
organisational values.
Perrucd and Potter (1989) in their research on inter-organisational relations raise the
concept of centrality in the network, which bears similarities to the original literature on
embeddedness (Burt, 1976), where individuals close to the centre of the network have a
high volume of ties, and individuals at the periphery have a low number of ties. The higher
the volume of ties, the greater the opportunities available to the organisation (Uzzi, 1996)
and the more likely that these organisations will be in a position to influence policy and
engage with it. The works by Perrucd et 01 and Uzzi demonstrate that patterns of ties
between organisations at board level, that is, where executives hold multiple board
positions on several organisations, exist and reveal the centrality of individual actors within
the network. Ties between individuals do not necessarily need to be social to be useful,
indeed Kenis& Oerlemans (2008) suggest that directed relationships where one individual
approaches another in the network for advice may be just as useful in developing
confidence in a potential partner organisation. This centrality and influence enables
organisational leaders to mould their external environment in their favour. This is similar to
arguments put forward by Galaskiewicz(1985), who highlights that co-option of individuals
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onto executive boards can pacify or neutralise problematic external issues, and that this
strategy is actively usedby organisations to bring external opposition 'in-house'.
It is however, the relationships between these individuals as agents of organisations that
are of interest to this study, and the extent to which these relationships between
organisations are embedded within the network may impact upon the organisations
deemed desirable as project partners. Organisations within this study that are structurally
.-
embedded were most likely to exhibit a high volume of ties to the network and to
governing organisations. They would also be more likely to engage in policy, partnership
and service delivery activities than those organisations which are not structurally
embedded.
The concept of power within this study emerges in both the institutional and network
strands of theory, and the next section will build on this discussionof power to incorporate
the full range of network factors influencing organisational ability to engage with
government programmes.
3.7 Rationality, Games and Relationships In the Network Context
The inter-organisational network has long been a focus of statutory and voluntary sector
organisations interested in the formation of policy and the delivery of operational
outcomes (e.g. Benson1975; Kickert & Koppenjan, 1997; Klijn, 1997; Klijn & Teisman, 2008;
Provan & Kenls, 2007). Governments, in particular, have recognised the potential for
collaborative working with the private and voluntary sectors to deliver more effective policy
outcomes, and as a. result have facilitated the development of a 'network society' (Klijn,
2008 ppl18).
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The voluntary and statutory environment forms a large inter-organisational network in
which multiple fields of activity and expertise interact and overlap geographically, by sector
and through the mobility of individual employees (Farrington & Bebbington, 1993; Benson,
1975; Scott, 2005). The application of a theory of inter-organisational network as a political
economy (Benson, 1975; Stern & Reve, 1980; Hardy & Philips, 1998; Oliver, 1990 & 1991)
frames the wider environment, and encompasses the dual issues of distributing financial
resource and the authority to direct or secure it. The network acts as a context within which
"
all interactions influence other actions and combine to determine success and failure in
engaging with government programmes.
3.7.1 Constraints on Decision-Making
Organisations establish inter-organisational relations to secure the resources vital for
organisational survival (Galaskiewicz, 1985). This gives rise to the inter-organisational
network and, despite the need to interact with other organisations to ensure survival,
organisations strive to be autonomous (Galaskiewicz, 1985; Park, 1996). This struggle for
autonomy in an interdependent environment is the cause for rational decision-making, as
organisations strive to make decisions resulting in the best possible outcomes based on the
limited information available to them. Schotter (1981) suggested that institutions can be
regarded as an equilibrium of behaviour patterns in some underlying, on-going game, in
which rationality is inclusive of historic and contextual knowledge. Calvert: (1993)
concurred, suggesting that institutions were merely a persistent pattern of contextually
rational behaviour to which all actors adhere because each knows that others will adhere
and will expect adherence, in such a way that any individual who deviates is worse off for it.
Actors therefore actand trust that others will act in a certain way as well, even if they do
not have firm information that they will do so.
- 103-
This concept of rational decision-making despite the incomplete information available has
been defined as 'bounded rationality' in the literature (Klijn & Teisman, 1997; Lindblom,
1979; Pressman& Wildavsky, 1984; Simon, 1972) and highlights the limits of organisational
decision-making and barriers to actions that would be considered completely rational. The
ability of actors in organisations to make rational decisions is limited by both the
incompleteness of the contextual information available to them, and their own limited
capacity to use the information that is available to them to accurately calculate the best
courseof action in order to achieve the most positive outcome possible.
Within these limits of bounded rationality, decision-makerswill develop their responsesto
external conditions. Benson(1975) proposed four strategies used by organisations to utilise
and increase their power, these being manipulative, authoritative, disruptive and
cooperative strategies. These strategies could be used by any organisation, and their
strategy outcomes would depend upon their organisational power over any certain
resource relative to other organisations. These strategies provide an insight into the
perceptions organisations have of themselves and others in their strategizing. These
strategies and behaviours bear similarities to Galaskiewicz's(1985), ideas on the origins of
inter-organisational relations and organisational motivations, resource procurement,
political advocacy and organisational legitimacy. The categories put forward by Benson
may be useful groupings to consider when reviewing the field, and sit within the scope of
the overarching inter-organisational network. It is however, difficult to separate the various
behaviours of organisations within the field tidily into these three themes due to the
politicised nature of resource procurement and the importance of legitimacy in conducting
political advocacy.As suchthis study does not use these categories in a prescriptive manner
to define behaviours.within the network.
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Based on the consideration of bounded rationality, it was considered likely that
organisations in the network would strive to make rational decisions in order to increase
their probability of securing funds. The result of these rational decisions would be
organisational strategy to increase the probability of being awarded funding. The
following table, drawn from the work of Williamson, shows the trade-off between
bounded rationality and opportunism in a contracting environment face by
organisations and networks engaged in public policy programmes (Williamson, 1985).
Table 3.3 Four cases of contractual trade-offs between opportunism and bounded
rationality
Conditions of Bounded Rationality
Absent Admitted
Absent Bliss "General clause"
Conditions of contracting:
Opportunism Admitted Comprehensive Serious
contracting contractual
difficulties
Source: Williamson (1985)
This table shows the varying degrees of complexity of networks who bid for state-
underwritten contracts to deliver policy goals and programmes. It acts as a guide to
behavioural responses in the face of organisations attempting to negotiate conditions of
bounded rationality and opportunism within an institutional framework.
Wherever there is resource scarcity, organisations will compete to acquire the greatest
share possible in order to safeguard their existence and increase their legitimacy and power
(Benson, 1975; (jalaskiewicz 1985; Oliver 1990). This competition will inevitably mean that
organisations will follow strategies to maximise their chances of receiving a seat at the
table or a share of the goods (Benson, 1975; Oliver, 1990; Galaskiewicz, 1985; Rodriguez et
al, 2007). Policy processes instigated by government in which the wider network is engaged
have been referred to as 'games' (Allison, 1971; Klijn & Teisman, 1997; Klijn, 2008; Kenis &
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Schneider, 1991; Lynn, 1982; van Bueren et al, 2003) where the network itself is the context
in which games are played, and games themselves are complex policy making and delivery
processes, the outcomes of which depend upon the strategic behaviours of all of the actors
involved. Lynn (1982) views games in slightly wider domains in which the game begins at
the very first public airing of an issue, continuing until all interest in that particular issue has
been lost, this is, however, too broad a view for this thesis. Within the game, actors
rationally choose to act based on their own knowledge and perceptions, and will be
.-
involved in any number of games simultaneously, where their actions in one game will
influence another (Klijn & Teisman, 1997).
Allison (1971) acknowledged that games are most often structured by 'action channels' or
policy goals, and that 'action channels structure the game by presenting the major players,
determining their usual points of entrance into the game and distributing particular
advantages and disadvantages for each game'. He also identified the concept of 'rules' that
would provide structure for games. These action channels are arguably institutions. Action
channels were further developed by Klijn & Teisman (1997), who defined action channels as
organisational institutions that regulate game interactions. The use of this action channel
model indicates that the organisations that would be successful would be determined by
the structures and rules put in place by the governing organisations and interpreted within
the network. Essentially, there is a criterion for an eligible winner, and this is set by the
state through institutional relationships, and through the network through organisational
strategy. Established action channels theoretically reduce the number of organisations
likely to be successful in gaining entry to project partnerships, because eligibility criteria
filter out players that are not structurally embedded or attractive for one reason or
another. This relates. to the earlier discussion in this chapter on structural embeddedness
which stresses the perceived legitimacy of organisations that are centrally located in the
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network with a high volume of network and government ties. Success in gaining funding
would, therefore, be linked to the level of structural embeddedness of an organisation.
Government funding programmes, such as European programmes, established to achieve
policy aims, will frequently include a partnership working component (Ferry et al, 2007;
Shortall, 2004), which places obligation on organisations to design and deliver projects
through a formal partnership structure. In order for collaboration and partnership to occur
around specific policy goals, organisations must identify suitable partners; conduct
negotiations to determine how the partnership will work, and develop the partnership brief
(Huxham & Vangen, 2005). In an inter-organisational field in which each organisation would
be likely to seek to maximise its own share of funding at the expense of another,
competitive behaviours can cause collaboration to break down (Huxham & Vangen, 2005).
Differences in culture, power and areas of specialisation are also prone to cause complex
interfaces between organisations that are not easily resolved (Brown, 1983). This can be
further compounded when projects need to be of a high value, but few voluntary sector
organisations are able to underwrite the risk of leading such high value and high risk
projects, and administering to a large partnership. This does, however, open up the field of
bidding and delivery to managers in the public sector, who may become far more influential
in project design and delivery when acting in a project lead role, rather than as a policy and
procurement role. This 'hands-on' public sector management activity in the network
reinforces the work carried out by public sector programme developers in directing project
funds towards specific activities. This channels funds to certain organisations that are
judged to have the right skills, expertise and capacity, and targeting activity in favoured
policy areas. This a<;tivity has been referred to as network governance (Klijn, 2008; Lynn et
01,2000).
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3.8 Governance, Network Management or Strategic Bridging?
Klijn defined public governance as 'the directed influencing of societal processes in a
network of many other co-governing actors' (Klijn, 1997 p39). This statement serves to
remind us that the network is affected by a number of forces at anyone time, and that
organisations in it will be unlikely to be focused solely on one source of income, even
though they may be more dependent upon one source than others. As such, actions taken
by participants of this study would be based on information not only around one funding
programme, but by information on other funding and political considerations as well. A
network of co-governing actors could include those from multiple public sector
departments or authorities directing different funding streams into the network. Co-
governing actors could also include policy makers and politicians that would not direct
funding themselves, but would potentially create the conditions for funds to be allocated
towards a particular area. This equates to governance being the attribution of public status
in policy formulation and delivery.
Organisations in the network attempting to secure monies from more than one source
would be required to consider the implications of their actions for all of their confirmed and
potential sources of funds, and so would be subject to the decisions of multiple network
managers. This is a rationality trade-off seen in Table 3.3. Lynn et 01 (2000) took a broader
and more descriptive view of governance, stating that it 'implies an arrangement of distinct
but interrelated elements' and that it 'comprises both formal authority and the informal
exercise of judgment by the numerous actors and entities involved in implementing public
policies and programs' (2000, p4). This echoes the type II MLG discussed in chapter 2. This
certainly provides a.broader consideration of public governance and makes explicit the role
that civil servants play in the use of their own judgement, however neglects consideration
of the impact those decisions make upon the network.
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Bovaird and Loffler (2009, pp6) occupy a middle ground more appropriate to this thesis,
describing public governance to mean 'how an organisation works with its partners,
stakeholders and networks to influence the outcomes of public policies'. As will be
discussedlater, it is important to this casestudy to uncover the influence of the governing
organisations involved in order to identify the effects these actions have on the network
and the eventual recipients of the funds. An active approach to governance by governing
bodies, which is evident from programme structures that require high value projects or
,-
cross-sectoral partnership (Mitchell & Shortell, 2000), may demonstrate a process of
'network management'.
Viewed from the network perspective, governing organisations act as network managers in
so far as they determine the rules of any individual game that is instigated within the
network (O'Toole et al, 1997). Where government is very involved in influencing or
directing action within networks, there are often criticisms of this activity, and the use of
networks to achieve policy goals has been considered by a number of people to be non-
transparent and un-representative of the wider voluntary sector (Klijn & Teisman, 1997
ppS9; Rhodes & Marsh, 1992). There are, however, acknowledgements in the literature
that engagement with or management of the network is essential in order for government
to achievegoals it would be unable to achievealone (Klijn & Teisman, 1997).The legitimacy
of a government department to be acting in a dual network and project manager role for
any particular game instigated by their own organisation is questionable. This is because
this dual role arguably reduces transparency in how funding is allocated to the network, as
the rigorous application processes to secure funds from the main managing authority
would not be used to select partners or sub-contractors. This role also provides the
government department with a monopoly on those funds, and with this monopoly comes
the power to distribute the funds as the project leader wishes. These questions of
legitimacy raise issues concerning the transparency of funding directed through these
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programmes and the overarching obligations of trusteeship to procure the best services for
the public.
This concern with governance in and of the network becoming more closely directed by
public managers draws the discussion finally to the need exhibited by the network to have
a body not only influencing in a network manager capacity, but actively driving, facilitating
and managing processes in order to achieve the desired outcomes. Funding instruments are
.,
tools of the state that are used to achieve its own policy goals, however these need to be
used strategically at the right time and in the right environment (De Bruijn & ten Heuvelhof,
1997). Even with this expectation of some contextual work having been applied to the
instruments, programmes may be too complex for a lot of actors to engage with
independently as a result of a lack of expertise, experience or capacity. This imbalance in
the network between organisations that do and do not have the relevant expertise to
compete fully in the game can cause the organisation governing the programme to attempt
to improve accessibility to the programme that goes beyond network management and
becomes a more hands-on strategic bridging activity.
The primary purpose of a bridging organisation is the connection of other organisations and
individuals in activist domains (Lawrence & Hardy, 1999). Agranoff (1990) has noted that
inter-governmental organisations emerged in the U.S. in response to a need for
organisations to bridge the state and the service delivery sector. Whilst Lawrence and
Hardy view bridging organisations as independent entities, Westley and Vredenburg (1991)
point out that unlike mediating organisations, bridging organisations enter into
negotiations to forward their own ends as well as the ends of those organisations involved.
These are somewhat conflicting views, however it is possible for governing organisations in
particular to act as a higher form of bridging organisation operating above the conflicts
within the network, whilst still forwarding its own policy agenda.
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Brokers or strategic bridges in cases where there is conflict are usually best placed to
intervene when there is a clear hierarchical dominance on the part of the intervening
organisation, or where organisations are collaborating (Brown, 1983). Therefore, governing
or mediating organisations are best placed to moderate interactions and develop
consensusas they operate above the resource and legitimacy competition experienced in
the network. Thesestrategic bridges are however still susceptible to, as noted by Lynn et al
(2000), the decisions and judgements of civil service employees, and these actors will look
to structurally embedded organisations in the first instance to achieve consensus and
deliver policy goals. Basedon these considerations, it is likely that governing organisations
acting as project leaders will become strategic bridges between the organisation and the
network, and will determine the successof organisations in receiving programme funding.
This thesis proposes that it is possible for governing organisations to move from being
network managers acting at a defined distance to control the rules of a game, to become
strategic bridging organisations that become embedded in the game itself, negotiating with
the network to develop projects and defining which organisations will be involved. Is this
MLGby another name?Or is this something different? The second analysischapter will look
critically at this process of government department moving from network manager to
strategic bridge and ask whether the network conditions caused by the programme
structure necessitated this change. A question that will inevitably follow this will be
whether the embedded involvement of a governing institution in the management and
distribution of funds to the wider statutory and voluntary sector was considered a
favourable outcome when the programmes were being designed, and whether the
programme design was in fact carried out to necessitate departmental involvement in
project partnerships.
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3.9 Summary
This chapter has demonstrated the need for the use of dual theoretical themes in order to
uncover the processes that influence funding programmes instigated by governing
institutions.
The first two research questions focus the study towards institutional and bureaucratic
.,
themes. These themes were illustrated on the right side of Figure 3.1 and considered to be
key in reinforcing MLG and shaping funding opportunities for organisations in the network.
Using first a bureaucratic lens to look closely at the state governed and bureaucratic
processes that shape funding programmes, the framework illustrates how organisational
desire for legitimacy and organisational commitment to its own bureaucratic values shape
eventual funding instruments and eligibility criteria. The work of Meyer and Rowan (1977)
and Scott (1987) on institutions, and Meadows (1967) and Zucker (1983) on legitimacy and
bureaucracy, contributed to the institutional approach used in this study linking to the
over-arching concept of MLG. Power, as discussed by Lukes (1974), Gray (1989) and
Berenskoetter (2007), is considered in terms of hierarchy, position and relationships, and
the concept of structural embeddedness (Burt, 1976; Granovetter, 1992) emerges as a
likely characteristic of successful organisations. At each level involving government, MLG
emerges as a reinforcing characteristic for rationalising activity.
Research questions three and four turn the focus of the study towards the network context,
illustrated on the left of Figure 3.1 (see p.83). This is important in understanding the ability
of network organisations to access funding and in answering research questions 2 and 3.
Themes of power, ratlonalltv, competition, strategic bridging and network management are
used to understand the functions and dysfunctions that characterise the inter-
organisational network, which in turn determines how organisations have differing ability
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to engage with the funding. Within this context, the importance of structural
embeddedness is reinforced and shown to create a higher tier of organisations within the
network that hold key informational positions.
Running through both of the overarching themes is a consideration of power and how this
is held and utilised throughout the whole process by different actors. This exhibits an
overarching theme of MLG.
In both the review of the literature and construction of the theoretical framework,
institutional themes emerge as likely to be slightly more dominant in shaping the ESF
funding route which is the focus of this study. This is due to the operation of type II MLG
within governing bodies, which does not conform to rigid jurisdictions and in which policy
aims and activities overlap. Further, the institutionalised nature of relationships between
governing bodies and network organisations will consolidate the relative importance of
institutional themes in addressing the overarching research question. That is not to say
network factors are marginalised, indeed without attention to these factors, it would be
impossible to understand why certain organisations are successful and others not. Rather, it
is important to consider the relative significance of the themes under investigation in
answering the key research questions.
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CHAPTERFOUR
The Welsh and European Contexts
4.1 The European Union (EU), Wales and the Structural Funds
In order to address the research question it is necessary to consider both the overarching
European environment and the Welsh institutional and network context in which the study
is situated. The European Social Fund (ESF)programmes were created and delivered against
a backdrop of significant structural change in Wales, and the scope and political context of
these changes should be considered alongside any research into the institutional and
network environment of this time period.
The first section of this chapter explores the history of the European Social Fund, its place
within the European Commission (EC) and its evolution into the programmes that were in
place in Wales for 2007-2013. Consideration of the themes guiding the ESF and the
implementation of changes and programmes in its lifetime by both the EC and by the
member state governments provides valuable context for the study of the partnership
project formed for the 2007-2013 programme.
Secondly, this chapter focuses on Wales as a devolved 'region' of the European community
made up of two NUTS 2 regtons'", This section provides background information on the
Welsh political and institutional environment, particularly with consideration to the
changes associated with devolution, and considers the relevant history of the Structural
Funds within Wales, focusing on the political and policy-making environment governing the
funds and the issues associated with the 2000-2006 Objective 1 programmes that preceded
the 2007-2013 programmes. This context is beneficial in understanding how policy-making
10 The Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics (NUTS) is a geocode standard for
referel1cing the subdivisions of countries for statistical purposes. The standard is developed
and regulated by the Eurostat for the European Union. NUTS is instrumental in European
Union's Structural Fund delivery mechanisms. The NUTS 21evel encompasses counties and
groups of unitary authorities
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was carried out in Wales, why the networks, relationships and partnerships detailed in this
thesis exist, and identifies differences in the structures and behaviours of those
organisations involved in the 2007-2013 programmes.
Finally, information gathered by Welsh institutions on the lessons learned from the 2000-
2006 programmes is explored, and relevant detail on the 2007-2013 programmes is
provided in order to illustrate the requirements that were set out for organisations wishing
to engage with the funds. This provides a basic guide to how the funds were presented to
the wider statutory and voluntary sectors and assists in the analysis phase in understanding
why the programmes were structured the way they were, and how this created a network
environment in which certain organisational profiles would have an advantage over others
in securing funding.
4.2 The History of the ESF
A brief history of the ESF is included as Appendix 1. This short section outlines the
significant changes affecting the fund that impacted upon this study.
In the previous chapters, the concept of MLG was raised in relation to the involvement of
supra-national, national and regional bodies upon Structural Funds policy delivery. It has
been proposed by some scholars (Hooghe & Marks, 1996) that MLG has been strengthened
through the changes made to the Structural Funds. This has likely strengthened
relationships between the EU and regional administrations, and has afforded regions a
louder voice and presence in the EU, a role in which they are able to take different positions
to their national governments. Importantly, MLG ceases the monopoly the nation-state had
on diplomatic and administrative relationships with other states and the EC.Cappelen et al
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(2003) studied the convergence of EU nations and the process and effectiveness of the EU
funds. They suggest that:
'One of the main purposes of the 1988 reform was to strengthen the co-
ordination between the regional policy of the Member States and the EU
structural funds on long-term plans and objectives.' (2003, p629)
Sutcliffe (2000) concurs with this view, stating:
'In one view, the 1988 reform was integral to the development of a system of
multi-level governance in the policy sector, whereby sub-national actors would
become increasingly important alongside European actors, such as the
Commission, and the central governments of the member states' (2000, p291)
MLG was, therefore, strengthened through the EC's changes to the 1988 Structural Funds
revisions, it allowed Wales' civil servants and politicians to develop relationships with
European counterparts, and as such, provided regions such as Wales with greater power
than they had previously, to speak for themselves in Europe.
Figure 4.1 provides an overview of the key developments in the Structural Funds from the
1988 revisions to the revisions of the 2007-2008 programmes. In 1994 the Cohesion Fund
was created to work alongside the two other Structural Funds. In 2000, the EU adopted the
Lisbon Strategy with the aim to make the EU the most advanced, knowledge-based
economy by the year 2010, and in order to support the Lisbon Strategy, the ESFadopted
additional priorities, ln the 2000-2006 period to focus on increasing specific economic
activities in deprived regions.
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Figure 4.1 The Evolving ESF
-Budget increase, refocus on regions
-Block grant programmes
=Partnership requirement - EU-Nation State-Region
.5 x 'Objective' strands
-Introductron of Cohesion Fund into Structural Funds alongside ERDF& ESF
-Contlnued partnership requirements
-Reduction in ESF'Objective' strands from 5 to 3
-Majorltv of Wales awarded ESFObjective 1 status (highest level of income)
.Wales able to administer the funding programmes independently for the first
time
.2 x broad ESFprogrammes replace 'Objective' strands. 'Convergence' replaces
'Objective I' and 'Regional Competitiveness & Employment' replaces
'Objectives 2&3'
For the 2007-2013 programmes, the ECwanted to focus interventions on adaptability and
modernisation to encourage enterprise and entrepreneurship. The new programme
provided an opportunity to all regions receiving funds to change their programme
administration and to redirect funds, if they so wished.
The 2007-2013 programmes formed the focus of this case study.
4.3 The Contemporary ESF
The ESFis now considered (Bulgarelli & Vergani, 2000) to be the main European financial
instrument for investing in people. The importance of the Structural Funds has grown
steadily over time, and represented the second largest budgetary exp.enditure in the EU
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(Sutcliffe 2000) at the beginning of the 21st Century. For the 2007-2013 programmes, the
amount allocated to the Structural Funds was approximately €75 billion, which represents
approximately 30% of the EU's budget and 1.17% of total EU GDP
The broad aims of the ESFare to develop areas which lag behind the rest of Europe in social
or economic terms, and it does this through supporting activities which break down the
social and individual barriers faced by peoplellvlng in these areas. The ultimate outcome
desired by the EC is to see these under-developed regions achieve parity of economic
activity and become active in production and trading. The ESFin its current incarnation has
been, according to the EUwebsite:
'Set up to reduce differences in prosperity and living standards across EU
Member States and regions, and therefore promoting economic and social
cohesion.' Europeon Commission (2009b)
The activities funded have focused on getting the hard to reach, under represented and
under-employed groups into work, focusing in regions where underdevelopment is
contributing to poverty cycles and related social issues. In order to accommodate the
lengthy budget negotiations for the programmes, ESF and ERDF Structural Funds are
administered in operating programmes lasting either 5 or 7 years, and one major condition
attached to ESFfunding is the requirement for all ESFfunds to be matched with a defined
proportion of funding from either the recipient government, charitable trusts and
foundations, or the private sector (match-funding). The match-funding requirement differs
between programmes, however can be between 30%-60% of a projects total cost. This not
insignificant sum must be confirmed before ESFmonies can be released, and therefore the
ability to acquire match-funding will dictate whether an organisation can access ESF
monies. There is, therefore, a parallel game running alongside the game to secure ESF
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monies. Match-funding may be contributed by each organisation from their own funds, or
could be applied for collectively for the purposes of the project. Projects run by
government may be in a better position to receive match-funding from the government
purse, however projects run by the voluntary sector or projects without governmental
match-funding would need to conduct parallel negotiations with, or make applications to,
other funding sources. Either way, organisations must be mindful of meeting their match-
funding requirements and the regulations attached to funding from other sources.
The ESF can be awarded to any organisation, regardless of sector, to achieve the
programme outcomes. In particular, the ESFcentres around 5 priorities:
• Helping workers and enterprises adapt to changing circumstances in the economy
• Enhancing access to employment and participation in the workforce
• Improving training and skills, both for individuals, and through better education and
training systems
• Promoting partnerships between actors such as employers, trade unions and non-
governmental organisations, for reform in the fields of employment and inclusion
in the labour market
• Reinforcing the social inclusion of disadvantaged people and combating
discrimination in the labour market
Source: European Commission (2009c)
Following the 1988 revised framework, for the first time, sub-national governments and
administrations would be involved in regional policy making that would govern expenditure
(Bailey & De Proprls, 4002). Rawlings (2003) noted that the ECsees the funds as a 'powerful
means of increasing the effectiveness, visibility and democratic acceptance of the Structural
Funds' (2003, p440). He goes on however, to argue that the regulations' provided by the EU
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for the partnership principle are ambiguous and provide the member state with significant
power to dictate who can be part of any partnership, and how to administer it. This
considerable room for interpretation means that member states or regions managing these
programmes are potentially able to channel the funds to favoured service delivery
agencies.
Bailey and De Propris (2002), similar to the findings of Cappelen et 01 (2003), asserted that
the Structural Funds framework serves primarily to provide nation states with a sense of
entitlement to funding, and that the potential for regional actors to share in policy making
concerning the funds was over-exaggerated (Bailey & De Propris). Rodriguez-Poseet al
(2004) shared the view that the funds had perhaps come to be considered an entitlement,
and that this encouraged dependence, meaning regions were unable to grow beyond the
threshold of assistance. Historically, some governments had considered Structural Fundsas
reimbursements for their contributions to the EU (Bailey & De Propris, 2002; Sutcliffe,
2000L and sought to direct funds to where they saw fit, avoiding devolution of these
choicesto regional government. This was contrary to the spirit of the funds, and in the case
of the UK government an intervention was made by the Commission in 1991, prior to
devolution, to stop this practice (Bailey & De Propris, 2002). In the context of Wales, its
newly acquired governance of the funds would allow it to shakeoff the historic constraints
on their useby the UKgovernment.
The processes of the administration of the funds by member state and regional
governments have been commented on by numerous authors (Bache & Bristow 2006;
Bailey & De Propris, 2002; Hooghe 1998; McAllister 2000; Royles2006), and these studies
provide a collage oft~e struggles experienced by those states and regions. Hooghe (1998)
and Bailey and De Propris (2002) cite Spain as an example of a country that possessed
neither the administrative or technical expertise to effectively achieve the required
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outcomes. Bailey and De Propris also point to the difficulties experienced by Italy, which
resulted in significant sums being returned to the Commission, as an example of ineffectual
governance of funds. There is some consensus (Bailey & De Propris 2002; Royles 2006) that
these difficulties were experienced as a result of a lack of regional administrative and policy
making capacity in the very areas that were required by the revised frameworks to take a
more active role in this activity. This demonstrates that the ESF funds have not been
universally well administered, and that even with the requirements placed on nations and
regions to administer the funds according to stringent rules and regulations, the
programme may still fail.
The number of regions eligible and in receipt of Objective 1 (now Convergence) funding has
grown larger with every programming period. In 1989 only 44 regions qualified as earning
less than 75% of European GOP, however this grew to 67 for the 2000-2006 programmes.
There is debate however, as to the effectiveness of the programmes. Of the 44 regions
eligible in 1989, 43 of those remained eligible for the 2000-2006 programmes (Rodriguez-
Pose et 0/2004). Within the 2007-2013 programmes, 39 of the regions eligible in 1989 will
still be in receipt of the funds. West Wales and the Valleys therefore joined a number of
other regions in being a repeat recipient of the funds. Could one reason for this be the
handling of the funds by the Welsh Government?
The ECawarded approximately €75 billion (30% of the EU budget) in ESFacross the Union
under the 2007-2013 programmes. Approximately 80% of this would be handled and
distributed by national administrations. Member states would therefore design their own
ESFoperational programmes in order to respond to the unique issues considered in local
context on the ground. The ECwould not have any direct control or voice in the distribution
of these funds, other than agreeing a framework for distribution and monitoring with each
member state distributor (Bailey & De Propris, 2002). The ECwould however, have both its
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institutionalised relationships and its increasing access to regional government Wales
through MLG, to exert its power over the direction of the funds. Wales therefore, would be
subject to ECinfluence, but would largely be able to decide the detail of its own ESFfuture.
4.4 Wales and the Early Days of Devolution
The creation of Devolved governments in Scotland and Wales has been judged
the most radical constitutional reform to affect the territorial politics of the
United Kingdom, at least since the Second World War, and arguably since the
Great Reform Act of 1832.' Hogwood et al (2000, p81)
Whilst Hogwood et ai's statement is debatable, their basic point that devolution has caused
significant structural change is sound. It is important for this study to consider devolution in
Wales in particular because the award of European Structural Funds was made within the
same year as the devolved government took power, and was subject to high expectations
and political scrutiny (Royles, 2006). The Welsh Government has never existed without the
influence of European Structural Funds on its internal policy environment, and the political
and policy-related activities surrounding the original 2000-2006 ESFprogrammes in Wales
would most likely have a significant impact upon the structures for the 2007-2013
programmes.
The New Labour government came into power in the UK in May 1997 with a mandate for a
broad programme of constitutional reform. The devolution referendum for Wales, held in
September 1997, resulted in the public voting in favour of devolution (Rawlings, 2003)
giving Wales its own legislature and supporting civil service.
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The referendum outcome approved and provided powers to the first Government of Wales
Act in July 1998, which led to the establishment of the National Assembly for Wales (NAfW)
as a corporate body in July 1999 (Rawlings, 2003) with limited and prescribed powers for
secondary legislation only (Drakeford, 2005). During its infancy, the civil service
administration was known as the Assembly Cabinet, and was not legally separated from the
National Assembly as it initially had no responsibility for scrutiny, an arrangement that
caused some friction in the early days (Osmond, 2000). This was quickly resolved through
restructuring, and the organisations were split into the National Assembly for Wales and
the Welsh Assembly Government (WAG11) (Palmer, 2008)
The first elections to the National Assembly for Wales (NAfW) were held in May 1999, and
the NAfW originally contained 60 Assembly Members (AM's). The NAfW's early years were
somewhat tumultuous due to the politics involved in establishing a new legislature, and
within the first year the new government faced 'a mounting tide of criticism' (Rawlings,
2003 pp1), a good deal of which was related to the management of the ESFprogrammes.
The young NAfW struggled to manage its newly awarded responsibilities, was accused by
opposition and in the press of having too narrow a focus on Structural Funds, and within a
short period of time, there was, as Drakeford notes 'one Party leader arrested, one
deposed in a 'palace coup' and yet another voted out of office by the Assembly itself
(Drakeford, 2005 p499).
Following the resignation of the first incumbent of the First Minister for Wales position due
to scandal, Alun Michael stepped into the role. However his political handling of the ESF
11Whilst much of this thesis' historical references will refer to the Welsh Government as WAG as it
was named originally, WAG was re-branded as the Welsh Government (WG) following elections in
May 2011 in order to further reduce confusion between the functions of the NAfW and WAG. This
thesis will predominantly refer to the 'Welsh Government' except where historical quotes use the
term WAG.
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Objective 1 programmes was to be his downfall" (Palmer 2008; Rawlings, 2003). Another
victim of the Structural Fund debates was the then Agricultural Minister, Christine Gwyther,
who was subject to two votes of no confidence concerning her apparent failure to
negotiate with the EC.This brief history should demonstrate the political importance of the
management of the structural funds, and serve as a warning to politicians and civil servants
that perceived failure or mismanagement has severe consequences.
A lack of flexibility in the operations of the new Assembly has been pointed to as significant
in the development of the devolved nation's policy work (Rawlings, 2003) including work
carried out on developing the ESF. The initial approach by Welsh political and
administrative leaders was suggested to have been quite narrow, and there have been
suggestions that the civil servants leading the early policy work in the Welsh Government
lacked experience in European and domestic policy making (Palmer, 2008). Early
accusations asserted that the new Assembly was not giving sufficient time to the issues
surrounding the implementation of the Structural Funds (Palmer, 2008), and, in particular,
AM's were argued to have given insufficient time for meetings with individuals perceived to
be key in negotiating better terms (Palmer, 2008). Rawlings (2003) provides a rather
damning account of an early plenary debate concerning the ESFfunding strategy:
'Here was a policy of fundamental importance to the economic regeneration of
large parts of Wales, one with many different aspects, and on which the
officials had laboured long and hard. The debate was crammed into one hour.
Far from being, in the infamous phrase, 'the Grand Inquest of the Nation', it
was 'the theatre of the absurd'.' Rawlings (2003, p190)
12 Rhodri Morgan took on the role of First Minister in October 2000 and occupied it until December
2009 when he was succeeded by Carwyn Jones.
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The inadequate amount of attention provided to the implementation of the Structural
Funds would suggest a lack of understanding of the gravity of the funds by the AM's in their
first days of government, and provides an example of the difficulties faced by the new
legislature.
4.5 Wales and Relations with the EU
It has been said that within Western Europe, the rise of regional government has been a
significant phenomenon in the last 50 years (Keating 1998, Rawlings, 2003). This has been
reflected within the strong regional focus within the EC,and was one of a range of political
drivers for devolution (Rawlings, 2003; Rodriguez-Pose and Gill, 2003). Indeed the EC, via a
European Strategy Group commissioned to look at the Wales-EU relationship post-
devolution, made a number of recommendations that would strengthen the Welsh-EU
bonds exclusive of UK government. This European Strategy Group Report (1998) makes
clear that in its devolved form, the National Assembly for Wales should have permanent
representation in Brussels, engage with European policy-making, support regular
secondments of civil service to the ECand encourage Welsh graduates to view the ECas a
potential employer.
Prior to devolution, neither Wales nor the Wales Office within Whitehall, had a significant
individual voice in terms of European policy making. The Cabinet Office European
Secretariat, the Foreign Commonwealth Office, the Treasury and the Cabinet Office Legal
Advisers have been identified as the main 'players' in the pre-devolution negotiation and
planning of European funding and policy (Hogwood et al, 2000). Whilst the Secretary of
State for Wales held ~ Cabinet post, these positions are often viewed as junior and do not
provide the power to influence key decision making on EU related policy (Palmer, 2008).
Whitehall's tight control of the European policy negotiation and implementation restricted
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the ability of wider actors to engage in the process and isolated Wales from early stage
negotiations on policy (Rawlings, 2003).
In reviewing the on-going process of devolution, Hogwood et al (2000) asserted that the
administrative and political landscape was becoming more complex and had begun to
challenge previous norms in engaging with Europe. They point to the fact that prior to, and
during devolution, the bureaucratic elements within Whitehall had the greatest input into
the management of European policy, but that this would likely be challenged by the
devolved territories once established. Since Hogwood was writing in 2000, Drakeford
(2005), writing five year later, commented in his view on Wales and New Labour that there
continued to be a tension during the negotiations for 2007-2013 programmes between
those such as the UK treasury who would prefer to see 'repatriation' of EU funds to nation
states, and the EC in Brussels, which promotes a regional approach (Drakeford, 2005).
Indeed, there continues to be friction between Wales and Whitehall concerning the UK
position on European policy in general, with Wales unable to wield any influence over, or
have a valued input into, Whitehall-based policy decisions (Palmer, 2008). This may be
compounded by the fact that although the Welsh Office in Whitehall is tasked with
representing the interests of Wales at UK government level, it is not required to act as a
mouthpiece for the Welsh Government, allowing the Secretary of State to formulate and
pursue actions based on their own views (Palmer, 2008).
The responsibility for ESF provided a significant opportunity for the newly devolved
government to make quick and visible impact when it took power in 1999, however it also
provided it with something of a headache (Rawlings, 2003). Morgan & Mungham (2000)
referred to the award, of structural funds as a mixed blessing for Wales, being beneficial to
the development of Wales from one perspective, but creating a significant political and
administrative burden for a very young devolved government. The very fact that Wales had
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been awarded this highest level of funding from the ECindicated that the nation was not
performing well economically compared to its peers, and reflected deep social and
economic issuesthat would no doubt be difficult to resolve. Of course, these wider social
issues could only begin to be tackled if the funding was targeted effectively. The work
required of the new Assembly to create the funding structures was significant, and would
require the collaboration and cooperation of Whitehall, the Wales Office and the EC. A
report issued by a European Strategy Group led by the ECand consisting of both ECand
Whitehall employees in 1998 stated that at its inception:
'The most urgent and immediate question facing the Assembly will be the
future support to Wales from EU funds. This should receive top priority as it is
crucial to meeting the economic development challenges for Wales in the years
ahead.' European Strategy Group Report, 1998, p8)
Much of this urgency revolved around the necessity for the Welsh Government to find the
necessary match-funding for the ESFmonies. The previous ESFmonies directed to the
Wales 'region' had been allocated via the UKgovernment and were subject to, and bound
up with the block grant calculated by the controversial Barnett Formula". The block grant
and budgets for Wales had already been agreed, and it was settled by the U.K.government
that the newly devolved administration would need to find within its block grant, the
13 The Barnett Fprmula, so-called after former Chief Secretary Joel (now lord) Barnett, was used
within the course of a public expenditure survey to adjust the spending plans for the three territorial
departments (the Scottish Office, Welsh Office and Northern Ireland Office) to reflect changes in
comparable programmes in England (or, in the case of Northern Ireland, Great Britain). Following
devolution, the formula has contributed to the calculation of the budgets for the Scottish Parliament
and the National Assembly for Wales. Put simply, the Barnett Formula .set percentages of changes in
comparable expenditure in Great Britain. That is to say, it would be 85% of expenditure for England,
10% for Scotland and 5% for Wales. Under devolution, it was decided that the Barnett formula would
be up-gated annually to take account of the latest mid-year population estimates to be published by
the Office for National Statistics. A reduction in the population ratios would mean that the Scotland
and Wales blocks receive smaller increases as a result of expenditure increases in England but
smaller reductions in the event of cuts (Twigger, 1998).
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necessary monies to provide match funding to the ESFgrants. As a result, the new
government:
'Had little choice but to scrabble around for funds to initiate the [ESF]
programme, while continuing to pursue negotiations with the Treasury for
special treatment' (2003, p80)
This early difficulty was destabilising for the politicians involved, and even though they and
their civil service had devoted considerable attention to the ESFprogrammes, the sheer
scale of the funding seemingly at stake was enough to trigger resignations. McAllister
notes:
'There were tensions from the very outset between the Assembly and the
Treasury in Whitehall surrounding the issue of match funding far the first
Objective One prowamme in Wales. It was to prove the irresistible catalyst
bringing about the resignation of First Secretary, Alun Michael, early in 2000.
Between May 1999 when the Assembly met for the first time and Michael's
resignation in February 2000, the planning and organisation for the
management of the newfunds had been a priority for the Assemblyand its civil
servants.' (2000,p595)
These observations are also echoed by Morgan & Mungham (2000), who note that the
whole issue of Objective 1 funding and the principle of additionality 'cast an awesome
shadow' over the NAfW, and they claimed that, although the substance of the ESF
programmes may hav,ebeen in the quality of the projects, the politics, internally within the
UKat least, were in the issuesof additionality. Shortly after the departure of Alun Michael
as First Minister, the UK Treasury provided Wales with the substantial extra funds it
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required in order to implement the new programmes. Approximately £20 million was
provided over three years, with a further £500 million being earmarked for 2003-2006
(Rawlings, 2003). This provided the Welsh Government with the budget to implement its
own projects, and allowed it to avoid the necessity of raising match-funding from private
sources that would seek to include their own vision in any projects. This provided the
Welsh Government with a certain level of freedom in delivering its fairly inclusive and
grants-based approach to funding distribution.
The Single Programming Document governing the Structural Funds was finally signed off by
the EC during July 2000. This approval allowed the Programming Monitoring Committee
(PMC) within Wales to be formed. Representatives from all three sectors, plus political
parties, technical and thematic experts (e.g. voluntary sector, business, environment) and
EC representatives made up this committee, the purpose of which was to monitor and
guide the programmes (Royles, 2006; Rawlings 2003). This committee would be the main
interface between the ECand Wales for the Structural Funds programmes, and it is at this
intersection that influence from the ECmay be applied and may persist, ensuring the ECs
agenda is not forgotten or overlooked throughout the programme life cycle. It is possible
that it is at this point that some aspects of MLG are most evident, with the supra-national
EC able to engage with the sub-national Welsh Government and influence its actions. It is
also clear that direct relationships between the EC and Wales would be formed and
institutionalised through the PMC, and that this would provide opportunities for both
agencies to completely by-pass the member state government.
In 2000 the administration of the funds fell to the Welsh European Funding Office (WEFO).
This office was formed from the former Welsh Office European Affairs Division with staff of
the Wales European Programme Executive. The PMC continued to oversee WEFO's work
and guide its approach to implementation. WEFO, as an executive agency of the Welsh
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Government, became the Managing Authority for the structural funds in Wales (Royles,
2006). In 2003, a further shift took place in the status of WEFO, with its executive agency
status being removed, and its integration into the Welsh Assembly Government
Department for Economic Development and Transport taking place. The politics of the
absorption of WEFO into the Welsh Government structure concerned increased
accountability and control over WEFO's activities. Mindful of the points made earlier in this
chapter concerning a political lack of precision in managing the Structural Funds in the early
days of the Assembly, the absorption of WEFO into the Assembly signalled that the
government was trying to remedy those early criticisms. The process of moving WEFO into
the central governmental structure was a clear demonstration of governmental will to be in
control of, and accountable for, the work of WEFO.
Within its 2007 Annual Implementation Report for Objective 1 programme 2000-2006,
WEFO describes its aims:
'WEFO'sprimary aim is to ensure that Wales derives maximum benefit from
European funds. Its objectives are to enhance economic development and
employment opportunities throughout Wales by promoting sustainable
economic growth; increasing prosperity in all parts of Wales and tackling
inequality, inactivity and the resulting social exclusion.' (1999, p9)
WEFO is therefore, in its own view, the body that designs the funding programmes in line
with the European regulations, assesses applications for funding, awards monies, and
monitors funding awarded. This is conducted under the guidance and advice of the PMC,
and within the reporting structures of the Welsh Government.
- 130-
Against the backdrop of the 2000-2006 ESF programmes, the Welsh political and
administrative leaders began building their presence in Brussels, hiring new staff and
becoming more active in attempting to influence relevant EU policy (Palmer, 2008). There
had also been an indication that the Welsh governing bodies were now responsible for
influencing the UK position in Europe, rather than blaming centralised government if Welsh
considerations were not taken into account (Palmer, 2008).
4.6 Wales, Partnership and the Voluntary Sector 2000-2006
Welsh devolution provided an obvious opportunity for the newly formed National Assembly
to differ from Whitehall in their strategic planning and delivery of services in Wales. The
2000-2006 Objective 1 programmes were of huge significance, and enabled the Welsh
governing institutions to implement their inclusiveness agenda. This inclusiveness agenda
was key in Objective 1 programme design, resulting in open programmes that were similar
to grants funding models. Rawlings states that 'inclusiveness as a constitutional value takes
on a special prominence in the Welsh devolutionary scheme' (2003, p8). There is some
general consensus that Labour's influence within Wales, and its 'third way' approach has
included a more central role for voluntary sector organisations to engage with policy
development and delivery (Alcock, 2009).
The Assembly rhetoric was that it would be open to, and would draw into it, a range of
interests in society, sharing values and objectives across the sectors and working as a model
of inclusiveness. The 1998, and newer 2006 Government of Wales Act demonstrated
arrangements designed to create relations. The Assembly itself would, therefore, have a
lead role in encouraging the reform of wider engagement with the governance and policy
process, and thematic communities would form around the Assembly's policy powers
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(Royles, 2006). The partnership processes implemented under the first round of ESF
funding 2000-2006 consisted of three layers illustrated in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2 Three Tiers 0/Partnership
2000-2006 Programmes: Three-tiered partnerships
Local Regional Strategic
• Geopolitically • Thematically • High level overview
structured structured • Social, rural,
• Partnerships • Regional community and
covering local partnerships business
authority areas and providing differing partnerships -
engaging third expertise usually Wales-wide
sector and grass-
roots groups in
projects
Source: Rawlings (2003, p441) & Royles (2006, p140)
There were between 3-10 partnerships per local authority, and several cross-authority
projects in this programme. These were not integrated with the hundreds of individual
projects operating in isolation, and neither was WEFO able to fully evaluate the socio-
economic performance of such different projects. It is documented that there were
concerns from within the voluntary sector about implementation, delays and bureaucracy
directed at the 2000-2006 Objective 1 programmes. Rawlings notes:
'It is not surprising to learn from the coolfoce not only of cumbersomeprocess
and lengthy delays - an elongated decision-making chain - but also of
elements of incoherence and duplication of activity across the range of
different levelsof partnerships.' (2003, p442)
This would be logical given the di~cussion earlier in this chapter concerning the teething
problems experienced by the young devolved government. It is also a useful observation in
identifying at least one of the motivations behind reforming the future programmes, as
duplication in particular would demonstrate poor return on investment, and prolonged
decision-making structures prove unpopular.
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'There is, too, evident tension between, on the one hand, a programme
objective of 'developing the skillsand attitudes to allow the region to compete
as a modern advanced economy', and on the other hand, limited or small
minority representation of business in the formal structures of partnership"
(2003, p442)
This last point Rawlings makes is interesting in highlighting the parochial nature of the
partnership structures in place for the 2000-2006 Objective 1 programmes. How can
genuine change be planned and implemented without significant input from the
community of interest being targeted for growth?
It is documented that the development of the Objective 1 SingleProgrammeDocument was
a largely public sector affair (Bache, 1999; Brooksbank et at, 2001). However, it has been
argued that upon implementation of the programme in the early days of devolution,
paradoxically, the opportunities for engagement were too many and too wide ranging for
the third sector to cope with (Royles, 2006). Indeed, the 'three-thirds' principle, whilst a
noble endeavour, was a struggle to implement in practice (Bristow et al, 2008). This
principle required steering and other management groups to be composed of one-third
public sector, one-third private sector, and one-third voluntary sector representatives. In
reality, difficulties in meeting the quotas for private and voluntary sector positions
rendered the principle unworkable. The ability to engagewith the policy processesrequired
expertise and capacity, qualities that were common in large organisations that could afford
to keep dedicated funding staff on the payroll, but qualities that smaller organisations in
Wales lacked. No ..immediate or tangible financial compensation could be provided to
organisations 'donating' staff to partnerships and this reduced the pool of available
participants (Royles,2006). Roylessummarised:
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'Overall, it seems that it was simply assumed by WEFO, the Assembly and WAG
that all partners could participate effectively and equally, and disparities in
experience, skills and resources were not adequately recognised.' (2006, p145)
There is however, a legal basis for engagement with the voluntary sector in Wales, and
Section74 (1) of the Government of WalesAct 2006 states that:
'The Welsh Ministers must make a scheme (the voluntary sector scheme)
setting out how they propose, in the exercise of their functions, to promote the
interests of the relevant voluntary organisations. ' Legislation Online (2011)
This third sector scheme is mandated, and is an agreement between the Welsh
Government and the third sector in Wales to engage with and use the services of the
voluntary sector. This scheme ensures that principles of partnership are embedded in the
work of the Welsh Government, and provides a legal basis for voluntary sector
organisations to exert their influence in policy making. The scheme does not go as far as
supporting the sector to engage, but provides a commitment to listen and structure
consultation to enable those organisations that wish to engageto do so.
The partnership principles, such as the three-thirds principle, embedded into the devolved
government's activity could certainly be viewed as entirely positive action by a third sector
wishing to take advantageof such opportunities. However, there is a clear tension between
the wish of the Welsh Government to be inclusive, the capacity of organisations to engage,
and the necessity to spend European funds in line with requirements. MLGemerges here
in the development of bureaucracy, and Rawlings (2003, p335) warns that 'a danger of
devolution is centralisation' pointing to an absorption of powers from local level into
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regional territory level, potentially disenfranchising the very grassroots communities that
partnership principles were supposed to target. If Rawlings is right, then any increase in
centralised collaborative or partnership activities may serve to exclude a significant
proportion of the Welsh voluntary sector. Alcock (2009) in his working paper on devolution
acrossthe UKmakesa similar observation, pointing to the potential issuesof closer state-
voluntary sector partnerships in terms of incorporation of organisations into the state, but
also identifying isomorphism as a risk factor in reducing the diversity of organisations
delivering services.Whereas Objective 1 programmes avoided this form of centralised and
standardised project funding, this complete aversion is likely to have contributed to the
failure of the programmes. Criticism was highlighted in WEFO's evaluation of the
programme, as the grants-model used resulted in a lack of coherence and strategic
application that could ensure the many individual projects were contributing to a clear
strategic vision. Most importantly, socio-economic performance was not improved to an
acceptable level through the Objective 1 programmes, and this would logically have an
impact upon the 2007-2013 programme designs.
Bachtler (2002) and Royles (2006) noted the politicisation of the structural funds, and
Bachtler was mindful of the context of the scramble for funds, stating that 'Wales is unique
(not just in the UK but possibly across the EUas a whole) of having to accommodate so
many institutional shifts at one time' (Bacthler, 2002 p39). This is just one of the reasons
why this casestudy is so interesting. The scale of institutional change that Bachtler refers
to, at a time when organisations were vying for funding, created a rush to influence any
seemingly influential individual. Royles(2006) identified incidencesof lobbying of individual
Assembly Members (AM's) by voluntary sector organisations in order to increase the
pressure on civil serv~nts to accommodate their needs.This relational basisfor engaging in
policy making or funding could create a two-tier system within the voluntary sector
(Levasseur & Phillips, 2009) where organisations that have some 'personal access to
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relevant policy-makers may pull ahead of others in the funding race, and become more
established as a result. The volume of opportunity that is only meaningfully open to a small
minority could also contribute to a two-tier system and result in a dense range of
partnerships populated by the same people (Royles, 2006). This is a key consideration in
this research, and provides further evidence of the case against the open, grants based
structures of the 2000-2006 programmes.
Royles' paper on Civil Society (2006) is important to consider here given the research she
carried out into partnership in the previous 2000-2006 Objective 1 programmes. Royles
states that:
'The key to explaining the degree to which organisations could meaningfully
contribute to Objective 1 partnerships was resources and capacities.' (2006,
p144)
Royles points to the issues discussed above, such as a lack of capacity or expertise within
the voluntary sector to engage, and the daunting level of complex reporting required, as
reasons key to explaining the level of engagement of civil society groups under the 2000-
2006 programmes. Within these programmes, however, it is evident that organisations
were being awarded project monies for them to deliver services independently. During the
application procedure for securing ESFmonies in the 2000-2006 programmes, application
materials show that organisations were merely required to give an account of how their
project would meet the programme aims, provide standard project plans and details, and
illustrate how they were avoiding duplicating services. In practice, this resulted in a high
number of low net ~orth grants being awarded and some duplication of activities (NAfW
Enterprise and Learning Committee, 2011). Under the 2007-2013 programmes, the Single
Programming Document for Wales shows there have been significant changes in the
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requirements for collaboration that remove the possibility of organisations applying and
delivering projects independently, which inverted the practices of the 2000-2006
programmes by providing a low number of high net worth projects. These fewer but
significantly larger projects received significant facilitation to be inclusive, and events by
organisations such asWCVAwere held to enable the smaller organisations gaining funds in
the previous programme rounds to be able to gain funding in 2007-2013, as these smaller
groups were be required to collaborate aspartners.
It has been argued that inclusion may be more of an issue than the initial Welsh
Government rhetoric on partnership and the 'third way' would suggest. Inclusivity
appeared patchy within the Objective 1 programme, and the delivery of this programme
drew criticism for its incoherence and poor performance in reducing social and economic
disadvantage. Royles (2006) noted a clear shift away from inclusivity for the voluntary
sector by the majority Labour Assembly Government installed in 2003, and suggeststhat
this could have led to a constraint of opportunities for the majority of voluntary
organisations to engage with the Assembly. She suggested that the Welsh Government
would need to up-skill the sector significantly in order to offset continuing disparities
between those organisations that have the ability to engage, and those that do not. This
study explored how the Welsh Government conducted itself in the distribution of the
funds, and looked closely for any evidence of this 'upskilling'. The failures of Objective 1
and criticism made as a result would logically impact significantly upon the design of the
2007-2013 programmes. Where incoherence, duplication and inclusivity characterised the
Objective 1 programmes, the criticisms generated by it would prompt the Welsh
Government to move away from this to a more strategic and top-down system of funding
distribution in 2007-2013.
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4.7 The 2007-2013 Programmes
The 2007-2013 Structural Funds programmes in Wales were intended to bring significant
financial stimulus to the Welsh economy. As detailed by WEFO in its operational
programme document for the ESFConvergence fund:
'The region will receive total Community funding of €2.08 billion to suppart
Convergence programmes worth over €4 billion. This ESF Convergence
programme will receive Community funding of €833 million (40% of the total).
When this is combined with national public and private funding, the
programme will provide €1.S0 billion to boost growth and jobs over the period
2007-2013.' (200ge, p1)
The 2007-2013 programme, much like the preceding 2000-2006 programmes split Wales
into more or less socially and economically developed regions. The 2007-2013 Convergence
stream mirrors the preceding Objective 1 geographical locations, named as West Wales and
the Valleys. This area receives £1.6 billion of funds due to the high levels of poverty and
economic inactivity in these areas, in particular targeting young people and providing them
with the skills needed for work. This programme has 4 priorities which are:
• Providing young people with skills for learning and future employment
• Increasing employment and tackling economic inactivity
• Improving skills levels and the adaptability of the workforce
• Modernising and improving the quality of public services
Source: European Commission (2012a)
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East Wales by comparison, is awarded only a fraction of the funds, £120 million, and these
are distributed under the 2007-2013 Competitiveness programme (previously Objective 3).
These funds are more targeted at getting those outside of the workforce economically
active again, and at improving and increasing relevant business skills (WEFO, 2011). The
area of Wales covered by each fund is shown as Figure 4.3, where the yellow areas display
the Convergence areas (NUTS 2 West Wales and the Valleys), and the White areas show the
more affluent Competitiveness areas (NUTS 2 East Wales).
Figure 4.3 Wales Convergence Areas
Source: WEFO (2009a)
In order for the expenditure to produce satisfying outcomes, member states must have
effective structures in place to distribute funds and demonstrate outcomes (Duhr et al,
2010). In their thematic paper on the implementation of the 2007-2013 ESFprogrammes
across the territory, Ferry et 01 (2007) stated that:
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'/mp(,ementation systems are vital to the achievement of Cohesion Policy goals,
for the efficient delivery of quality projects and as an area where Community
resources can add value' (2007, pV)
Implementation priorities for 2007-2013 have been identified as:
• Improving the strategic management of programmes - ensuring value for money
• Investing in capacity for programme delivery - increasing support for organisations
• Changes to partnership arrangements - Lisbon Treaty considerations
• New co-ordination arrangements - changes to programme structures
Source: Ferry et 01 (2007, pviii)
These priorities are based on evaluation of previous programmes across Europe by The
European Policies Research Centre at Strathclyde University, and the known changes to the
2007-2013 programmes. This report reflects extensively on the issues experienced by states
in the previous programming periods, and identifies a range of potential issues. Ferry et 01
go on to state that:
'A broad concern is the complexity and time involved in implementing
programmes through increasingly complicated systems.' (2007, plO)
This concern for the implementation process is specifically based on evidence of delays in
the development and implementation of previous programmes, and is a key consideration
within this study. The failure of the Objective 1 programmes to reduce economic
disadvantage and produce coherent outcomes prompted the need for a more strategic
approach in 2007-2013. It followed that, based on the duplication of activities and volume
of individual projects for Objective 1, improvements in coherence and strategic delivery
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could be made through the development of larger projects which could deliver higher
volumes of outcomes over larger geographical areas. The programme structures and
materials would therefore need to be designed to attract only such desirable strategic
projects. In Wales, the use of new tools, called 'strategic frameworks' was expected by
WEFO and the Welsh Government to improve the integration of projects and contribute to
a more strategic approach to funding. These strategic frameworks provided a level of
thematic split that would sit underneath the main operational programme document for
the 2007-2013 Convergence programme in Wales, and the overarching single programming
document that was agreed at the highest level with the EC. WEFO also indicated that it
wished to reduce the number of applications received and projects awarded compared to
the 2000-2006 programmes, and work with fewer, larger and more strategic projects that
exhibited strong partnership and inclusion principles (Ferry et at, 2007). In its operational
plan for the Convergence funding stream, WEFO notes:
'Evaluationsof the 2000-2006 programmes have suggested that there are too
many projects and that it is difficult to quantify the contribution of some of
these to achieving the strategic aims and objectives of the programmes.'
(200ge, pl06)
WEFO awarded 2,937 projects ESFand ERDFfunds under the 2000-2006 programmes, 65%
of which were under the ESFprogrammes. This amounted to a considerable workload for
that department, especially considering that this number is for successful applications only
and does not take into account the assessment of unsuccessful applications over that
period. This trend towards fewer, larger projects was reflected across many EU countries,
based not only on guldance from the Commission, but also on past experience of significant
administrative burdens on managing authorities to manage a high volume of projects (Ferry
et al, 2007).
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Partnership is a theme that has run through this chapter as a key operating principle for
both the EC and the Welsh Government. WEFO had invested in the evaluation of the
previous 2000-2006 programmes and these reports identified several areas for
improvement, citing the strength of local and regional partnerships as particularly effective
(WEFO, 200ge).
The angle of the partnership principle that would translate into the project requirements by
WEFO would need to be carried out with care. This is because the evaluation report cited
the difficulties organisations experienced in the partnerships formed under the 2000-2006
programmes, especially when combined with the existing administrative requirements
attached to ESFfunding that were already known to be a significant barrier to voluntary
sector organisations engaging with ESF. This is made clear in the WEFO 2007-2013
operational programme - Annex B covering lessons learned from previous programmes,
which states:
'The Commission recognises that the control procedures required ore often
regarded by those involved in the implementation as unwarranted, given the
costs involved, and as duplicating national systems. There are also concerns
that the administrative procedures could discourage participation in
Partnerships by voluntary/community sector or social partners and discourage
these partners from bringing forward projects. '(200ge, p40)
This WEFO Annex to the 2007-2013 operational programme (200ge, p38) also cited several
examples of how difficulties within partnership manifested, such as lack of sharing of good
and poor practice, a I~Kkof understanding or individual partner roles and lack of capacity to
engage with the partnership.
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The principle of partnership within the ESFprogrammes was strengthened by WEFOfor
2007-2013 to improve the strategic direction of the programmes. In its operational
document for the ESFConvergencefund it states:
'Sustainable and effective solutions to the challenges facing Wales are
increasingly reliant on the direct and active participation of all stakeholders at
national, regional and local levels. The Managing Authority (WEFO) is
committed to working through good-quality partnerships and networks to rally
key stakeholders behind the Lisbon reform agenda so that resources are
genuinely focused on growth and jobs. In accordance with Article 11, the
Managing Authority will work in close cooperation with both the Commission
and representative partners at national, regional and local level, including
representatives in the economic, social and environmental spheres. This
partnership engagement will cover the preparation, implementation,
monitoring and evaluation of the Operational Programme.' (200ge,p187)
WEFO, therefore, committed itself to working in partnership in the development and
management of these programmes, as well as enshrining them within the application
process to do so. This would reduce the duplication of work funded through the ESF
programmes, and encourage voluntary sector organisations to work together. WEFOalso
stated in its operational document for the 2007-2013 Convergenceprogrammes its belief in
the necessity of collaborative work to overcome cross-cutting and complex social and
economic issuesthat required multiple fields of expertise that only partnership could draw
together (200ge). WEFOtherefore made dear its intentions to promote the partnership
agenda,and its belief.that funding work that was carried out in partnership was a key route
to addressing the main programme objectives. Indeed, throughout the operational
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document for the convergence programme, indicative activities for achieving the aims of
the programme list examples such as:
• strengthen co-ordination and liaison mechanisms with partnerships and promote
partnership working. WEFO (200ge, p166)
• supporting projects by regional and sub-regional partnerships to implement and
improve joint delivery arrangements, including shared approaches to improve the
delivery and/or efficiency -of procurement, corporate functions, environmental
management and customer service. WEFO (200ge, p163)
From the very beginning, therefore, WEFO was clear in its intentions to fund the 2007-2013
programmes with a much stronger partnership focus than the previous programmes and
such explicit language provided groups wishing to secure funds with a clear understanding
that partnership was integral rather than peripheral to any project they required funding
for. Partnership would logically create some standardisation across organisations in
evidencing socio-economic outcomes, and would be more strategic in targeting delivery
activity through requiring organisations themselves to streamline their work. WEFO carried
this partnership principle through to its acknowledgement of the voluntary sector role in
achieving the aims of the programme, specifically stating that strategic partnership had a
role to play and committing to promote the engagement of the sector. The document
states:
'The Managing Authority will promote good governance and partnership,
including by efJcouraging the participation of social partners in programme
activities. This includes allocating an appropriate amount of ESFresources to
capacity building actions as defined in Article 5(3). The Managing Authority will
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also encourage participation and access by voluntary and community
organisations, particularly in projects that promote social inclusion, gender
equality and equal opportunities.' (200ge,p190)
This commitment includes an indication that funds would be provided for 'capacity
building' actions in enabling the voluntary sector to engage, although there is no research
to demonstrate whether this would support embedded organisations or the wider sector.
Article 5 (3) of the ESFregulations that is quoted in the extract from the WEFO operational
programme refers to capacity building activities such as training, networking measures,
strengthening social dialogue and joint activities, and is specific about ensuring measures
improve the adaptability of workers and enterprises involved. Importantly, Article 5(4)
builds on these suggestions, stating:
'The managing authority of each operational programme shall encourage
adequate participation and accessby nongovernmental organisations to the
funded activities, notably in the domains of social inclusion, gender equality
and equal opportunities.' (2011b)
WEFO was, therefore, required by the regulations to not only provide the voluntary sector
with the opportunity to engage with the ESFprogrammes, but to actively encourage those
organisations to do so, implementing activities such as those suggested to enable that
engagement. In line with these requirements, WEFO launched a 'project ideas' notice-
board on its website in 2008 to allow individual organisations to find others to partner with
in the themes they wished to work. The WEFO operational document states:
'Strategic Frameworks will be posted in draft form on the WEFOwebsite for
comment prior to their agreement, allowing for the widest possible
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engagement of individuals and organisations at all levels. The website will also
provide a space for prospective project sponsors to publicise brief details of
their project ideas with a view to encouraging partnership and collaboration at
a project level.' (200ge, p189)
This space for organisations to communicate and develop a partnership would be the first
place organisations wishing to engage would be directed. Whilst WEFO could be considered
to have fulfilled its obligations to engage the voluntary and private sectors through making
information available and providing the notice-board facility, there was a distinct lack of
facilitation evident from WEFO in actively encouraging partnership or widening
engagement. The information and notice-board made available to encourage participation
of the voluntary sector were 'hands-free' tools that required minimal maintenance and no
direct contact between those using them and WEFO. WEFO's attempts to comply with the
EU Regulations could therefore be considered to follow the letter, but not the spirit, of the
requirements for participation.
The acknowledgement of the difficulties that partnership requirements potentially
presented to the voluntary sector in Appendix B to the operational document was not
clearly reflected in the wider strategic requirements set out in the operational documents
or application material. Additional support was provided directly by WEFO to the voluntary
sector in the form of the website notice-board and in the form of regional Spatial European
Team individuals to enable this sector to overcome the barriers that partnership caused in
the formal project development activities. The Annex B (200ge) made several additional
recommendations such as provision of training and ensuring partnerships were more fully
aware of their responstblhtles, however it is unclear from the document where the
responsibility for the provision of this training and support lies. The meaning of these
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somewhat light-touch activities logically suggestsan organisational reluctance to deal so
directly with smaller voluntary organisations in 2007-2013.
The principles underpinning the move to these larger strategic projects suggest that large
partnership projects would procure smaller organisations to deliver work on their behalf as
well as deliver their own sections of the projects, and in this way, the EU funds would
continue to filter down to those organisations that would have been awarded their own
individual project funding in the previous programme rounds. This is, however, the
theoretical direction of funding, and would not necessarilybe borne out in practice due to
the institutional influences putting pressureon the programmes design.
4.8 Summary
This context chapter has provided an overview of the EuropeanSocial Fund and its history,
and has shown how incremental changes in the fund over the years have shaped the
principles underpinning how the funds are directed both socially and geographically to
target the most socially and economically disadvantagedareaswithin the EuropeanUnion.
The award of ESFfunds for the programming period 2000-2006 was in one view, a
significant boost to the new government's spending powers. However, in a different view,
the funds were an enormous administrative, managerial and political burden to carry. The
EU funds received in Wales were afforded the highest importance and claimed political
casualtiesasa result of perceived failures, however, later programme reports show that the
methods of funding distribution exhibited issues such as delay, duplication and
incoherence.
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The 2007-2013 programmes were specifically designed to avoid duplication of past errors.
These programmes were to be more strategic and more targeted, whilst retaining principles
of partnership and inclusivity. These changes to the requirements of the programmes signal
a shift in the attitude of WEFO and, more widely, the Welsh Government, to achieving the
policy aims set forth by the EC.
These changes have significant implications for the voluntary sector in Wales and for this
study. Whereas in the previous programme an individual organisation had merely to
propose a project it wanted to carry out relating to its own expertise and the proposal
would either be accepted or rejected, this revised process requires organisations to
collaborate to design large projects that include a number of partners or sub-contractors.
These changes, with the potential to reshape the network depending upon which
organisations do or do not receive funds, will have long term consequences for the
engagement and success of the voluntary sector in Wales, and this is why it is important to
explore both the construction of the programmes and the receipt and distribution of funds
within the network. The findings of this study will demonstrate that specific institutional
and network factors interact to significantly reduce the pool of organisations in Wales able
to receive ESFfunds.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Research Methods
5.1 Introduction
This chapter provides a rationale for the research methods utilised in this study, and
discusses the strengths, weaknesses and implications of those choices. It considers the
issues that emerged in the course of carrying out the study, and how these were assessed
and resolved to ensure good quality, relevant and unbiased information would be collected.
Firstly, the decision to use a qualitative method is discussed, demonstrating the logic
applied to this choice and its superiority over a quantitative method for the purposes of the
research question posed in this study. This discussion flows into the process of narrowing
the research methods suitable for the study, to present the benefits of a case study method
over other qualitative methods available.
The chapter then focuses on the question of sampling and how a suitable sample was
identified and engaged to participate, making clear the potential for bias and threats to
validity implicit in this process. This proceeds to a consideration of the process of data
collection, including a review of interviewing techniques and guidance utilised in this study.
A short description of the analysis follows this, outlining the processes executed to make
sense of the information collected.
This chapter ends with a discussion of the ethical considerations necessary to ensure good
practice in research and validity of the information collected.
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5.2 Why Use Qualitative Methods?
This study takes the view that this institutional and network reality is a shared social
construct, produced and perpetuated by the actors involved, and regulated by shared and
socially constructed meaning and knowledge. This position is best associated in the
literature with social constructivism or interpretivism (Blaikie, 2003 p17). Social
constructivism stressesthe relevance of culture and context in understanding how society
organises itself, and constructing knowledge based on this understanding (Derry, 1999;
McMahon, 1997). This perspective is closely linked to the theories of Vygotsky (Daniels,
2005) and Bruner (1960), and to Bandura's social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1977). This
basis for the research lends itself to a more qualitative method, and as the research
question does not attempt to enumerate or quantify the incidences of a phenomenon,
rather, it attempts to understand how features of a system occur and influence other
systems in turn, and research methods to investigate how shared experiences and values
constructed these systems would be required. Similarly, 'interpretivism' indicates those
strategies in sociologywhich interpret the meaningsand actions of actors according to their
own subjective frame of reference (Williams, 2000 p210).
It became clear in the very early stages of the research that a statistical or other form of
quantitative study would have been unsuitable to address the research question posed.
Given the complexity of the processes under investigation, quantitative data would be
unlikely to provide the depth of information required to demonstrate how the programmes
in question were structured, and would also have been unlikely to provide scope for
unknown factors to emerge (Hardy & Bryman, 2004 p8). The perceptions of participants
would be crucial to understanding the phenomenon being studied, and a quantitative study
would have been difficult to develop to capture these perceptions. Due to potential
difficulties in designing questions to capture the right data, the volume of questions that
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would have been required, and the range of different 'types' of participant, it is difficult to
envisage how a quantitative study of this size would have been able to uncover the
influences of institutional values and history upon the structuring of programmes without
significant margins for error that would render the study invalid.
A second consideration in choosing between qualitative and quantitative approaches was
the sample size available. The small pool of project partnerships receiving this funding at
the time of this study was so shallow as to invalidate any attempt to use surveyor similar
methods, as the limitations in sample size would have likely invalidated any conclusions
from a statistical analysis (Black, 1999). In order to gather meaningful evidence to answer
the research question, the stories of participants would also need to be traced back several
years in some instances against the context of significant political change, and participants
would originate from a range of organisations with a wide variety of different experiences.
A quantitative tool such as a surveyor questionnaire would be unlikely to capture the
contextual differences in participant experience, and the questionnaires would need to be
sufficiently different for each participant 'type' to ensure relevant information was
captured. In addition to this, the choice of using a network analysis approach would provide
a broad contextual structure in which the study would sit, enabling multiple linkages, as
considered by structural embeddedness theory, to emerge.
A qualitative study would be more likely to provide the rich data necessary to address these
points, as qualitative methods provide greater flexibility in participant experience (Creswell,
2007), enabling the capture of descriptions as articulated by the participant in their own
vernacular (Creswell, 2007), to pursue themes that a participant does not ascribe
importance to but which may be of significance to the study (Denzin & lincoln, 2005), and
taking in contextual information that may be relevant to the research question (Creswell,
2007). In the early stages of the research, consideration was given to the use of different
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approaches, such as a phenomenological approach, as well as a case study method, to
address the research question.
5.3 Why Use a Case Study?
The complexity of applying the research question to the proposed environment became
clear very early in the planning process for this study. The overlapping institutional and
network environments meant that other methods such as phenomenology were
considered and discounted due to the risk of the study cleaving in two, or failing to acquire
sufficient meaningful data. According to Yin, a leading author on case study research, 'the
distinctive need for case studies arises out of the desire to understand complex social
phenomena' (Yin, 2009 p4) and allows researchers to retain the meaning and value
attributed to events by participants, in order to better understand how a system works.
Similarly, Stake (1995) stated that 'a case study is the study of the particularity and
complexity of a single case, coming to understand its activity within important
circumstances' (Stake, 1995 pxl), The complexity of a single case was therefore judged to be
sufficient to investigate how theory can be applied to a system that has not been provided
much attention in the literature.
A case study method enabled the focus to be directed upon one partnership and to explore
the vertical process of ESFfunding from the ECright through the Welsh Government and its
departments, and down to the grass roots organisations in service delivery roles. This
encompassed both the institutional and network aspects, and provided scope to use a
variety of resources. A case study approach consisted of one 'experiment' which would be
used to iIIustrate.how two levels of theory interact to produce a funding channel, and this
would have the potential for further development in the future. This method also allowed
for an in-depth investigation into a phenomenon that will not occur again in this particular
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context after the closure of the programme in 2013, making the case quite unique. Case
studies that exist within the literature demonstrate comparable complexity to this case, e.g.
Le Gales (2001), Mikkelsen (2006), and as such, it was clear that the case study would be a
legitimate method for investigating the research questions. Recent examples that bear
similarities to this study include a case study method used by Le Gales (2001) in
investigating French urban policy networks and the political influence upon them, and also
by Mikkelsen (2006) to demonstrate how individual organisations utilise policy networks to
their advantage. Both of these studies acknowledge the wider political environment in
which the network operates, and identify the institutional themes that have influence over
activity within the network.
A variety of media were available for this study, both within the public domain or secured
via request under the Freedom of Information Act 2000, which would provide documentary
evidence to complement interview or observational activities to answer the question. A
case study method is able to encompass evidence from a variety of sources in order to
explore a research question and allows for triangulation of data to enhance validity
(Creswell, 2007). In this case it was envisaged that copies of annual accounts, annual
reports, project design documents and other materials would provide a balanced evidence
base that would reinforce or question assertions made during interview or observation.
The type of case study to conduct was also a key consideration for this research, and there
occurred initial difficulty in defining the study as either cross-sectional or longitudinal. From
one perspective, this study would view the case in a very detailed and descriptive manner
and focus on a snapshot of the events that had taken place. This would suggest a cross-
sectional study (Millser 01,2009). A different perspective on the case is, however, possible.
Given the nature of the case as a process rather than a single occurrence, with information
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collected about a series of events taking place over a period of two years, the study could
be argued to be more longitudinal in nature.
Upon reflection, this research was most suited to a cross-sectional approach, as the
research questions formulated focused more upon a specific period of time and a specific,
time-limited process. Whilst the process occurred over a period of time, the purpose of this
research was not to understand how the passage of time affected certain events, rather, it
was to understand how past actions had influenced the observed outcomes. Additionally,
the research was conducted over three years, with data collection taking only one year, and
with very few participants being revisited. Such time-constraints would be unlikely to allow
for a valid longitudinal study of this process as described by Mills et 01 (2009).
5.3.1 Potential Drawbacks
The potential drawbacks associated with the case study method of research have been
widely debated in the academic field. An illustrative paper by Miles (1976) provides an
articulate and cautionary tale concerning the pitfalls of approaching and carrying out
qualitative case study research. Miles points to an inability to meaningfully generalise
findings across his 6 cases as one of the failings of the case study method. He does not
consider, however, multiple case studies and 'generalizability' to be absolutely necessary to
produce valid results. In science, facts are rarely based on single experiments. Rather, they
are based upon multiple repetitions of experiments by various researchers. It is therefore
possible to look at a case study as a single experiment, and to assume that case studies
have the potential to contribute to theoretical proposltlons and not to a population (Yin,
2009). The exlstlngIlterature on institutions, networks and partnership will be used in this
study, alongside the findings, to aid in forming conclusions that can be used to evidence
and to challenge established theory. Concerning the use of case studies in public policy,
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Heclo (1972) discussed concerns that this method did not appear historically to contribute
to empirical theory, and cited the importance of a relevant theoretical position to improve
the likelihood of a case study being more than an interesting narrative.
A common difficulty observed among researchers, in particular inexperienced researchers,
is the issue of selecting a 'bounded' case, and defining the case in terms of time,
participants, and other related variables (Creswell, 2007). A positive feature of this specific
study and the research question to be addressed is that it provides a useful linear
parameter for the research, viewing the processing of ESF funds vertically from the
institutional development to the network implementation phase in the form of a project
partnership, reducing the difficulties involved in identifying the case boundaries. The
network environment aspect of the case was not so easily 'bounded' as the institutional
one, however the study considers the network to include those organisations that had
expressed an interest in becoming an ESF project partner in order to limit the potential
field.
Based upon the considerations in this section, a case study method was considered to be
the most appropriate method for exploring the research question, and for producing
meaningful results. Whilst there are criticisms levelled at the validity or generalizability of
case studies, the fact that this study examines institutional and network theory would
ensure that it produces valid conclusions that go beyond narrative in exploring how funding
is distributed.
5.4 Selecting a Sample
In looking at the institutional and bureaucratic dimensions of the development of the
programmes, the process of agreeing the programmes between Brussels and Cardiff was
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firstly mapped out to detect which teams and which departments had involvement in
creating the frameworks. Based on this work, preliminary contact was made with each area
to investigate which individuals had the most involvement and knowledge of the process at
different levels, and access was negotiated at this point. Further individuals that were very
involved outside of the vertical process were also identified through their roles on relevant
committees and through their names arising on official documentation secured through the
Freedom of Information Act 2000. In addition to this, snowball sampling was employed, in
which participants were asked to identify other individuals they thought may have relevant
experience of the funds. The limited number of relevant individuals involved in the
development process meant that at least one individual at each level, from those agreeing
the programmes in the ECto those implementing the programmes in Wales, was able to be
interviewed.
Whilst it was relatively simple to identify the relevant public institutions and departments
involved in the structuring of the programmes, an investigation of a project partnership
would be required to fully understand how the programme structures influenced the
composition of partnerships. At the time of this study, the limited pool of potential project
partnerships to observe within the ESFcontext in Wales meant that only a small number of
partnerships were suitable for consideration. A number of these partnerships were
-, however, either pre-existing in one form or another prior to the inception of the 2007-2013
programmes, or the partnerships were 'lead partner only' which were single organisations
planning on subcontracting all activity, and therefore not consisting of a meaningful
partnership. It would be unlikely that the composition of pre-existing partnerships would
have been affected by the changes in ESFfunds for 2007-2013 to the extent of them having
clear relevance to this study. Even if these partnerships had changed their composition in
relation to the new funding programmes, it would represent a different experience to a
newly formed project partnership, and would have significantly' more project-specific
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historical and political factors influencing the change rather than the new funding
structures alone. With regard to procurement based projects, these would not provide an
insight into the partner selection element at all, however the number and size of these
projects were monitored and contributed to a comparative aspect of the analysis of this
study in demonstrating how funds have been distributed through procurement exercises
rather than through project applications.
As discussed previously, the field of study was small in scale and there existed within the
network some overlap in individual interests with regard to staff turnover and committee
membership. Given the practitioner experience the researcher possessed in the field of
study, several potential research participants were known to the researcher. As such, care
was taken in the choice of participants to avoid partnerships where the researcher had pre-
existing relationships with the organisation or its leading staff.
The delays in the opening of the 2007-2013 programmes for application and the complexity
of the process meant that projects took a considerable amount of time to develop and
secure funds. Only two projects were approved in 2007, and only 17 were approved in
2008. Few projects emerged with a cross-sectoral partnership, and even by 2012, only a
total of 5 projects included partners from more than one sector.
The project partnership eventually selected for this study was among the first projects to be
announced as receiving ESFfunding in early 2009. The lead partner, a Welsh Government
department, began consulting widely with the voluntary sector in 2007 and confirmed the
partnership membership in mid-200B. Elements of this process were highly visible to the
wider civil society network as application for partnership was widely invited by the Welsh
Government, and from a large pool of over 50 potential partners, a mix of nine voluntary
and statutory sector organisations were selected to become partners (with the Welsh
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Government Department acting as the tenth and final partner). One of these organisations
dropped out during the very final stages of securing project funding from WEFO, but has
been included in this study as a confirmed project partner as it is the project development
and selection process that is of greatest interest to this study.
Some of the confirmed partner organisations could be considered to be almost statutory in
nature given the core support provided to them from statutory sources such as the Welsh
Government or from local authority sources, however others had a balance of funding and
seemingly more autonomy from the state. This was a 'flag-ship' project when it was
launched by the Welsh Government and as such would be worthy of study not only to
explore how the project partnership formed and how the programme structures and
network relationships affected this, but to provide a baseline knowledge for future study
into how the Welsh Government itself interacts with and inadvertently shapes the wider
civil society network through its funding programmes, ESFand otherwise.
The partnership selected was prominent in the 19-strong pool of potential projects at the
time the research was carried out due to its composition of statutory, voluntary and hybrid
partners. It was also judged by these characteristics to be representative of the type of
collaborative partnership that the Ee, in its ESFregulations and guidance, had indicated it
wanted to see tackling complex social and economic disadvantage. As this was potentially a
project partnership that would provide an ideal model for replication given its size and
diversity, this partnership was chosen for this study. Figure 5.1 illustrates the project
partnership.
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Figure 5.1 The Case Study Partnership
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Voluntary
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Interviews were carried out with one or two relevant individuals at each partner
organisation, dependent upon the size of the organisation and the involvement of multiple
representatives in the project process. These individuals were predominantly a chief
executive and either a trustee or a funds manager. Interviews were also carried out with
the civil servants that developed and managed both the programmes and the project.
These wen: predominantly within the Welsh Government, however two participants were
sought from the ECto gain a European perspective on the aims and regulations attached to
the funds.
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In order to gain a rounded view of the network processes,interviews were carried out with
a small sample of organisations that were unsuccessful in gaining membership in the
partnership", and also with key voluntary sector individuals with a good knowledge and
overview of ESFfunds in Wales. Of the significant number of unsuccessful organisations,
eight were selected to participate in this study, and this consisted of three purely voluntary
sector organisations from eachWelsh 'region' (North, South, & Mid-West) and two smaller
statutory organisations. This was approximately 10% of unsuccessful organisations,
~
however, being mindful of the scope and overall focus of the study, a small sample was
judged to be sufficient to produce balanced opinions on fairness and selection in the
process.
In total, 35 interviews were carried out for this study, and in addition, annual accounts,
reports, programme documentation and project documentation were gathered and
analysed.Further details of participants can be found in Appendix 4.
5.5 Interviewing
Within this casestudy, interviewing played a significant role in data capture, and Yin (2009,
ppl02) notes that the benefits of interviewing include the ability to specifically target data
collection around the areas of relevance, and the level of insight that interviews can
provide, bringing to the fore the perceptions of those involved and their assessmentof links
and causes. As noted earlier in this chapter, the potential for greater depth of
understanding arising out of the use of qualitative methods, such as interviewing, was a key
factor in both choosing a qualitative method, and choosing a case study structure. The
format of interviews can range from the very structured in which questions are
predetermined, ordered and standardised, to the completely unstructured, in which the
14 Identified following a review of all applications to the project managing departmentfor the
project, releases under the Freedomof InformationAct 2000
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issuesof interest are allowed to emerge organically through a conversation. In this case, it
was judged that highly structured interviews would create the same restrictions on the
quality of data as a quantitative study would have created. However, at the other end of
the spectrum, carrying out a programme of unstructured interviews would be both time-
consuming and potentially redundant if the issuesthat were the focus of the study did not
emerge organically. It was decided that the most effective course of action would be to
pursue a semi-structured approach, in which a range of topics and key questions would be
developed for use, with these being subject to changeor for the interviewer to be able to
pursue points of interest further where they arose. In this way, the interviewer would be
able to draw out further information, guiding the conversation whilst not stifling the
participant.
All methods have strengths and weaknesses, and Yin (2009) discussed several perceived
weaknessesof interviewing asa data capture technique. Hewarned against bias arising out
of poorly articulated questions, the potential for respondents to provide inaccurate
answers due to poor recall of events, and reflexivity resulting in the participants presenting
events in a way they believe the interviewer wants. In order to reduce the risks of these
weaknessesemerging, significant consideration was given to the questions to be asked,and
informal consultation on them was conducted with colleagues to check their clarity.
Reflexivity was reduced by giving an idea of what the interviews would be about prior to
conducting them, and through raising this with respondents prior to collecting information.
It was explained that participants may sometimes feel that they are being asked the same
question or circling back to issues because they aren't giving the 'right' answers. It was
made clear that this was not the case, and no 'right' answers existed. It was stated that
returning to themes or accounts was necessary to confirm details or to gain a better
understanding, and that as long as answers were genuine, anything said would be
extremely useful to the study. The issue of inaccuracywas considered, and whilst this was
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reduced given the short time period between the actions taken and the interviews,
triangulation was used to corroborate details in participant accounts wherever possible.
There also existed the issue that the longitudinal nature of the process under investigation
would produce differing views than those held initially by participants, as such individuals
may have changed their views over the course of the process. Questions were included to
uncover any differences in feelings or views on the funding process that occurred.
The discussion of power and of the work of Lukes (1974) within Chapter Two of this thesis
raised the possibility of some very powerful agents shaping global business and political
structures to dictate how individuals think about and approach their environment. Clegg
(1989) made the very valid point that Lukes' approach, taken very rigidly, would potentially
render data collected from individuals subject to this form of power as useless. These
participants would arguably, according to Lukes's philosophy, be providing answers based
on values and desires impressed upon them without their explicit knowledge or
understanding, and as such any data drawn from them could be fundamentally flawed.
Clegg, discussing the implications of Lukes' argument, states:
'From this perspective it may be said that people do not know their own minds.
It is precisely the belief that they falsely think that they do which is the locus of
the problem of hegemony.' (1989, p3)
This exploration of individual's intentions and reasons for their actions as a form of
analysing power is therefore problematic for the researcher. It is possible that there is an
ultimate inability to ever be able to know what individuals think about things without the
data, in theory, being clouded by a more powerful influence. It was not possible to
approach this study with such definite assumptions, however it was beneficial to have an
awareness of this concept of 'false consciousness' that participants may be operating in.
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Based on these potential difficulties with the interviewing process, participant perception
of the interview and its aims was managed, and it was imperative to adopt a neutral and
non-judgemental approach to asking questions. Becker (1998, pp58-60) recommended the
use of 'how' questions, rather than 'why' questions, as he argued that participants would
be more likely to become defensive if asked a 'why' question, and this recommendation
was actively followed within this study. In order to reduce potential defensive stances, the
participants were informed of the general purpose of the research, and that it was being
approached neutrally. However, the possibility of participants wanting to present a certain
image of themselves and their organisation contrary to reality would be a continuing
concern.
5.6 Elite Interviewing
There arose from the literature a need to consider the implications and characteristics of
gathering data from the elite individual in order to conduct a successful interview. Several
individuals key to the process of developing the funding streams, implementing the
programmes and developing the case study partnership could be classed as 'elite'
individuals within the Welsh network, the Welsh Government or the Ee, or as 'inter-
organisational leaders' within the given inter-organisational network. There are several key
considerations when interviewing elite individuals that needed to be accommodated prior
to collecting, during and in analysing the data received, and these will be described in this
section. It is important to specify here, that the term 'elite' is not used here to describe
individuals who may form what is considered a 'power elite' in some other scholarly studies
(Wright-Mills, 1956) for example, CEO's of international companies, heads of state,
oligarchs, and the like. Rather, the term elite in this discussion will refer to individuals in
those positions cited above, such as politicians, senior civil servants, chief executives and
committee chairs.
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The term 'elite' was used but not explicitly characterised by Dexter (1970) despite his
contribution to the concept of elite interviewing. Indeed, Dexter, in questioning what is
meant by 'elite' refers back to Riesman's (1964, pS28) definition that merely suggest that
elite status is something attached to those requiring 'VIPtreatment on topics that relate to
their importance or exposure' in an interviewing situation. This lack of a clear definition,
and failure to describe what identifies an individual as a member of an elite, has been a
criticism of Dexter's work (Richards, 1996). Harvey, in his paper on methodological
strategies for interviewing elites (2009) arguesthat:
'An individual's position within a company ... is not exclusively an indicator of
elite status because certain actors are deemed elite members because they
hold strategic positions within a social network and therefore act as important
connectors and bridges between social structures.' (2009, p4)
This argument is applied to the network and the individuals therein for the purposesof this
study, as this study involved engaging with actors that occupy several key positions, and
therefore are important links between organisations, aswell as 'elite' individuals within the
organisations in which they are employed. Harvey (2009, p4) goes on to identify other
relevant factors in determining what affects 'elite' status, and points to the relevance of
place and time in this assessment. He argues that elite status can be embedded within
spaceand time, explaining:
fA person . . . might be considered to qualify as an elite member in one
particular region but not in another. In addition, this group are by no means
spread evenll( across geographical space, and elite status is not static since
individuals can gain or lose their status over time.' (2009, p4)
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These arguments provide some justification for using the term to refer to the supposed
'elite' individuals within this study, but contributes to the arguments of Smith (2005) who
debates the variations in the usageof the term, and therefore the usefulnessof the term at
all. For the sake of clarity, within this thesis, the term 'elite' is used to describe individuals
who hold key positions of power or influence within Wales, the UKand Europe and within
the phenomenon being studied.
Dexter (2006) a pioneer of 'elite interviewing' detailed useful guidance in the practicalities
of dealing with elites. Harvey (2009) discusses the specific implications for junior
researchers when interviewing elites, and suggests five core areas that require
consideration in this activity. These five considerations are however, quite applicable to
interviewing in general, and therefore provided a good basis for pursuing the right
information. He recommended firstly being both organised in making and maintaining
contact with elite individuals and their staff, and secondly to be flexible to the individual's
needs. Harvey maintains that elite individuals may try to dictate the conditions of
interviews, such as timing and location, and that these factors may affect the type of
information the individual iswilling to disclose.Heargues that it may be more beneficial to
meet elite individuals outside their workplaces to reduce distraction and to provide
opportunity to disclose professionally sensitive information. This may be appropriate in
certain researchcircumstances, however the choice of venue within this study was given to
each individual participant for their convenience, as it was unlikely that extremely sensitive
organisational data would be imparted in the course of the interview. Specifically
requesting an interview external to the working premises of an individual could call into
question the motive behind the research and prove counter-productive to a study where
the general researchaims can be disclosed to participants.
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Harvey's (2009) third point is to ensure transparency in communications with elites, arguing
in line with Dexter (2006) that this instils trust and comes 'to the point of the matter'
quickly. Both Dexter (2006) and Harvey (2009) note the likelihood of elite individuals to ask
how long interviews will take, and that this group may challenge the purpose or usefulness
of the project. A clear rationale for conducting the research communicated succinctly could
serve to reduce debate on this matter, and a short rational of the study and its goals was
provided to each participant at the point of requesting access. Fourth, Harvey (2009)
recommends maintaining good etiquette to ensure professional standards, and fifth,
advises to persevere with rejections and after uncomfortable interviews.
Whilst this provides a useful baseline for basic protocol, these basic points lacks the more
detailed attention to interactions prior to, and within, the actual interview. The process of
gaining access to elite individuals for this study could have presented obstacles such as
refusal to meet, access only via gatekeepers or non-response, among other things. Elites
will frequently have Personal Assistants or similar individual's charged with managing their
diaries and screening individuals requesting their time. Peabody et al (1990) stress that the
role of these individuals is to protect the interests of their organisation, and researchers
should not be put off by the necessity to negotiate access with them. Harvey (2009) notes
that gatekeepers may be able to negotiate access with multiple relevant participants, and
Dexter (2006) goes further than this by suggesting that access can be arranged as a result of
the participant making a recommendation to their contacts, providing the researcher has
conducted themselves professionally.
Whilst these points were taken into account during the negotiation of access, there were
only two individuals, who declined to participate but were considered of limited relevance
to this study. For the purposes of this study, it was expected and it transpired that some
individuals were known to the researcher as a result of a previous professional
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acquaintance, and that this increased the likelihood of acknowledgement and co-operation.
Where gatekeepers were in place, it was considered appropriate to discuss the possibility
of the interview and the research itself with the gatekeeper first, to enable them to
positively suggest it to the relevant individual.
5.7 Access and Interview Conduct
The negotiation of access and the response provided by participants to any questions may
also have been affected by a slightly different approach of what has been referred to as the
'lnsidery'outslder' concept, where the researcher may already be {inside' or {outside' circles
in which the participants exist. It should be noted here that this discussion differs from the
earlier discussion of Grant's (2004) {insiders' within the Literature Review Chapter in terms
of its focus upon the researcher's position in the study in terms of gaining access, rather
than the status of participants of the research. This was a relevant consideration for this
study as a result of the researchers familiarity and professional history in the Welsh
voluntary sector. Harvey (2009) discussed the fact that {insiders' could be considered to
have an advantage in gaining access due to a shared sense of belonging to the participants,
but that {outsiders' could potentially collect more objective data and critically assess it. It is
likely in these terms, that the researcher would be considered an {insider' in terms of
gaining access to individuals at a certain level, mostly within the Welsh voluntary network,
but viewed as an {outsider' when gaining access to the wider professional participants
outside of the voluntary sector network, such as those within the Welsh Government and
its departments, politicians and aides within the National Assembly for Wales, and those
participants working for the EC. This dual status required the researcher to be mindful of
possible assumptions made about them by certain participants in terms of their
professional history within the sector, and their previous affiliation to certain organisations
and individuals. More importantly, this factor was a consideration in "the execution of the
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study to be aware of any possible personal bias and to mitigate against the risk of that
bleeding into the approach to the research being carried out. The interviewing and analysis
stagesof the research in particular needed to be carried out with particular care to avoid
using leadingquestions.
Another dimension of the insider/outsider concept that could have affected the data
gathered relates equally to the core identity of the researcher and the research participant,
and how that is perceived by the other. Ethnic identity may play a subtle. part in the
interview interactions such as an individual making assumptions about the other and
tailoring their answers accordingly (McEvoy, 2006). Whilst in McEvoy's case this was
discussedin relation to carrying out research in Northern Ireland, it was a phenomenon to
be mindful of in any interview situation. In particular, these considerations were considered
relevant to the Welsh environment where there exist deep cultural divisions between
Welsh speaking and non-Welsh speaking individuals, and a divide between the north and
south of the Welsh nation (Rawlings,2003). Participant perception of the researcher may
also have been a factor where interviews were carried out with individuals of non-British
nationality within the EC, where it is also possible cultural generalisations may have
influenced opinion.
Within an interview situation, the participant should feel a level of comfort about the
process in which they are in, and it is important for a researcher to ensure relations are
polite and relaxed to achieve a certain level of trust. Harvey (2009) noted that it is
important to develop a rapport with subjects from the first contact, and that this can be
greatly improved by carrying out preliminary research into each subject to enable
conversation and to have a better consideration for the participants needs. Certainly,
within this research project, a certain level of research into potential participants was
carried out as a matter of course prior to invitations being sent, and this provided good
groundwork to develop rapport with all of the participants, elite and non-elite alike.
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McDowell (1998) raised the possibility of presenting oneself differently according to the
individual being interviewed. Shepoints to a tendency to 'play dumb' with older male elites
as this allowed them to take on a patriarchal role, whereas with women of a similar age to
herself, she would adopt a more 'sisterly' approach to achieve their confidence. McEvoy
(2006) also points to a clear 'power dynamic' obvious during the interviewing stagesof her
studies, where she was conscious of being a young female carrying out research in the
'male space' of politics. Her experiences go some way to support the strategies of
McDowell (1998), as she cites occasions during interviews when participants provided
answers to her questions in a similar fashion that they would explain it to their daughters,
and referred to her as 'love' or 'dear'. McEvoy (2006) found this patronising and irritating,
and had to account for her negative feelings when analysing the data, so as not to bias any
findings. This kind of treatment was not generally experienced within this research,
however there were occasions when participants would seek to simplify or gloss over
concepts they appeared to consider were too complex or lengthy to fully explain, and in
these instances, significant enthusiasm on the part of the researcher was required to
encouragefull explanations or disclosures.
The format of the questions directed at participants for this study was an important
consideration in terms of gathering the quality of evidence required. Harvey (2009, pp12)
states that subjects prefer not to be asked closed ended questions, and this is a positive
assertion for the purposes of this qualitative study, which requires rich data most likely to
be derived from using open-ended questions. Berry (2002) highlights the possibility of elite
individuals in particular 'often or advertently not answering the questions askedof them'.
In this case, he advised that continuing and backtracking to pose the question differently
may be more beneflclal that asking it again in a direct fashion, and this strategy was
required during a number of the interviews conducted.
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Because the interviews were split between those conducted with the case study partners
and those that were involved in the development and structuring of the programmes,
different questions and conversational steers were used to focus in on the areas of interest
with different participants. When interviewing those individuals developing the
programmes, examples of questions asked" to stimulate the conversation include:
• Could you give me an idea of how the 2007-13 programmes were developed?
Which organisations/departments/individuals were involved?
• How long was the process? Were there delays? What caused those delays? How
were they resolved?
• Which policies/frameworks did you need to apply/work within when structuring
the programmes? Did any of these constrict what you were trying to do?
• What were you trying to achieve by changing the programmes from 2000-06?
• What impact upon the voluntary sector do you think the new programmes will
have?
Typically, the following questions were used in interviews to prompt conversation with key
members of the partnership:
• Could you tell me from your perspective how you came to become part of the
partnership, from when you first heard about it to when your bid was approved?
• What kind of involvement have you had with the Welsh Government in the past?
• Have you received funding, been on a steering group or been involved in lobbying
with the Welsh Government?
15 See Appendix 2 for full interview schedule
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• Which individuals were you most in contact with when the bid was being
developed? What kind of relationship do you havewith them now that the bid has
been agreed?
• How did the Welsh Government decide who was going to be a partner? Why do
you think your organisation was selected over organisations that have similar aims
or expertise?
• How involved are you in the Welsh voluntary sector environment? Do you have
links with other organisations or work together with other organisations?
• How do you feel about the demands and processes involved in the
application/formation process?How did you interpret the ESFrequirements? Did
you haveany support to do that?
In the later stages of the interviewing process, a small number of questions were asked
concerning points raised by other respondents in order to triangulate the evidence
collected (Flick,2009). Examplesinclude:
• It's my understanding that the programmes were heavily influenced by civil
servants in the EC.Was that your experience?
• I have read that all of the partners have Welsh Government funding in common,
received prior to the partnership project, was that a consideration in selecting
them?
• I read in the guidance that projects are supposed to procure instead of have a very
large partnership, is that the plan with this project?
Through using these types of questions, a range of information was provided, and key
themes were pursued to confirm details or to peel back layers of administrative ritual to
understand the underlying reasonsfor certain actions.
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The nature of these interviews prompted the use of a digital recorder, to ensure that all
information was gathered in the participants own words, and to reduce the need for the
researcher to make continuous notes on only the spoken information emerging. The useof
such a device allowed the researcher to engage more fully with the participant and to
collect non-verbal information such as changes in body language, hesitation and facial
expressions.Berry (2002) noted that during careful observation of one interviewee, he was
struck by the individuals' tendency to lower their voice when they were criticizing their own
organisation. Hecommented that this was 'seductive' in leading him to believe that he was
being told something confidential due to the interviewee going 'out of his way' to tow the
party line. The recorder also allowed a full transcript to be produced of each interview,
making the maximum volume of information available for coding and analysis.
The responses gathered from individuals would inevitably vary, and would display
differences in opinion, passion and logic, however Berry (2002) warns of the pitfall of the
persuasiveparticipant. Hestates:
'There is a very high risk of finding one interviewee more persuasive than the
others and having that one interview strongly shape our understanding of the
issue.' (2002, p680)
Thiswas a significant potential pitfall, and certain participants were extremely convincing in
their convictions on the programme and articulated their arguments with an air of
superiority. Berry (2002) goes on to explain that the participants will have consciously or
not, thought about what they would like to say in the interview, and will likely attempt to
justify their actions, or opinions. Further to this, he warns of simple exaggeration by
respondents, and advisesthe researcher to consider what is being left out of the opinion or
account to allow for the exaggeration.
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Further to the above considerations by Berry (2002) there is not a good deal of literature
concerning elite interviewing that deals directly with getting past the official 'party position'
when interviewing politicians, and these individuals would require additional attention
during interviews to unravel genuine opinion from the 'official line' (McEvoy, 2006). The
background of this study makes reference to the Welsh power-sharing government, with
Labour and PlaidCymru operating asa coalition at the time of the research.Politicianswere
included in the sample where they were considered to have had relevant influence or
knowledge on the programmes in Wales. A consideration in these interviews was the party
affiliation of these individuals and whether the information collected would suffer from
party bias.McEvoy (2006) warns:
'The researcher should also take into account politicians' competing narratives
and consider how recent political developments may cloud their interpretations
of past events.' (2006, p189)
This is a useful perspective to use when analysing data from all participants, and this
influenced the preliminary pre-interview research on each individual and organisation to
ensure full preparation was carried out and a reasonable awareness of current issues
affecting these participants was developed.
5.S Use of Documentary Evidence
The merits of the case study method include the ability to utilise a wide range of
information in order to build a comprehensive picture of the phenomenon. Whilst the bulk
of information would most certainly be gathered in the form of interviews, the variety of
other relevant information on the project partners and relevant organisations added a
valuable seconddimension to the study.
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This study utilised publicly available information on the partners and other relevant
organisations to ensure a clear picture of each partner was formed based not only on
qualitative evidence and opinion, but also on financial and historical facts. This information
took the form of annual reports, financial accounts, items on official websites, and
documents such as the project plans and copies of emails sent by the individuals working
on forming the partnership. The Freedom of Information Act 2000 was instrumental in
securing a wide range of documents from statutory sources concerning the formation
processof this partnership and the development of the programmes, and the information
secured under this legislation included emails, internal briefings, reports and draft project
documents. The Charity Commission's website also proved a useful resource in accessing
the audited accounts for both the members of the partnership and the organisations that
were unsuccessful,enabling the main sourcesof funding for participant organisations to be
identified.
5.9 Approach to Analysis
It has been acknowledged by authors in the subject (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2009) that the
method of analysis in casestudy research is not formulaic or standardised, and therefore
this can produce a challenge to pull together in a coherent form. In the planning stage of
this research, the decision was made to carry out a system of coding in the first instance in
order to identify broad themes, coding further to produce smaller sub-themes and
categories that would link to demonstrate how the process operates in reality. A code has
been described as 'a word or short phrase that symbolically assignsa summative, salient,
essence-capturing, and/or evocative attribute for a portion of language-based or visual
data' (Saldana,200~ p3), and this definition of a code is one that was implemented in the
three coding cycles carried out for this research. An example of a code taken from this
study is asfollows:
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1We have had severalgrants in the past from various
WAGteams.
1EXISTING FINANCIAL
RELATIONSHIP
Coding in this manner produced overarching themes, with categories and several sub-
categories underneath exhibiting a pattern that in the analysisstageswas linked back to the
institutional and network theory structuring the study.
Coding was only the first step in the analysis activity, and Miles and Huberman (1994)
suggested tabulating data, creating charts and categories, noting frequencies of activities
and using chronology, to rearrange the data several times in order to allow themes to
emerge. The evidence collected from both interviews and other documentary sourceswas
rearranged and regrouped several times in order to draw out key strands of interest that
were influencing the processof the funds.
The initial analysis and presentation of the findings was carried out chronologically,
providing an account of the phenomenon in a linear fashion. However, it proved difficult to
present the analysis and findings in this way due to the recurrence of themes throughout
the process and the cyclical nature of the concepts explored. This method became
repetitive and cumbersome, with the narrative disjointed. The decision to approach the
analysis and presentation in a thematic form proved more fruitful. Themes in this thesis
were grouped based on the coding and manipulation of data, and this allowed for themes
emergent in several stages of the case to be examined together, rather than repeatedly
through a chronology.
The documentary evidence was vital in providing a method of triangulation both in the
interviewing stage and in the analysis stage, and there were instances where the
documentary evidence reinforced what had been said in interview, 'and others where it
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disputed it. The use of evidence relating to organisations unsuccessful in acquiring
membership of the partnership was also used to compare the differing experiences of
those who were involved in the application process. Finally, the use of the theoretical
framework for this study detailed in the Theory Chapter was implemented to explain how
the process functioned, and to present a coherent picture of the complex phenomenon
under the microscope. The analysis is split into two chapters, one focusing on institutional
aspects and MLG, and the other focusing on the network, competitive and collaborative
aspectsof the casestudy.
5.10 Ethical Considerations
The study focused around government processes and a statutory and voluntary sector
project partnership operating openly in the public domain. The focus of the researchon the
combination of factors involved in funding programme and partnership development is
intended to uncover links and behaviours that are unlikely to be controversial in the public
sphere, or to pose risk or distress to individuals or organisations in any way. Information
was provided to participants in the form of an information sheet at the point of requesting
accessoutlined the project, the aims, and ensured participants were informed of what they
could expect from the process and how they could withdraw consent if they wished. This
sheet specified the area of study as ESFprogramme development and partnerships, but
was not explicit in explaining the theories structuring the project or in identifying the
programme development and partnership formation activities as key areas of interest to
avoid being overly prescriptive and to avoid participants volunteering information they
thought the researchermay havewanted to hear.
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All participants were of sound mind, and therefore able to understand what the interview
was about, and what they had consented to. Confirmation of consent was taken at the
beginning of each interview.
It was unlikely that the potential participants could have been caused distress or
psychological harm by the questions asked, as all were issues that are frequently discussed
in the public domain and concerned day to day experiences for the organisations involved.
To ensure participants were as comfortable as possible, it was emphasised that the only
information that was required was that which the participant was willing to give, and that
the interview was able to stop or break at any time. All participants were made aware that
interviews were voice recorded and later transcribed, and that this information may later
be directly quoted or discussed in the thesis, albeit in an anonymised form. Complete
anonymity could not be guaranteed due to the ability of individuals to speculate on the
identities of participants from information contained in the final thesis, which participants
were made aware would be a publicly available document. It is unlikely, however, that
participants will wish to review the full thesis upon its completion, and a summary of the
research will be provided to interested participants that does not provide the level of detail
or identifiable information that is likely to be contained within the full project report. The
participants were given up to 6 months to withdraw consent to participate and ask for their
information to be destroyed, after which time it was possible that the information provided
would be contained in a conference paper, published paper or in a final or submitted
version of the thesis. No participants withdrew consent.
All interviews were conducted through the medium of English. It was considered in the
planning stages of the project that several participants in this research study would not
speak English as a first language. Within Wales it was expected that some individuals would
speak Welsh as a first language and English as a second language. The need to interview
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individuals working for the EC also meant that participants from this organisation were
speaking English as a third or fourth language and thus these interviews were allocated
more time and more clarification on exact words and phrases was sought during the
interviews. All participants were requested to confirm their ability and willingness to
engage with this study through the medium of English, and whilst all individuals were
comfortable with this arrangement, the fact that a small number of individuals were unable
to discuss their experiences in their first language is a fact that was taken into account
during the analysis of the evidence collected.
Other ethical considerations in the planning of the study concerned the potential harm to
individuals and the exercise of common courtesies. It was judged that this research may
possibly reinforce or contest widely discussed themes within the sector, but it is unlikely to
reinforce any negative stereotypes within SOCietyor provoke extreme reactions. The safety
of the researcher was not of significant concern within this study, as no areas or premises
to be visited could be considered hazardous or high risk, and basic safety precautions were
taken, such as leaving details of appointments with colleagues. In order to acknowledge
and express the researcher's appreciation to the participant organisations, a standard note
of thanks was distributed to each participant, as well as to those who participated in initial
discussions.
5.11 Summary
This chapter has demonstrated the rationale behind the selection of the qualitative case
study method, highlighting areas of traditional criticism aimed at this method of research
and the systems pu~ in place to ensure validity and objectivity within the study. The bulk of
the data collection has been shown to be through semi-structured interviews with
documentary evidence as a valuable supplement, and following the data collection activity,
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transcription, coding and data analysis was carried out. Whilst the analysis of the evidence
in a case study has been shown to be less of an exact science than a quantitative method,
this chapter has demonstrated that the methods used in this study were able to make
sense of the information collected, and to validate and triangulate it. This chapter has also
expressed the ethical considerations that were judged to be relevant to this course of
investigation, and has detailed how any potential issues were minimised or resolved.
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CHAPTER6
Analysing the Institutional Context
6.1 Introduction
This first analysis chapter focuses on the institutional factors that influenced the
distribution of ESFfunds in Wales. It specifically examinesthe processesundertaken by the
governing entities to structure the funding programme, and applies the theoretical
framework described in Chapter Three to explain the features of the process that shaped
the programme. Figure 6.1, based on the earlier Figure 3.1, illustrates how the theory in
this chapter is usedto explain the processesexamined.
This chapter begins by demonstrating that the classicinstitutional model of perpetuation of
norms and values was observed in this study, and that this was reinforced by a model of
MLG stretching from EC level down to the structures imposed on the network. This
observation provides a brief description of the deference of the sub-national actor to the
supra-national actor's requirements, and shows that this deference occurred in the greater
institutional goal of achieving legitimacy and reinforcing power. The discussion then
progressesto consider the bureaucracy, and the values that influenced the development of
the programme structures.
The analysis then considers the theme of power within the institutional context, which
leads into a discussion of trusteeship that highlights the lack of transparency in the
development and implementation of the funding programme.
Finally, this chapter will consider the theme of structural embeddednessand will show this
to be key in organisational successin engagingwith this funding programme.
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These discussions answer the first two key questions within this research:
1. How did institutions and power shape the structures of the Welsh ESF
programmes?
2. How did the composition of the Welsh network influence the eventual success of
organisations in joining ESFpartnerships that would receive funds?
This discussion concludes that the institutions embedded in governing entities coupled with
the power wielded by those entities served to structure the ESFprogrammes in Wales in
such a way as to make them largely inaccessible to a large proportion of the network. MlG
served to structure and lnstituttonallse relationships and processes between Wales and
Europe, and the Welsh Government's preoccupation with this resulted in the construction
of funding programmes skewed towards organisations with specific expertise in engaging in
highly bureaucratic and large, low-risk projects. This meant that the organisations in the
network that were structurally embedded in service delivery for the governing entities
would be in a better position to succeed in gaining funding than those organisations that
had fewer institutionalised relationships with government departments or statutory bodies.
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Figure 6.1
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6.2 Institutions: Constructive. Constraining & Complicating
This section will show that institutions and MlG had an important role to play in shaping
the ESFprogrammes, but what did this mean for the funding decisions made for the ESF
programmes? In fact, the values and norms the Welsh Government associated with
developing and administering EUfunding were found by this study to be incompatible with
standard organisational processeswithin the voluntary sector network and the overarching
policy aims of the ESFprogramme.
Whilst most organisations accepted the standard difficulties involved in applying for
Europeanfunding, participants cited the 2007-2013 programmes as particularly demanding
to engage with. In particular, the programme requirements for high-value partnership or
procurement and sub-contracting models were not compatible with the skills of a
significant portion of the voluntary sector network. However, this was the very pool of
organisations that the Welsh Government claimed should be delivering a lot of ESF
outcomes. Through the influence of institutions on the programme development process,
and the model of MlG model operating in the negotiation on development of structural
funds programmes, bureaucracy increased to include programme requirements for large,
strategic projects that the Welsh Government believed would be attractive to the EC.
Alongside this, risk was reduced by shaping eligibility and requirements to suit a statutory
sector organisational model.
The following are the impacts of institutions on the ESFprogrammes detected by this
research:
• Norms/values oriented towards increasing legitimacy created a high volume of
bureaucracy for both the Welsh Government and fund applicants in an already
bureaucratic funding stream
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• Norms/values oriented towards increasing legitimacy reduced acceptable risk
associated with eligible projects/organisations to the point of excluding voluntary
sector organisations from direct application to the funds
• Norms/values associated with both MLG between the EC and the Welsh
Government, and internal, individual, legitimacy within the Welsh Government
caused significant departure from the programme timetable
• Norms/values associated with individual power provided individuals within the
Welsh Government without specific ESFprogramme expertise the opportunity to
modify aspects of the programmes
Each of these impacts could be considered subtle in isolation, however their cumulative
impact was to create a programme that to a certain extent, excluded the very organisations
that work with the individuals that the programmes were conceived to help.
6.2.1 Normsand values
The institutions that shaped the ESF programme structures were primarily those that
concerned the Welsh Government's perception of its own power and status in relation to
the EC. Values and behavioural norms that developed over time within the Welsh
Government concerning EU relationships were characterised by the Welsh Government's
efforts to impress the EC, in order to be assessed as a 'good' or 'impressive' administration.
These institutionalised values and approaches to engaging with the EC served to confine
the parameters of the programmes, and the programme development became oriented
towards the Welsh Government's perception of what would please or impress the EC.
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6.2.2 Increasing legitimacy
The reverence with which the EC was held by the Welsh Government indicated that the
Welsh Government had some concerns about how it was perceived in Europe, and wished
to reaffirm its legitimacy through developing programmes the ECwould be impressed with.
Although channels between the Welsh Government and EC had multiplied significantly
since devolution, in line with the model of MLG discussed by Hooghe and Marks (2001), the
Welsh Government clearly felt it needed to increase its legitimacy as a strong regional
government in Europe. One participant explained:
'Our reputation in Europe is somewhat at stake with the management of these
funds. European funding is our most significant link inta Europe. It wouldn't
look good if we made a hash of things, and everyone at the Commission is
sitting round saying 'Oh dear. Wales is obviously not up to it [managing the
funds]'.' Participant #14
Issues surrounding the legitimacy of the Welsh Government as a recipient of ESFemerged
in a number of discussions with participants when looking at the relationship between the
Welsh Government and the EC. As discussed in the context chapter of this thesis, the
monies for the whole of the UK were historically negotiated and administered centrally by
the Treasury. This structure changed as a result of the devolution settlements to Northern
Ireland, Scotland and Wales, with devolved administrations becoming actively involved in
the development of funding programmes, and taking on responsibility for administering the
funds. Direct relationships between the Welsh Government and Brussels increased and
began a process of norrnallsatlon.
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The relationship between the ECand Wales could therefore be considered to be in its
infancy during the negotiations for the 2007-2013 programmes in comparison to the long
relationship the EC has had with Whitehall. The devolved administrations also held
different status to their colleagues in Whitehall, serving as 'Regions' rather than asmember
states, and lacking the full ability to negotiate their own settlements. These factors were
raised by participants as key weaknesses in Wales' approach to the EC and the
management of the funds. All of these factors contributed to a cultural attitude within the
Welsh Government that institutionalised a need to increase legitimacy in order for Wales to
be taken seriously in Europe, to be seen to be doing as well as, if not better than, the UK
Government, and to ensure Wales would be well-placed to receive further funds in future.
One third sector individual observed:
'WAG appear to have some, almost self-esteem issues, in dealing with
Structural Funds. Its all very self-conscious and tentative, as if they are terrified
someone's going to turn up, announce they don't know what they are dOing,
and take the funding off them.' Participant #32
Those actors in Wales responsible for structuring the ESFprogrammes saw this area as a
key way in which to consolidate Wales' power and legitimacy in being a management
administration and beneficiary of the ESF.This could be achieved as a result of MlG. Good
programmes that keenly reflected the EC's guidelines were considered by the Welsh
Government to be a good way of demonstrating Welsh attention and commitment to the
funds. One participant noted:
'It's very important that we do things properly. We want to show what Wales is
capable of and a big part of that is making sure everything is absolutely in line
with what Europe have laid down.' Participant #20
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Programmes that were well designed and delivered would, theoretically, increase Welsh
legitimacy, and this perpetuated the institutional environment in which activity was
oriented towards impressing Europe. It became clear that, whilst the MlG model was in
place, this was not enough to reassure the Welsh Government of their position or standing
in Europe. The Welsh Government directed a lot of energy towards reinforcing and
institutionalising the MlG model through pleasing those individuals it dealt with in Europe.
One participant explained:
'We mean business. We have developed excellent relationships with Eurape
through these programmes. And. You must understand. We must show our
competence. Technically we are still new at the table, and we need to show
that giving these funds to Wales to manage was absolutely the right thing to
do.' Participant #5
Several participants in this study discussed the level of importance the Welsh Government
assigned to securing the ESFfor the 2007-2013 programming period in comparison to other
member states as one method of Wales demonstrating its competency and conformity.
This demonstrated how Wales went beyond basic requirements in an attempt to increase
its legitimacy. These participants cited a collective political will to gain the funding, and two
participants referred to the funds as being dealt with 'at the highest level' in order to
convey the importance with which Wales viewed the ESF.These efforts to demonstrate
Wales' commitment, and the level of importance it attached to the ESFwas not lost on the
EC.One participant noted:
'What's a bit special about the Wales PMC compared to the others it's chaired
by a Member of the Assembly. In other regions it would just be the Head of the
comparable department, a Director or Head of Division. In Wales the Deputy
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First Minister himself came to the PMC to present and defend his Recovery plan
which shows the attention they give to it. So I would never see it in Scotland
for instance that there would be a Minister showing up at a PMC meeting.'
Participant #25
This high level interest was emphasised to demonstrate clearly to the ECthat Wales was
not only committed to achieving the policy aims attached to the funds, but would be
competent and fully compliant in its administration of the programmes. Meyer & Rowan
(1977) pointed to the tendency for institutions to incorporate practices and procedures
that are current and accepted as rational concepts of organisational function as a move to
increase their legitimacy. Through demonstrating commitment to 'doing the programmes
properly' (Participant #20) or in essence,managingthe programmes very closely, the Welsh
Government and the National Assemblyfor Wales (NAfW) were attempting to demonstrate
their legitimate claim to receiving the funding.
Boland (2004), in his discussions on the 2000-2006 programmes in Wales, noted key
similarities in the Single Programming Document for Wales and other member states,
suggesting that this was as a result of Welsh administrators of the ESFtrying to emulate
standard practices. Interestingly, the thrust of Boland's paper outlined Wales' emulation of
errors occurring in other member states and regions in the management of the ESF,
suggesting that in the previous programmes, Wales' enthusiasm to legitimise its actions
through incorporating accepted practices used in more established member states may
actually have hindered its effective use of the funds. This emulation of processes of
seemingly legitimate regions demonstrated Wales' earlier attempt to increase its
legitimacy. The absorption of practices perceived by Wales to be 'correct' in the eyesof the
EUis a clear example of isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), and if these practices had
been effective, Wales' short-cut to programme development' and delivery would
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theoretically have increased its legitimacy. The fact that those administrative practices
were later found to be flawed is perhaps an example of isomorphism gone wrong.
Nevertheless, the very action of emulating accepted practice demonstrates, as suggested
by Meyer and Rowan (1977), that Wales had historically attempted to increase its
legitimacy through performing well in the administration of the funds.
Entwistle et al (2007) found that there was a popular perception within the UK and in
Europe that Wales had adhered to the minutia of requirements with the funds, whereas
other member states had worked the funds more to their advantage, using creative
reporting and accounting methods to maximise funds going into favoured domestic policy
areas. There is little literature that will corroborate the assertion that other member states
did not act in complete accordance with the rules, with perhaps one exception being
Laffan's (1999) paper on the evolution of the European Court of Auditors, but the paper by
Entwistle et al (2007) does support the seemingly popular idea that Wales itself was very
much working hard to be demonstrably compliant with EC requirements. This supports the
assertions made in this study that the Welsh Government expended significant effort in
increasing Welsh legitimacy within the ECthrough performing well in the administration of
funds.
It was recognised by the EC as well as by organisations in Wales during the 2000-2006
programmes that projects were duplicating services and that there was a fundamental
incoherence in the delivery of policy aims. As such, the Commission required a more
strategic and considered approach to policy delivery. The 2000-2006 programmes were
developed in a disjointed and rather hurried fashion, with the development split between
the Welsh Office in.Whitehall, and passed to the Welsh European Executive (WEPE - later
renamed as WEFO) upon devolution. The Welsh Government, WEFO and a number of
external agencies and organisations found some faults with these programmes, and the
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Welsh Government and WEFO in particular wished to change the administration of the ESF
for the 2007-2013 programmes. Royles (2006) highlighted a number of issues with the
programmes, including difficulties in engaging the private sector and Bristow et al (2008)
pointed to lack of human resource and expertise within Wales to fulfil the partnership
principles the Welsh Government had initially committed to. Within this study, there was a
recognition amongst participants that Wales needed to perform better, as the 2000-2006
programmes were not perceived as impressive enough to legitimise the Welsh
administration in Europe. One participant explained:
'The first rounds [of ESF- 2000-20061 used a very scatter-gun approach. I think
it's the best that could be pulled together at the time of the programme
development, but it wasn't really up to the kind of strategic stondard that other
regions and states have used.' Participant #5
Another participant noted:
'[The 2000-2006 programmes] didn't have much co-ordination. We consider
them absolutely a success, but this time we wanted to be a little bit more
professional and strategic about it. We wanted to show Europe exactly what
we could do.' Participant #20
These attitudes demonstrate a perception that the Welsh Government and WEFO wanted
very much to improve upon their first attempt at administering the funds, and that a more
successful attempt for 2007-2013 would enable the Welsh Government to gain further
legitimacy in the. eves of the EC. Through providing a more comprehensive and strategic
administration programme for 2007-2013, the Welsh Government and WEFO were hoping
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to increase the legitimacy of the Welsh Government as an administration, and of Wales as a
region and administration.
Participants in this study working in the administration of the funds discussed the need for
change as having two driving forces. Firstly, the Welsh Government wished to impress the
EC with much improved structures for the funds during the 2007-2013 programmes. As
participant #20 noted, the Welsh Government wanted to 'show Europe exactly what we
[Wales] could do'. Participants explained that the previous programmes were perceived to
have lacked strategic vision, and that the Welsh Government faced difficulty in building a
cohesive picture of the work and benefit of the ESFas a result. Participants also noted that
monitoring was difficult, with the grass roots organisations engaging in the funds lacking
the expertise and capacity themselves to comply with ESF monitoring requirements.
Secondly, the Welsh Government and WEFO wished to reduce the administrative burden
that came with accepting project proposals of widely varying value from individual
organisations. WEFO had received in excess of 3,000 project applications during 2000-2006,
and wished to significantly reduce this number for 2007-2012. One participant recalled:
'It was far too much last time. Far too much. Thousands of applications for tiny
projects. We don't have the capacity to be doing all that. We wanted, maybe,
ten per cent of that this time. That obviously means a big change from
objective 1. Fewer, bigger projects.' Participant #14
The perpetuation of funding distribution norms developed in the first programming period
of 2000-2006 became to be understood by the Welsh Government as unacceptable in the
face of reports of the programme weaknesses and the recognition of these weaknesses by
the EC. There was explicit direction from the EC to make the programmes for 2007-2013
more strategic and coherent in nature, and this instruction served to override any
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commitment to existing institutionalised distribution channels that the Welsh Government
and WEFO had to the established distribution structures in place for the first 2000-2006
programmes. In order to improve its legitimacy and demonstrate its co-operation, the
Welsh Government therefore rejected accepted practice in order to defer to the higher
authority of the EC. This deference preserved the Welsh Government's receipts from
Europe and improved its stature within the Commission, coming to be known favourably
therein as a nation that placed significance on its receipts from Europe and caused no
delays or issues in compliance (Participant #1). This demonstrates that within an
institutional environment, where the perpetuation of norms is in conflict with pressure
from higher authority or in conflict with its ambitions, deference to authority and
commitment to ambition would override the perpetuation of norms. This is in line with the
conformity aspects of institutional theory proposed by Zucker (1983), and later, the
inducement strategies of more powerful organisations, as described by Scott (1987).
6.2.3 Delays and constraints
The persistence of other institutional processes within the Welsh Government emerged as
key to delays in the formal opening of the programmes to applications. Institutions, values
and norms at the level of the individual worker had a significant impact upon the
development of the programmes, from allowing a wide range of individuals to have input
into the programmes themselves, to standard procedures delaying and constraining the
agreement of the final product.
As discussed in Chapter Four of this thesis, there was a requirement for the Welsh
Government / WE,FO, as with any other member state receiving ESF, to construct a
framework for the distribution of funds and achievement of policy aims. The overarching
strategy governing this at member state level would be the Single Programming Document
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or Operational Programme as it is frequently called, and this would need to be agreed with
the EC prior to the commencement of fund distribution. It emerged during this research
that this process of EC sign-off of this document and the frameworks structuring the
operation of the programme caused significant delays in the start of the programme, and
these delays in turn affected the approach statutory and voluntary organisations took to
engaging with the funds. The delays observed in this case study of the strategic
development stage of the programme conflict with the assertions of Hooghe & Marks
(2001), who identified that MLG is at its weakest during the strategic development phase of
the structural fund life-cycle. Indeed, in this study, the relationships and norms developed
through the MLG model were being embraced and reinforced by the Welsh Government in
the strategic development stages of the programme. It was at this point in the study that
MLG was at its most significant.
It was WEFO's responsibility to draw up the Single Programming Document, and as WEFO
was by this point, acting as a department of the Welsh Government rather than as an
independent executive office, there were inevitably a wider range of civil servants with an
interest in this process. Within the Welsh Government, as in any organisation, there exists
hierarchy and a balance of power that is observed by those operating within it and provides
structure to internal organisational interactions (Ibarra & Andrews, 1993). A number of
participants in this study cited the internal linkages within the Welsh Government and the
large pool of individuals with sufficient power to cause blockages in the passage of the
Operational Programme to the ECas key in causing these delays. Participant #14 noted that
it took almost a full year for the final programmes to be completely signed off by the EC,
and that after this, internally within the Welsh Government there was a further delay in
agreeing the strategic frameworks that translated the Single Programming Document into
several thematic strands which would structure the distribution of funding in detail. This
demonstrates that the rules applied to internal communications, over time solidified into
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institutional norms, actually had a negative effect on the programme development
timetable. What was implicit in several participants' description of this process, was the
very close involvement of the EC in the development of these programmes, contrasting
with the work of Hooghe & Marks (2001). Another participant explained:
'The whole process was, well, it took a long time. You've got maybe two or
three people drafting [each of] the strategic frameworks, but then rather a lot
of managers that want to review them and sign them off internally before they
go back to the EU, and changes and so on, so of course, it was going to take
time.' Participant #29
The large pool of managers that were required to review and agree the paperwork for the
ESF programmes therefore became something of a hindrance in terms of the timely
execution of the programmes. Participants were asked why such a number of managers
would need to agree the frameworks, whether all of these managers were directly affected
by the changes in detail in the frameworks, and several were at a loss to explain why
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certain managers were inclu~ed in the list. Two participants claimed that 'they seem to get
copied into everything as standard' (Participant #14) and so their inclusion in agreeing such
documents was expected because that was the organisational norm. The institutional
characteristic of perpetuating accepted norms and practices within this context
demonstrates how delays occurred in the development of the programmes (Barley &
Tolbert, 1997). In the requirement for each draft of the frameworks to be sent to several
individuals for review and approval regardless of whether it was actually necessary, there is
a clear duplication of work at a detriment to efficiency, however one participant noted:
'They just have to be sent to people whose work it affects. If the right people
aren't made aware of the plans and don't have a chance to have their soy, it
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could cause problems down the line. To be honest I'm not sure it's strictly
necessary, but if people are left out then it's like a snub, like they're not
important.' Participant#29
Meyer & Rowan (1977) noted that the conformity of employees to the accepted
institutionalised structure of action often conflicts clearly with efficiency criteria, and the
Welsh Government exhibited these behaviours in this casethrough requiring a large pool of
individuals to approve the programme structures at every step of the way. This would
inevitably consume a significant amount of time in the development stages, however was
accepted as a sign of reinforcing individual legitimacy and power within the organisation.
This is a clear example of commitment to norms and values resulting in increased
transaction costs.
Participants in this study explained that at the high level of the Single Programming
Document, this trade-off between standard practice and efficiency could be argued to be
acceptable, given the high profile and external nature of the Single Programming
Document. There was much lower tolerance exhibited by participants when discussingthe
same issuewith the delays in the sign-off of the strategic frameworks that would structure
the spending of the ESF.Participants discussingthis second delay cited the same reasons
given earlier in this section for the delays in the approval of the Single Programming
Document. As explained in more detail in Chapter Four of this thesis, the strategic
frameworks were lower level instruments designed to aid bidding organisations to
structure their project applications to the needs of each of the programme themes. The
same issues with requirements for large numbers of managers horizontally across the
organisation toapprove or comment on the frameworks were experienced with these
strategic frameworks, as observed earlier, with less tolerance. Two different models
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emerged in looking at this activity - MLG and institutionalised hierarchy. One participant
explained:
'We had to send them to everyone for approval, even people that really knew
nothing about the programmes, people in other departments, communications
even! How ridiculous is that? Thing is, it's an exercise in covering our backs as
much as an exercise in pandering. This way, six months down the line, no-one
can come back and have a tantrum about how they weren't informed and how
that's affecting their corner, 'cause that's what usually happens if someone
gets missed off the list. . . There may be other consequences, maybe not
disciplinary, but it wouldn't reflect well on whoever forgot to include those
people.' Participant #30
The same principle of perpetuating accepted organisational practice can again be seen
here, slightly lower down the ladder, within the Welsh Government and WEFO. This could
also be argued to exhibit a popular trait of bureaucracy, which could be considered here as
hierarchy (Gajduschek, 2003). Civil servants involved in this process 'pandered' to their
managers throughout the organisation by requiring their input into these important
instruments. This reinforced the power and legitimacy of the individual managers in
question, and equally protected those lower down the hierarchy from future repercussions,
as the responsibility for ensuring they would not be adversely affected by the frameworks
was shifted to those managers consulted, rather than resting with the individuals that were
actually writing them. The immediate implications of this behaviour were clear in the delay
of programme sign off, and in a wider context, in the financial difficulties of a number of
voluntary and statutory organisations attempting to plan activities and organisational
futures in a climate of uncertainty caused by these delays.
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Within the Welsh Government and WEFO, the conformity to these accepted practices that
were inefficient, but that had some mutual benefit for both individuals with some level of
power and those lower down the pecking order, shows that neither efficiency nor
expediency were ranked as more important by the Welsh Government than the
perpetuation of the internal organisational culture. North (1990b) noted that these types of
institutional rules are often inefficient, and that the cultural 'rules' within organisations are
created to serve the interests of those with the bargaining power to create new rules. On a
micro-level of analysis, MLG can be seen to be at work here. The EC used its dominant
position to prompt the Welsh Government to develop new distribution structures, and
from this point, the senior bureaucrats within the Welsh Government bound these
conditions up with the their own institutional structures, and filtered these requirements
down through their departments by requiring multiple directors across departments to
approve of the operational plans.
Participant #30's earlier comment alludes to the practice of imposing requirements
horizontally across the organisation. This demonstrates an effective cascade of
requirements and information distribution originating from the ECacross the organisation.
However, at face value, and therefore no less 'real' to those involved within the Welsh
Government, this requirement for so many senior managers to be involved was seen to
have grown out of previous experience of managers that were not consulted on previous
pieces of work, and the consequences for those lower down the hierarchy. As a result of
managers feeling slighted in the past, these individuals have secured their 'right' to
involvement through exerting their hierarchical status. Lower level staff have learned to
avoid 'consequences' by inviting their input. The managers appear therefore, to have used
their power to ~reate this rule, even though this rule causes inefficiency. These
institutionalised behaviours therefore serve to constrain and delay the development of
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programmes, and result in individuals not necessarily qualified or experienced in European
programmes contributing to programme design.
A point emerging from the evidence collected that was not explicitly considered by any
participant to be of significance in developing the funds was that of the need for the draft
frameworks to be seen and contributed to by a very wide range of employees across the
organisation. Participant #30's comment earlier concerning the need for items to go to the
communications team was a good example of how precise funding instruments were
subject to the thoughts and recommendations of teams whose expertise and function was
in some cases significantly different to the process of programme design. The
communications team would, for instance, check and amend the language of the final
documents, ensure adequate translations into Welsh and apply corporate branding and
formatting. This simple act of changing the language or translating may however alter the
meanings or impressions given in the original text. Applying bright pictures of school
children on the guidance document may give the wrong impression that schools would be
eligible to apply for funds. Similarly, IT staff were engaged in the consultative and sign-off
process as the programmes would be on the website, a portal for partnership was planned
for use by the wider network, and an online application facility was proposed, and so
considerations of how these features would operate directly affected the structuring of the
application process. Evidence of individual changes and recommendations made for the
programmes was not available to scrutinise how much change was made by teams outside
of the main programme development unit. This lack of opportunity for scrutiny reinforces
the power and legitimacy of the Welsh Government, as no negative external assessment
can be made.
Participants did however indicate that these institutions were not considered in terms of
their impact upon the final look and feel of the programmes. It is impossible to assess how
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much these norms influenced the final programmes from the evidence gathered as part of
this study. However, sufficient evidence was collected to indicate that a lot of individuals
without ESF programme expertise from across the Welsh Government were involved in
programme development, that they made recommendations and modifications to the
programmes, and that there was no formal process to evaluate if or how their
modifications altered the way the programmes were implemented or received in the
network.
The range of actors involved in the development and agreement of the operational
programme documents meant that the programmes developed in a very pluralistic way.
The programme structures were subject to scrutiny and amendment by individuals with
broad functional priorities within the institution, priorities that were not necessarily
compatible with the achievement of policy goals, and this significantly influenced the
composition of the final programmes.
6.3 The Bureaucratic Impulse
Throughout this study bureaucracy has to one extent or another, been cited or alluded to
as having impacted upon the distribution of ESFin Wales, and to be embedded within the
system of resource distribution. It is not unusual for bureaucracy to become embedded into
governing bodies over time through the assignation of value, and as such many state
organisations are characterised by their bureaucracy (Meier, 1997). Within this study, the
bureaucratic requirements of the programmes, from the design of the Single Programming
Document down to the monitoring requirements following implementation, served to
reinforce the MLG model in operation between Wales and the EC.At a territorial level, the
bureaucratic elements of the programme enabled the Welsh Government to attempt to
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reinforce its legitimacy, and for its department WEFO to assert its cultural difference from
the rest of the organisation.
Meier defined bureaucracies as permanent, goal oriented systems that were in many cases
capable of becoming storehouses of expertise with the ability to specialise beyond the
political masters that often govern them. Meier argued for an increase in bureaucracy in
the United States, citing the merits of bureaucracy to achieve effective policy goals, but
stressing this could only be carried out under the right conditions. In terms of the levels of
expertise held within the Welsh Government, areas of this chapter have already highlighted
the Welsh Government's own perceived lack of legitimacy due to its youth and size, and
this meant that as a bureaucracy, the Welsh Government did not have the 'storehouse' of
knowledge and expertise in European funding distribution available to it that older
bureaucracies would hold. This lack of expertise was widely commented on in the press as
well as in academic literature as a result of the simultaneous processes of devolution and
the Objective 1 ESFprogrammes for 2000-2006 (Boland 2004; Ferry et 01 2007; Rawlings
2003; Royles 2006) and this recognition of weakness prompted the Welsh Govemment to
improve its processes for 2007-2013 ESF.One participant noted:
'There are some that claimed it was too open last time. Too easy. You filled in
your application and you got your money. There wasn't enough thinking behind
it and it showed. I suppose there was the devolution excuse last time, but this
time {the Welsh Government] have to up their game to show that they do have
some strategy behind handing out 0/1 this cash. Unfortunately, their solution
has been to go mad with paperwork. ' Participant #3
This correlates with comments from Participant #5 quoted earlier in this chapter
concerning the Welsh Government's preoccupation with improving significantly on the last
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ESFprogramming period, and highlights that the Welsh Government/WEFO's strategies for
improvement increased the bureaucracy in the funding processes. In particular, participants
pointed to a three stage application process, rather than a one stage process in the
previous round as having increased both the volume of paperwork necessary and the
length of time it took to apply. This extended process would allow WEFO to screen for
duplicate activities, direct organisations wishing to carry out similar activities to work
together, and thus give out larger sums to fewer projects. In increasing the bureaucratic
nature of the processes to capture more detail, this would reduce risk and increase the
legitimacy of the Welsh Government and WEFO as competent administrators of the funds.
The desire for increased legitimacy has been shown to lead to mimicry of more established
or accepted practices (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Selznick, 1996), and in the case of Wales,
the Welsh Government and WEFO had cast their eyes over other forms of organisation of
distribution for inspiration:
'We had a fair look around at what others were doinq. No-one wants to re-
invent the wheel, and it made perfect sense to try and take the best bits of
other structures and make them work here. That way you know you are going
in the right direction. I Participant #29
This confirms Boland's (2004) assertions cited earlier in this chapter, that the Welsh
Government was looking to other regions to emulate accepted practice. Selznick (1996,
p273) noted that it is frequently organisational anxiety rather than a desire to 'reinvent the
wheel' that prompts organisations to emulate accepted practices, and whilst this individual
participant (#29) ~ited their rational argument that emulation was to avoid ire-inventing
the wheel', their qualification for this was to ensure they were 'going in the right direction'.
A small amount of anxiety could be detected in what participant #29'discussed here, where
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WEFOwere making efforts to mimic practices accepted elsewhere by the ECasvalid, rather
than relying on their own, possibly lacking 'storehouse of expertise' gained through the
previous programmes to design their new funding structure. The main thrust of
improvements to the programmes to increase legitimacy does, from the anecdotal and
documentary evidence citing increased strategy and procurement models as
improvements, appear to centre around increasing bureaucracy rather than developing
innovative or evidence based policy solutions. This increase is however, a by-product of
reducing risk and application volumes, rather than as a deliberate desire for bureaucracy
itself.
Participants described WEFO as very internally focused with a definite, centralised
preoccupation with rules, regulations, risk and accountability. The previous section on
institutions made it clear that the reduction of risk was considered by the Welsh
Government to be key in achieving legitimacy. However, in analysing the bureaucratic
dimension, it is clear that there is a balanced benefit between the institutional environment
and the bureaucracy,where the reduction of risk and increasein processnot only increases
legitimacy but reinforces the bureaucratic system. Fukuyama (1999) recognised the
interaction of the institutional and bureaucratic environment, and argued that tradition,
assigned value, and socialisation, perpetuated inefficient and bureaucratic systems. One
participant explained:
'ESFequals mountains of regulations, so it's not really surprising WEFO is the
same. Their priority is pleasing Europe not us [wider voluntary and statutory
sectors}. That means they stay in their little offices and write reams of
incomprehensible stuff that we have to conform to to get our money. I doubt
any of them have any idea what it's like out here in the real world.' Participant
#19
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This quote very much illustrates several of the characteristics of a bureaucracy as described
by Kernaghan. The phrase 'their priority is pleasing Europe, not us' suggests an
organisation-centred attitude being exhibited by WEFO that does not take full account of
the needs of the external organisations that may deliver the programme outcomes. WEFO's
pre-occupation here was presenting a professional and competent front to the EU, rather
than creating programmes that were reasonably accessible to organisations that could
achieve policy aims. The accusation that 'they stay in their little offices' betrays a reluctance
by WEFO to meaningfully engage with the network, as echoed by other participants in this
study, that points to a tendency in WEFO for independent action that lacks consultation.
The reference to regulations and 'incomprehensible stuff reinforces a view of bureaucracy
that is wedded to rules, procedures and constraints. This is a quote from a participant
outside of the organisation in question, and perhaps includes a certain amount of
assumption on the internal workings of WEFO, however perceptions are important in
assessing issues of legitimacy, power and bureaucracy. Participant #19's account
demonstrates how WEFO not only exhibited characteristics of a bureaucracy, but that those
characteristics formed a barrier between WEFO and the network that was difficult for the
network organisations to overcome.
Another perspective on WEFO's bureaucratic features contrasts its difference to its
overarching organisation the Welsh Government:
'We are all one organisation now, but we weren't always. WEFO was an
independent arms-length agency, and it grew up a bit differently to the [Welsh
Government] core administration. There's still a little bit of a divide there.
While a lot 9f [the Welsh Government] work in the early days was about being
inclusive and consulting, there was, well, no need seen in WEFOfor any of that.
They were just able to say jump, and because everyone wanted money,
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everyone said y'know, how high. They maybe see themselves as a bit more
important. Above it all. Than some of the other departments. ' Participant #6
This quote has echoes of Kernaghan's bureaucracy (2000), in particular in terms of
positional power and hierarchy. It is interesting that this participant clearly perceived
WEFO'sattitude as superior or incompatible with what they considered to be core Welsh
Government values. The original split between WEFO as an Executive Agency and the
Welsh Government clearly continues to cause some cultural differences that impact upon
relations between government departments. The perception of WEFO from within the
Welsh Government as more hierarchical, and as preoccupied with control and compliance,
meant that the programmes were developed without the Welsh Government's early
approach to the network, which was inclusive and consultative. Whilst Welsh Government
staff did move in and out of WEFOon secondments and other work-related assignments,a
difference in culture was definitely detected. This difference centred around a more
controlling and rigid approach to internal and external work. WEFO's preservation of its
bureaucratic system reinforced its authority and its ability to control the funding through
reaffirming the distance between it, Welsh Government Departments, and the network.
There was an understanding by some within the programme development process that
bureaucracy was necessaryto deliver the programmes to Europe's specifications, and that
whilst this would inevitably affect the organisations wishing to engage, some thought had
been diverted to making this as simple as possible. One main merit of bureaucracy is its
ability to regulate and deliver complex and high volume servicesin the right conditions. The
right conditions are quite vital to the process however, and bureaucratic systems can
experience blockagesand dysfunctions in unfavourable environments. Meier (1997) stated:
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"Bureaucracies perform best and can contribute the most to the policy-making process
when:
1) they are given clear goals by electoral institutions
2) they are allocated adequate resources and
3) they are given the autonomy to apply their expertise to the problem"
Source: Meier (1997, p19S)
Reviewing this criteria, on the surface, it could be asserted that WEFO existed in favourable
conditions for it to perform well and make a valuable contribution. WEFO had clear remit
and strategy for development and delivery of the programmes, had more than sufficient
resources to achieve those goals, and had the administrative autonomy to carry out its
work.
Whilst an increase in bureaucracy for the 2007-2013 ESFprogrammes was clear from the
evidence collected in this study, authors have argued that an increase in bureaucracy is not
necessarily a bad thing. Indeed, several authors have discussed the merits of bureaucracy in
the organisations and delivery of public services, such as Weber (1918), du Gay (2000),
Meier (1997) and Parsons (1967). Du Gay noted that well-structured bureaucracy could be
frustrating for external individuals or organisations, but that this was necessary for the
ultimate successful operation of the bureaucracy as a whole. The necessity of bureaucracy
and the tension between it and implementation into the network was cited by some
participants close to the programme development process. One participant noted of
WEFO's bureaucracy:
'Of course its bureoucratic. We can't help that. Europe is bureaucratic, and we
have to answer to Europe. In order to do that, we have to be bureaucratic
ourselves. That obviously gets filtered down the food chain to the organisations
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bidding. Is it too bureaucratic? Maybe. But we try to achieve a balance
between requiring the right paperwork and making it as accessible as possible
for voluntary groups. That's why we want big high value projects that will take
care of filtering the money down to smaller groups. ' Participant #20
Digging a little deeper however, uncovers a few areas where the lines between WEFO's
goals and WEFO's autonomy were blurred or occasionally subject to interference by forces
..
external to WEFO. It is these instances in which negative aspects of bureaucracy emerge.
The informed documentary evidence collected from those that attempted to apply for ESF
funds highlighted a significant level of confusion and suspicion over the new structures put
in place for the 2007-2013 programmes, and participants cited the perceived bureaucracy
involved in applying coupled with the difficulty in reconciling ESFprogramme requirements
with their normal activities as a barrier to engaging with the programmes. Organisations
wishing to receive funding were required to understand the required outputs and
indicators outlined in the strategic framework, to design a project to achieve those outputs
which was sufficient in scope as to be considered strategic (meaning that the project was
high value, covering a wide geographical area and would include either project partners or
would sub-contract outcomes) and were then required to go through the process of
negotiating partnership or procurement with other organisations intending to carry out
similar activities. Participants explained that this learning and negotiating activity consumed
significant time, and several indicated that had there not been the potential to be written
into a Welsh Government department bid, they would not have pursued ESFfunding.
Other participants identified difficulties in aligning the activities required as part of the
programme with their standard operating procedures. The programme timing, claiming
methods and requirement for match funding would place additional stress on the
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organisational resources, and would have a detrimental effect on the organisation as a
whole. One participant noted:
'After the original project we were supposed to be in fell apart we just didn't
bother. It was so much effort to put together a project and try to get the match
funding timed perfectly and work with other people while all the time trying to
sustain our actual real activities that we just couldn't muster the enthusiasm to
.,
have another go. We don't have the staff or the funding to throw into the ESF
black hole. ' Participant #18
This gives a clear indication that engaging with the ESF placed strain upon the
organisational resources that would not necessarily be rectified by receiving the funding.
The bureaucratic characteristic of developing rigid, low risk and compliance-heavy policy
exhibited by WEFOprevented voluntary network organisations from receiving funds. This
occurred by placing too great a burden on organisations to comply with bureaucratic
requirements through the application process. The 'ESFblack hole' swallowed resources,
and the only participants in this study to discuss coping well with the programme
requirements were attached to organisations that had staff dedicated to the pursuit of such
funds and the design of these kinds of projects. These organisations tended to be larger
with bigger budgets, and their accounts showed significant receipts from the Welsh
Government.
Participants have pointed to the measures for accountability and transparency within the
ESF programmes as some of the most cumbersome bureaucratic measures, as the
information to meet these conditions must be able to stand up to audit by the European
Court of Auditors". Laffan (1999), in her paper on the evolution of the EuropeanCourt of
Auditors, notes that this institution has, over time, progressively become 'less timid' in its
16 The Court has, however, stressed that it is member states in the first instance that must act to
prevent irregularities in the use of EU monies (Laffan, 1999).
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criticisms of member states and their useson EUmonies, and this has prompted the ECin
turn to re-interpret its own rules and regulations attached to the ESF.For member states
and regions receiving European funds, this meant a higher level of scrutiny of their
programmes and as a result, a need to be compliant in the distribution and use of funds.
This is a clear demonstration of MLG driving regional policy implementation. One
participant reinforced this view, explaining:
..
'After an Audit of the Court and dealing with Enlargement [of the number of
member states] it was like suddenly the Commission was a lot more severe and
tough than they used to be. And they [member states in receipt of ESF]said
'this isn't fair because it is the same regulations but you changed your
interpretation.' No, it was just, well they say it was a stricter approach from
the same book. So and that's how all the attention went to Audits and
Monitoring systems. Well it made life more difficult but, also the lives of those
people managing the funds in those States.' Participant #25
This increase in 'attention' to audit and monitoring systems by the ECfiltered down to
member state level through increased processes,requirements and regulations attached to
the Structural Funds that would in turn, need to be absorbed into programmes and
complied with by organisations receiving funds. In the case of Wales, the tougher EC
approach contributed to the increase in bureaucracy involved in the administration and
receipt of the funds, as WEFO and the Welsh Government scrambled to develop a
programme that would go beyond basic compliance and impress the EC.The value placed
on regulations and compliance within the EU requirements was absorbed by the Welsh
Government and somewhat magnified in the programmes developed for Wales. MLGwas
responsible for reinforcing relationships and processes between Wales and the EU, but
more importantly, this provided an effective conduit for institutional change.
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Clarke (2003) noted that scrutiny processes designed to hold public organisations to
account are generally low-trust/high-cost models, shaped by centralised bureaucracies, and
this is true of those regulations attached to the Structural Funds. Bovens (2005, p182)
proclaimed public accountability as 'the hallmark of modern democratic governance', and
defined accountability as 'a social relationship in which an actor feels an obligation to
explain and to justify his or her conduct to some significant other.' In this case study, the
issue of accountability was a hierarchical one, where ground level ESF recipients were
accountable to WEFO, where some Welsh Government departments were accountable to
WEFO, and where WEFO was accountable to both the Welsh Government, NAfW and to the
EC.This type of web of accountability has been described as 'the problem of many hands'
(Bovens 2005; Thompson 1980) where policies, decisions and instruments pass through an
exhausting number of public officials before being approved to ensure systems can be
explained or justified. This problematic phenomenon is an example of process-based
bureaucratic systems that are based on habit, and are the consequence of structuring the
organisation through grouping and separating specialised functions into smaller hierarchies.
This problem of many hands reinforces Bovens (2005, p194) assertion that 'there is an
inherent and permanent tension between accountability and effective performance' and
coupled with the findings of this study demonstrates that increases in accountability
measures have caused an increase in bureaucracy.
The programme requirement for large, high value, strategic projects with multiple delivery
agents coupled with the complexity of the bidding and monitoring process exhibited clear
bureaucratic values aligned with those held by WEFO. These values were applied to the
development of the programmes, and WEFO's attempts to reduce risk and increase
strategic working through increasing and refining requirements, resulted in a longer and
more complex application and project delivery process. The rule-centred and risk averse
structures were constructed to regulate funds awarded, and were designed to benefit the
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smooth running of the programme bureaucracy, rather than the goal of empowering the
service delivery organisation to achieve the policy goals. This meant that the application
processeswere difficult for organisations to comply with, as their needs and methods of
operation had not been taken into account in the designof the programmes.
Many participants generally felt that the ESFprogrammes, whilst potentially lucrative and
necessary in some cases for financial survival, were incompatible with the values of the
-
applying organisations. One participant described the process as 'like trying to fit square
pegs in round holes' (Participant #9), and this is a clear example of the incompatibility of
WEFO/the Welsh Governments bureaucratic, ECoriented ESFprogramme with the pool of
organisations debatably best placed to engagethe policy target group.
The discussions on institutions and bureaucracy presented here demonstrate that
institutions shaped the Welsh ESFprogramme structures through the values and norms
associated with the position of the governing entity towards Europe. Through a model of
MLG, processes and relationships were institutionalised, and the EC came to hold
significant influence over the actions over the Welsh Government. The Welsh Government
placed significant value on its reputation and performance in Europe, and the norms and
values within this organisation were therefore oriented towards this end. This meant that
the development of the programmes was carried out in order to comply with European
structures regardless of the norms or values in place within the Welsh network and its
organisations. This is an important point to establish, as it shows that the development of
the programmes was not in fact, wholly focused on achieving the policy goals of the
funding.
Whilst there is no evidence that the Welsh Government or WEFOdeliberately neglected the
policy aims, the institutional environment was oriented towards pleasing Europe in terms
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of process and paperwork. This can be considered fundamentally different to a structural
environment being oriented towards meaning fully engaging the most in-need individuals
through the organisations that were expert in working with them. This in part, answers the
first key research question, which asked how institutions and power shaped the structures
of the Welsh ESF programmes, and goes further in uncovering the implications of that
process.
6.4 The Importance of Power
Chapter 3 stressed the importance of power in enabling organisations with it the ability to
structure environments and succeed within those structures, possibly at the expense of
organisations without the power to do such things.
The preceding sections in this chapter on bureaucracy and institutional considerations have
contained several examples of power and influence and how these resources have been
employed to shape decisions governing the distribution of funds. The ability to
fundamentally alter the structures that govern the distribution of the funds indicated that
the ECwas in a position of power over the Welsh Government, and was not only able to
change the processes of the Welsh Government, but was able to direct these actions
without applying direct pressure to do so.
Instead, the EC was able to change the rules governing the programme, and indicate
preferences for certain ways of working not included in previous programmes. An example
was the requirement for the Welsh Government to take a more strategic and coherent
approach to distributing the funds, and to strengthen partnership elements of the
programme. There was no explicit conversation that occurred in which the Welsh
Government was instructed to change the programmes, rather the overarching
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requirements of the programmes themselves were restructured at EClevel, and this filtered
down to the Welsh Government, which then adapted these in order to continue complying
with the regulations. This fits Lukes' (1974) model of power, in which power is exerted in a
most subtle fashion, and outside of directly conflicting situations. Indeed, this form of
power to change the underlying environment which will in turn channel the funds in a
certain direction is positively collaborative in this case study, with the EC and the Welsh
Government working together amiably to design the 2007-2013 programmes.
Lukes' (1974) concept of power is unconscious and established as the natural order of the
system. In this case study, despite the collaborative nature of the situation, the natural
hierarchical organisation consisted of the EC wielding more power than the Welsh
Government, and possessed the power to award significant sums on the provision that the
Welsh Government administered them in a manner compliant with the will of Brussels. This
possession of such agenda setting power was key in the Welsh Government's assessment of
its own legitimacy, and because of the power wielded by the EC, the Welsh Government
developed a culture in which pleasing the ECwas a priority above everything else.
The Welsh Government was able to assert its own power as the administrator of the funds,
and further increase its legitimacy by demonstrating its control over the funding process.
Power, in the form of control of significant funds, was therefore delegated to the Welsh
Assembly by the EC.This authoritative, mandated power over the funds complemented its
existing power over the Welsh environment, however it granted the Welsh Government
particular power over the voluntary sector network, as these organisations had developed a
certain level of dependency upon ESF funds for their work over the preceding 6 years.
Should ESFfunds become unavailable to the sector, statutory and lottery grants received to
match the ESFfunds would also be likely to dry up, having significant impact upon voluntary
sector organisations finances. In some situations, this could mean the difference between
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some voluntary organisations continuing to operate, or ceasing operations in Wales. One
participant explained:
'We wanted to apply the changes quickly and simply. They helped us too,
because we could cite them as non-negotiable, coming from the EU. The
decrease in project numbers was the biggest bonus - not dealing with
thousands of applications. We won't have to deal with smaller organisations
now. Theywill have to deal with the big project leaders.' Participant #5
The application of power was therefore cascading down from the EC level to shape the
approach of the Welsh Government, which in turn altered the funding environment in
which a significant portion of the voluntary and local statutory sector had existed within for
the previous six years. The significance of the comments of Participant #5 (which were
echoed by participants 2, 4, 29 and 30) for the wider network, was the displacement of
funding distribution responsibilities downwards by one level onto the statutory and
voluntary sector network.
Where, previously, all organisations applying for funding would be assessed by WEFO, for
the 2007-2013 programmes, only the project leader or project partnership would be
assessed and awarded funds by WEFO, and further dispersion of the funding to smaller
organisations would be carried out by the leaders of the awarded projects. WEFO was able
to reduce its assessment workload by a factor of 10 by displacing that workload onto the
network, which it was able to achieve legitimately by reconstructing the conditions for
application. This clearly raises questions over accountability, transparency and 'fairness' in
funding distribution which will be put aside here and discussed in the next section, however
it also highlights the level of hierarchical and agenda-setting power possessed by the Welsh
Government to fundamentally alter the environment in which ESFfunding is distributed.
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Power over the voluntary sector network, as a result of the design of the 2007-2013
programmes, was concentrated and centralised within the public sector. The level of power
the Welsh Government held over the network essentially enabled it, consciously or not, to
maximise funds retained within the statutory sector at the expenseof the voluntary sector.
The implications of this were not only the possible contraction of the voluntary sector as a
result of a lack of funding, but a loss of expertise in engagingwith the very people that the
funds were awarded to help. Power held by the Welsh Government therefore had a key
role in shaping the funding distribution structures of the ESFin Wales.
This discussion on power suggests that dominant organisations would dictate the
programme and project structures, and that less powerful organisations would attempt to
conform. The conformity the Welsh Government demonstrated was in line with its own
interests, because although the changes in programme management required significant
work to be carried out to alter the established methods of administration, these changes
complemented its wishes to reduce the amount of administration involved in assessing
applications to the programme. The power awarded to project leaders as a result of the
centralised, low-risk programme design is more problematic, as this potentially had more
serious implications for the voluntary sector. Within the wider statutory and voluntary
sector networks historic relationships would have more impact upon which organisations
may be able to secure project partnership status or sub-contracts. Power to choosecan also
mean power to exclude, and because project leaders were in such a position, the
importance of power in the network and in relationships comes into play. This will be
explored in the next chapter.
This section has shown that possessingthe power to fundamentally alter the environment
through imposition of regulations and requirements was key to shaping the structures of
the Welsh ESFprogrammes. Without the power to change the structural environment, the
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programmes may have remained similar to the programming period prior to 2007.
However, the changescascadeddown to provide the Welsh Government with the authority
to implement its own preferences in the programme design that would alter the wider
statutory and voluntary network power structures. This is in keeping with the works of
Bachrach and Baratz (1962) who stressed the importance of power to alter structural
conditions, and later Berenskoetter (2007) who cited the relevance of agenda-setting
power in controlling and influencing organisational action. This also adds further evidence
to demonstrate how institutions and power shaped the structures of the Welsh ESF
programmes, asper key researchquestion 1.
6.5 Entrusting Resources to the Most Capable Hands
Trusteeship, as shown in Chapter Three of this thesis, is a principle that is embedded in a
governing entity's process of designing and delivery policy aims, and procuring others to
achieve these aims on its behalf. It is necessaryto examine this principle at this juncture, as
this theme draws together some of the points raised so far in this analysis concerning
bureaucracy,centralisation and power.
In principle, a trustee should utilise resourcesfor the development and benefit of the wider
public (Cowen & Shenton, 1996), and should develop the capacities of the public in line
with the policy aims attached to the resources in trust. In this casestudy this meant that
the Welsh Government and its Europeanfunding department WEFOshould ensure the ESF
funds were used to empower wider society to reduce the landscape of poverty and
exclusion that made large areas of Wales eligible for this funding, using the best possible
expertise to achieve this. This case study collected evidence that exhibits a strong
trusteeship tendency by the Welsh Government in building structures that would allocate
the greatest share of ESF funds to statutory sector and dominant voluntary sector
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organisations - those considered by the Welsh Government as best-placed to deliver. Who
is best placed to deliver though? This chapter has already shown the focus of the Welsh
Government's work to be skewed towards impressing the EC.Would the funding structures
developed from that focus really enable selection of the best organisations to deliver? Or
would the funding structures exclude certain organisations?
Firstly, in models of trusteeship, resources must be controlled and organised by the trustee.
Only then, can adequate decisions be made on distribution to externally competent
organisations. This case study exhibited exactly this process in the Welsh Governments
absorption of WEFO into its central administration.
Several participants noted the change in status of WEFO from an independent executive
agency to a departmental body as a turning point in the administration of the funding
programmes. The legitimacy and benefit of independent government bodies, quangos or
agencies has been queried in literature (Flinders, 2004; Gains, 2004; Talbot, 2004). Many
states in Europe and internationally have established arms-length agencies to carry out
certain statutory functions, some with the intention of increasing the transparency and
legitimacy of decision-making, and some to shift responsibility away from governmental
departments (Flinders, 2004). Talbot (2004) proposed that there are three fundamental
elements to the concept of 'agency', these are:
• Structural disaggregation and/or the creation of 'task specific' organisations
• Performance contracting - some form of performance target setting, monitoring
and reporting
• Deregulation (or more properly reregulation) of controls over personnel, finance
and other management matters
Source: Talbot (2004, p6)
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Comparing these criteria to the original status and remit of WEFO, it is clear to see that
WEFO in its original incarnation possessed these fundamental ideas of agency. WEFO was
created with a specific and limited remit, was responsible for delivering tangible outputs
and for monitoring those in line with European requirements, and had control over its
standard business functions. A common result of creating an arms-length agency is a loss of
direct control over its actions and its direction. Once independent, agencies may progress in
a direction not considered or envisioned by those that constituted it in the first place, and
--
may develop and institutional environment distinct from central governmental
departments. This divergence and separation makes it politically more difficult to control an
agency, and in situations where the agency is not complementing the central governmental
administration, reduces the credibility and legitimacy of the government. Within this study,
WEFO was identified to have much less autonomy than it had previously enjoyed as an
arms-length agency, and the involvement of the wider Welsh Government's departments in
the development and implementation of the programmes was also considerably greater.
This alluded to the Welsh Government's wish to exert significantly more control over
structural funds than it had in the previous programming period, at the beginning of which
WEFO was an executive agency.
Flinders (2004) suggested that the creation of autonomous public bodies by the last Labour
government was in part, to increase public confidence in the operation of democracy in
general. This was an extension of trusteeship and demonstrated a commitment to
entrusting resource only to those the government deemed competent. The creation of
WEFO as such a body was carried out with the same logic. One participant noted:
'Origina"y it was thought that having WEFOas an independent executive office
would make things more transparent, more open. Sort of. But then it seemed
that the powers that be had a change of heart or got a bit worried they'd given
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up too much power or whatever. Anyway, the upshot was that in 2003 we were
then part of the assembly [Welsh Government] and the official party line was
that the programmes would be run more effectively that way.' Participant #5
The 'official party line' at the time was also quoted in the Welsh news:
'An assembly government spokeswoman confirmed that WEFO was being
brought under the direct control of the assembly. But the spokeswoman added
that the change was being made to give the assembly government greater
strategic control over the programme. She denied the programme was failing
and said that Objective One money would not be sent back to Europe. Labour
AM Christine Chapman, who is chair of the Objective One monitoring
committee, which used to oversee WEFO, said the move was 'welcome'. She
said: 'I'm concerned at the way this story has been blown out of all proportion.
This is a welcome move - it's about improving Objective One.' 17
Source: BBe News website
The purpose of quoting this story here is to show that the publicly stated reasons for
bringing WEFO 'in-house' were fundamentally to improve the programmes. Improvement
WOUld, in the Welsh Governments own perception, increase the legitimacy of the work
being carried out. This research did not, however, identify significant improvements in the
programmes as they were being implemented, and did not identify any processes operating
alongside the development activity to evaluate whether the changes were being received
positively.
17 This news story also quotes opposition party members suggesting that the decision to change
WEFOs status was due to poor management and failures in the administration of the programmes.
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The act of drawing WEFO into the Welsh Government would have demonstrated to WEFO,
the EC and to anyone else paying attention that NAfW and the Welsh Government were
firmly in charge and prepared to take action should they so wish. It was a demonstration of
power by NAfW and the Welsh Government, and this proposition was confirmed by three
participants in this study discussing this incident with reference to the Welsh Government
wishing to convey a clearer image of control over its programmes. As discussed in Chapter 4
of this thesis and confirmed through the evidence collected, this need to make such a
demonstration of power was in part caused by the early difficulties and political
consequences of the perceived mis-administration of the funds when the 2000-2006
programmes first opened. One participant noted:
'It must have been pretty embarrassing for the politicians involved, the
shambles the programmes were in early on. Rhodri [Morgan - First Minister for
Wales] saw what happened to Alun [Michael- previous First Minister for
Wales] and probably thought a show of strength was in order. For us inside the
Welsh Government it didn't matter, but politicians' heads roll if they are
looking a bit clueless. Bringing WEFO in didn't look good, but at least it was
decisive. I Participant #2
The action of bringing WEFO 'in-house' was made to reassert political and governmental
control over the implementation and administration of the 2000-2006 programmes, and
would serve as an example of the Welsh Government's ability to decisively enact change
where it considered it was necessary. This would be invaluable to the public images of
NAfW and the Welsh Government in negotiating the funding for the current 2007-2013
programmes.,
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6.5.1 Best placed to deliver?
It could be argued from a number of different perspectives which organisations were truly
the best placed to deliver the ESF policy goals and how the cost of expertise could be
balanced with the need for efficiency and value for money. There is however, a general
acceptance within the academic (Kendall, 2003; Lewis, 2005; Mordaunt, 2006; Osborne &
McLoughin, 2004) sphere that the voluntary sector holds significant expertise, and is an
integral part of the solution to cross-cutting and wicked social issues. The context on the
Welsh environment provided in Chapter Four details the voluntary sector schemes and
commitments in place to enshrine the importance of the voluntary sector in service
delivery. The use of this sector would therefore be expected in the delivery of ESFpolicy
goals in order to best serve the needs of the public.
The ESFprogrammes, due to stringent requirements attached by the EC,were designed to
concentrate decision-making in the hands of WEFO, but were also structured to reduce the
administrative burden on WEFO and award greater power to projects to distribute funds.
This caused initial conflict with the trusteeship principle, as the release of control over
funds would dilute the power of WEFO to retain complete authority over the funding
process. The programmes were, therefore, structured in a strictly hierarchical and parochial
form to regulate the funds and retain maximum control over them, whilst reducing the
administrative burden. This meant that the trustee principle was actually reinforced, as the
programmes called for large, strategic and high value bids that could only be run by the
statutory sector. This served to centralise and confine the funds to organisations
fundamentally linked to the Welsh Government. One participant noted:
'The programmes still needed to be water-tight, but the reduction [in the
number of applications] had to be there, so that's why we said 'no - the bigger
projects can take on complete responsibility for the funds we give them, and
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they can do the partnering and procuring to make sure there's no duplication
and that the right organisations are getting involved' . . . We were still in
control, but we were essentially procuring the big projects to procure the little
projects.' Participant #5
Another participant explained a little more about what WEFO'sexpectations of what these
projects would look like:
'The expectation is that the fewer, bigger projects in this round will be led by
statutory authorities or departments, because the sums being talked about
mean that voluntary sector organisations probably won't be able to underwrite
the risk of leading such enormous projects. It's less risky if you think about it.'
Participant #29
This effectively excluded a significant proportion of the voluntary and private sectorswhich
did not havethis capacity and further demonstrates the principle of entrusting resourcesto
a small number of organisations considered competent to utilise the ESFresource. The
reduction in administrative burden clearly meant higher risk where projects were able to
further distribute funds to achieve policy outcomes. In order to mitigate this risk, WEFO
structured the programme requirements to ensure that the best suited organisations to
lead projects were those with features most commonly found in the public sector, such as
large experienced finance and procurement departments, large reserves and ability to
underwrite projects of high value. In this way, WEFO was able to rid itself of the
administration of funds to smaller projects whilst retaining control over the funding
distribution methods in conferring a certain amount of power to a small number of
trustworthy organisations. One participant noted:
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'Bigger projects, bigger risk to us as a managing authority. To reduce that risk,
and take some of the burden off the voluntary sector, projects are best situated
with large bodies and statutories. These types of organisation are already set-
up for projects of this size, and they can take responsibility for themselves.'
Participant #14
The bureaucratic values so fundamental to the Welsh Government and WEFO'sgeneral
operations clearly continued to have influence over the structure of the programmes, and
directed funding towards organisations that could handle the funds in the way in which
WEFO'svalues considered best.
There was an inherent reassurance in local authority or departmental procedures
regulating the funding processes,and so in its role as trustee, WEFOentrusted power over
the funds to only large, mostly statutory, organisations that in WEFO'sview possessedthe
necessary expertise to use the funding appropriately. The fact that this small group of
organisations awarded this power were closely tied to the state further demonstrates that
the power conferred was not distributed far from the centre, and was intended for
organisations which ultimately answer to the Welsh Government. This reflects the
centralisation of decision-making and retention of regulatory practice that paradoxically
characterises the concept of trusteeship in practice, and demonstrates how the actions of
the governing entities limit meaningful public or voluntary-sector oversight of this funding
process. Becauseonly statutory organisations were likely to be able to lead projects, these
bodies retained the financial and technocratic authority to design projects, and the ability
to choosewhich organisations would be subcontracted to deliver outputs.
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There was therefore, a clear exhibition of trusteeship features, as described by (Cowen &
Shenton, 1996), in the design of the ESFfunds, which presents a different power dimension
in answering the first key research question.
6.5.2 Displacing trusteeship through contracting
Preceding sections have stressed the preoccupation of the Welsh Government and WEFO
with its own legitimacy, and in order to preserve this legitimacy, WEFO needed to reduce
the amount of scrutiny it came under concerning decisions it made on individual projects. It
did this through reducing the number of projects, but also by displacing responsibility for
the further distribution of funds by those projects onto the project leaders. In order to
displace this responsibility effectively, WEFO was able to make the award of funds more
'contract-like' in nature, and to place stringent transparency and monitoring requirements
on projects. This enabled it to avoid blame coming from either direction - it could point to
the EC as the source of project requirements and, in the event of project failure, point to
individual organisations awarded funds for failure. One participant recalled:
'It was difficult to pin-dawn what WEFOwas in charge af sometimes. When you
tried to query why things were with them, they were always like 'oh we have to
do that because Europe want it' or 'we cant do anything, you'll need ta talk to
someone leading one of the big projects'. Nothing was ever their fault.'
Participant #35
It has already been demonstrated above that the design of the funding programme lacked
meaningful accessibility to the voluntary sector without this being made explicit as a criteria
for eligibility. The information collected also formed a picture of a system in which the
issues of accountability and transparency emerged again and again in different places in the
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process of funding distribution, thereby calling into question how these ESFprogrammes
are scrutinised and quality-checked in terms of the public good (rather than the ECgood).
Another key area relating to the theme of trusteeship emerged when considering the
process of subcontracting. The information collected showed that not only did the
environmental shift to public sector led bids serve to largely exclude the voluntary sector as
a driving force, the partnership concept and implementation of subcontracting in line with
transparency and accountability measures, increased dysfunction and competition in the
network between organisations wanting to deliver outcomes.
Bovens (2005) noted that one of the main functions of public accountability is to improve
performance, the other main functions being to enhance integrity of public governance,
and to provide for the democratic process. Combined, these serve to enhance or maintain
the legitimacy of the government in question, enabling it to be entrusted with the direction
of resources for the greatest good. Within this study, with the programmes being oriented
towards pleasing the EC, the Welsh Governments public-facing legitimacy was somewhat
neglected in pursuit of creating the most impressive programme in the eyes of Europe.
The delivery of policy goals, as in the ESFprogrammes, would in theory need to be carried
out by organisations outside of the state, given the present role of the state as an 'enabler'
rather than a 'deliverer' (Rhodes, 1994 p141). Local authorities and government
departments simply do not have to expertise in house to deliver the outcomes required by
ESF, so even where local authorities and government departments have been awarded
funds for a project, they would need to use this to procure the outcomes they had
committed to achieving in their project bid to WEFO. In line with Boven's theory on public
accountability measures, one might have expected to find project leads going through a
competitive selection process to recruit the right partners, much like organisations would
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recruit for staff. This would ensure the transparency and accountability of decision making
in selecting those organisations to deliver the services.
One method of creating transparency in the award and delivery of services used
increasingly by governments around the world is competitive contracting (Smith, 2005). The
logic behind this assumes that in a free, open market, competition to win contracts ensures
that the process is free from political influence or relational favouritism, that all
organisations are able to bid, and that monopolies are not supported by the state. Radnor
and McGuire (2004) noted that performance management of contracts provides a clear
mechanism for monitoring and improving accountability. Private, voluntary and smaller
statutory organisations campaigned for there to be a clear procedural element of fairness
in the distribution of funds.
The requirement from seemingly all sides for 'fairness' and for 'accountability and
transparency', added to earlier discussed requirements for increases in strategic spending
and efficacy, meant that WEFO shifted towards a cascading competitive contracting model
of funding distribution and away from the individual grant funding model employed in the
2000-2006 programmes. This was seen to be a fair and straight forward way of distributing
funds. Contracting would in theory, increase transparency and accountability and meet the
criteria for fairness through open competition allowing all organisations the same
opportunities. This would stand up to audit by the EU auditors, and would enable the Welsh
Government and WEFO to monitor large scale outputs and outcomes to demonstrate clear
success. This would also reinforce the regulations set in place by WEFO to reduce risk and
reinforce technocratic authority, consolidating this expertise within the public sector
organisations entrusted to achieve the policy goals required.
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Another attractive feature of contracting discussedearlier in this section was the potential
for it to shift responsibility for the award of funds away from WEFOand onto organisations
awarded funding for large strategic partnership projects. Through a model of MLG, the
structural funds solidified tiers of responsibility for decision-making concerning the
destination of funds, and this nurtured a higher tier of network and statutory organisations
between the Welsh Government and the network. Similar to comments by participants
earlier in this section, one participant noted:
'We won't have to make all the decisions this time. We will award the big ones,
and then it's their responsibility to sub-contract through the sell2wales website.
There will still be plenty of disgruntled voluntary sector organisations
complaining I'm sure, and they will need to go away and engage with the
bigger projects. The point of doing this is to reduce the burden on WEFO,
making the big projects do a lot of the scrutiny.' Participant #20
This shift of responsibility to an arms-length agencyechoesboth Talbots's (2004) discussion
of agency and Flinders'(2004) assertion that the creation of agency deflects potential
criticism in the event of the agencies failure, and could be viewed as a demonstration of
political manoeuvring to reduce governmental answerability for what may be publicly
unpopular decisions.Whereas in the previous programmes WEFOwas inundated with not
only legitimate applications, but significant political and public pressure to fund certain
projects and answer for projects not funded, this time, WEFOwould shift a significant
proportion of both small project application and the external pressures onto the large
strategic projects for them to deal with.
This system of displacing responsibility has been cited by Bovaird (2006) as problematic in
the contracting sphere, and may place disproportionate blame on the contracted agencies
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for any potential failure. The new model of awarding funds to only large projects and then
expecting them to cascade the funds down to smaller organisations would insulate the Ee,
WEFO, the Welsh Government and to a certain extent, NAfW against campaigning and any
accusations of poor grant-making decisions,incompetence or a lack of transparency. This
model would therefore leave the legitimacy of the Welsh Government and WEFO intact,
and shift any suspicion of favouritism or poor practice in the distribution of funds through
contracts onto those large project partnerships that were awarded ESFmonies. In reality,
the participants originating from the network viewed this multi-tiered model as very much
lacking in transparency, and difficult to navigate in terms of trying to access funds. This
challenges the assumptions inherent in New Public Management, that suggest that
procurement exercises would secure the best deal, and that transparency measures would
actually make procurement processes more visible. This study suggests quite the opposite,
with the evidence collected demonstrating a multi-tiered web of procurement so complex
it could not possibly be described as transparent.
Whilst contracting as a method of demonstrating accountability and transparency could
generate a clear and auditable paper trail, there is debate in the literature (Flinders, 2004;
Ketti, 2000; Pollitt, 2005) around its true value in ensuring accountability and transparency
across the whole process. The evidence collected for this study shows the logic of using
contracting to improve accountability and transparency to have been applied in this case,
however it is worth noting here that there is literature that conversely views contracting
models and the use of agencies as detrimental to efforts to achieve accountability (Flinders,
2004; Rhodes, 1994). Based on the evidence collected in this study, it is clear that
partnering, contracting and sub-contracting clouded the transparency of funding
distribution and ~s a result, the power relations within the MlG operating in Wales became
altered.
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The finding of this study support Rhodes (1994), who was very direct in his opinion that a
hollow or contracting state erodes accountability, and that the use of fragmented agencies
and a multitude of contracts creates a complexity of organisation that decreases the ability
of the public to understand or engage with the system. Voluntary sector participants in this
study stressed that they couldn't hope to understand how all of the funding decisions were
made or what 'deals' were done informally. If individuals are unable to understand how the
funding was directed, how can the process be transparent or accountable to the public?
A lack of ministerial accountability for actions of agencies carrying out delegated functions
is cited by Flinders (2005) as a result of increasing horizontal contracting by government. In
these cases, the government is able to claim transparency in its selection of those
organisations carrying out delegated activities, but a murkiness occurs in the position of
responsibility for the achievements or failures of those organisations. There is therefore, a
clear assertion in the literature that supports the view that governments, for one reason or
another, have difficulty holding contractors to account (Johnston & Romzek, 2004). The
evidence collected in this study supports this view, which demonstrates a lack of will by the
governing entities to concern themselves with the detail of the funding's final destination.
Dugger (1987) summarises this quite succinctly, stating 'Superiors, sometimes to shield
themselves from possible responsibility, are not to delve too deeply into how the goals are
achieved' (1987, p1659)
The centralisation of power and the concentration of power conferred enabled WEFO and
the Welsh Government to mitigate against the risk of failure, and to retain maximum
control over the ESFfunds without being a deliverer of services. Whilst risk of failure was
minimised, the.lack of transparency and accountability in this model benefitted the Welsh
Government and WEFO, as responsibility for unpopular decisions could be displaced where
necessary, whilst credit for success could be retained. This demonstrates that trusteeship
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principles such as careful delegation to competent organisations and centralisation of
resources in a hierarchical system shaped the structure of power in determining eligibility
for funds. This also established a more formal type of trusteeship. However, sufficient
distance between the trustee and the delegate was maintained to displace potential
failures. This provides an additional dimension to the consideration of the first research
question, which askedhow institutions and power shaped the Welsh ESFprogrammes, and
shows that trustee principles served to further reinforce the centralised and statutory-
favoured programme structures.
6.6 Structural Embeddedness: Occupying Advantageous Positions
The theme of structural embeddednessspans both the institutional and network contexts.
The decision to situate this section in this institutional chapter was made in order to create
a theoretical bridge to the network environment, and to highlight existing institutionalised
links between the bureaucratic structures of government and the network. Structural
embeddedness emerges as a characteristic of an organisation as a result of
institutionalisation of links and position between the organisation, the state and the
networked environment. It is, therefore, fitting to locate this theme here as a transition
between institutions and networks.
This section will consider the relationships between the government department that led
the case study project and the network that may have influenced the eventual decisions
taken concerning which organisations to accept into the project partnership. This is
relevant to detect the level at which relationships were already institutionalised prior to the
inception of the 2007-2013 ESFprogrammes in Wales and the design of the case study
project. The finding of this study suggest that structural embeddedness is an on-going
process, and that the institutionalisation of links between organisations and the Welsh
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Government over time has not only benefitted them financially, but has directly led to
these organisations being able to retain expertise that can perpetuate their state of
embeddedness.
6.6.1 Institutional/sing relationships
It has been demonstrated in the literature (Hager et 01, 2004; Huang & Provan, 2007;
MacKinnon et 01, 2004) that organisations which are structurally embedded are more likely
to have success in engaging with governing entities over organisations that are not
structurally embedded. This section demonstrates that organisations that have
institutionalised links with governing entities over time perform better in securing places in
partnerships with those bodies, than organisations that are missing those links. Through
this process of institutionalisation, organisations in the network become structurally
embedded in the delivery of policy aims for the state. This means they occupy a key
informational position between the state and the network, and as repeated delivery agents
for the state, adopt norms and procedures internally to better serve the requirements of
delivering for the state. This sets organisations that are structurally embedded apart from
other organisations, and creates a two-tiered network, as illustrated in Figure6.3.
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Figure 6.3 Structural Embeddedness in the Network
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Institutionalised
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Organisations
Wider Network
Structurally embedded organisations are, therefore, still part of the external network
environment, but occupy positions in which they will be more exposed to valuable
information. This information allows them to make more complete and less bounded
decisionsthan organisations not occupying these positions. This affords organisations more
power over their futures, as they are able to more easily identify where their funding will
originate from, and orient themselves towards it efficiently. This case study determined
those organisations that had long relationships with the state in terms of receipt of funds,
service delivery and policy engagement, as well as holding respect within the network, as
structurally embedded.
Within this case, there emerged a clear preference within the Welsh Government
department leading the case study project to engage organisations that were known to
them and with whom they had worked before. Whilst this was not explicitly stated, there
was much discussion by participants concerning fairness and transparency in the process.
The documentary evidence collected from organisations indicates that those organisations
that had received funding from the Welsh Government before were more successful in
gaining entry into the project partnership than those organisations that had not received
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funds. Of the nine organisations that were successful, one was 100% funded by the Welsh
Government, and 6 had received in recent years annual grants of over £lOOk from Welsh
Government and/or linked statutory sources, such as the Welsh Language Board or Arts
Council of Wales. Table 6.4 clearly shows that partner organisations received at least 30%
of their income from Welsh Government and related sources in the year the partnership
was formed (2008-9).
Table 6.4 Partners Public Funding Levels 2008-9.-----------------------~--------------------------------~
Welsh Govt & related public funding as a percentage of
income
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Conversely, of those organisations that were not successful and who participated in this
research, only 4 out of 8 had grants from the Welsh Government listed in their audited
accounts, and those that did have Welsh Government receipts had them sporadically rather
than annually or consistently. These unsuccessful organisations did however, show greater
dependence upon more diverse funding sources and more diversity in activity than the
project partners. The project partners had very similar organisational structures that were
clearly more efficient at processing funds for services from statutory sources, but lacked
diversity of activity and funding. This supports the argument for isomorphism made by
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) in suggesting that those organisations oriented towards one
specific goal will begin to look alike as they emulate and operationalize successful and
accepted practice.
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In this case study, the organisations that were successful were, at least within their audited
accounts and annual reports, similar in appearance when looking at the sources of funding,
and had similar internal organisational structures with an emphasis on being very involved
in the policy affairs of the Welsh Government and of delivering for high numbers of
beneficiaries. Based on the evidence collected in this study, it is clear that the close
involvement between organisations receiving grants and engaging with government over
time has embedded these organisations into the fabric of Welsh Government policy
delivery. Within this process, these structurally embedded organisations had aligned their
policies and procedures to be able to respond to the demands placed on them by the Welsh
Government and other statutory organisations, and this was evident in the way they sought
and retained expertise in funding. Participants from these organisations indicated common
methods of engaging with the Welsh Government and of hearing about potential funding
opportunities informally in policy discussions rather than through official channels. These
organisations were more hierarchical in their structures and decision-making and creativity
was limited, whilst emphasis was placed on 'churning out the numbers' (Participant #7). In
contrast, the organisations not successful were slightly different in appearance, exhibiting a
wider array of funding sources and demonstrating more diverse activities and
organisational structures.
How do organisations become structurally embedded in state policy development,
governance and delivery? Working together over time, relationships on both an
organisational and personal level can develop and become institutionalised. Where trust
between these organisations is developed, further opportunities may present themselves.
At some point, i~ this process, the organisational position becomes what Grant (2004)
described as an Insider, and can become the 'go-to' organisation for a particular type of
provision. Grants criteria for an Insider were not explicit, howeverthe term encompasses
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the status of the structurally embedded organisations in this study as occupying positions
of informational value.
Participants in this research that were successful in becoming part of the project
partnership were uncomfortable with the idea that they might have had an 'inside track' to
becoming partners, and all cited the original, more inclusive project designed by the Welsh
Government department as an example that they were not given preferential treatment.
Similarly, those participants within the department managing the project were quick to
stress that there was no favouritism in the selection process, and that they selected
partners purely based on the merit of their project, their expertise and their geographical
remit. These three criteria did, however, betray further differences between those
organisations that were considered to be embedded, to those that were not. With this
criteria in mind, the funding receipts of the partner organisations from the Welsh
Government and other sourceswere examined more closely, and revealed common grants
for 'corela, costs.
6.6.2 Coresupport as the conditionalfactor
The audited accounts of the structurally embedded organisations showed significant Welsh
Government or linked statutory body grants going back several years, and whilst these
grants were for a range of purposes, several were for the purposes of supporting core
organisational costs, expanding into other geographical areasand developing new services.
These core grants enabled organisations to retain expertise not only in delivery of policy
outcomes, but in fund raising, contract delivery and related paperwork. This retention of
expertise would ultimately enable the successful organisations to submit high quality
project appltcatlons to the case study project, and to maintain over months and years a
good relationship with organisations that were sourcesof funding. The financial support to
18 Core costs refer to items such as full-time non-project staff costs, overheads, maintenance, and
other costs associated with the day to day running of an organisation
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retain these individuals enabled those organisations to develop long term relationships
with the Welsh Government, enabled them to develop and retain expertise in grant
funding, and positioned them to be able to take full advantage of any project opportunities
that would require large geographical remit or expertise in a range of disciplines. One
participant noted:
'We have had some funds for core costs which were helpful in keeping
[employee] our fundraising manager. It's difficult to fund fundraising posts as
grant funders only ever want to fund specific projects, and they see fundraisers
as something that's not really necessary, even though no-one else here has the
time or the know-how to do those bids. I mean, we're a youth work charity.
Apart from [employee] we are all youth workers who wouldn't have the first
clue about the funding stuff Without [employee] we would be in the same boat
as a lot of other voluntary organisations whose board or managers have to
cobble together bids at one o'clock in the morning because that's the only time
spare, whereas we are doing ok because [employee] is there to get us those
core funds, plus lots of other grants. ' Participant #10
This participant clarified an important link between the receipt of core funds from the
Welsh Government and the ability to continue to be an established service provider. With
the benefit of core funds paying for a fundraiser's salary, the organisation was able to
retain expertise that was key in generating further funds to carry out a range of projects,
thus increasing expertise and/or geographical remit. Preserving and institutionalising this
role within the organisation as an interface between it and the state enabled the
structurally embedded organisations to further lnstitutlonallse this relationship through
repeated grants and delivery. This is an example of the value of relational links proposed by
Granovetter (1992), and demonstrates that the retention of expertise coupled with the on-
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going relation with the state allows organisations and their representatives to become
structurally embedded. Embedding is however, a progressive and constantly moving
process,and requires continued capacity on the part of the organisation. If that capacity to
continue embedding is there, the network links become institutionalised.
6.6.3 Networks as the lever 0/structural embeddedness
All of the organisations successfulin becoming project partners had at least one dedicated
fundraising and policy post, compared to 5 out of the 9 unsuccessful organisations
participating in this study (and of those 5 to have dedicated posts, two organisations were
UK organisations whose dedicated posts were situated in london). The functions of this
same fund raising and policy post across several different organisations also extended to
becoming involved in steering groups and responding to consultation, and activities
associatedwith these posts involved developing relationships within the network and with
civil servants. These activities were considered to be essential to the success of the
organisation, and all organisations taking part, both successful and unsuccessful in
becoming project partners, cited networking and relationships as key in gaining
opportunities. One participant noted:
'It's essential to be seen as an expert, to be consulted be/ore the consultation
comes out. And it's essential to know what's on the horizon so you can make
sure you are the first person people think about when they might have some
money to give out. The best way to do this is to be as involved as possible in as
much as possible. People get to know you, and then they feel comfortable
coming to you when opportunities arise.' Participant #9
Another participant felt that a lack of networking activity was detrimental to the fortunes of
their organisation:
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'/ try to get to os many of these events and stuff as possible but the thing is I
just don't have the time and even when / do / don't know anyone. / feel like
that's where / really fall down here, because you need to be on these steering
groups and having drinks with people in the know, but / just don't have the
contacts and / think that's why we don't get as much money.' Participant #23
This demonstrates a clear perception by those in the network that being involved in a range
of policy activities with a range of civil servants and network individuals was the best way to
ensure success in gaining funding or securing a seat on a decision-making group. This
echoes the assertions of Kenis & Oerlemans (2008) that interlocking provides opportunities
for advancement or collaboration. From the governing entities' perspective however, the
information gathered showed that it was the ability to deliver a high volume of the right
kind of outcomes that was important, rather than being seen to be networking.
Civil servants were largely aware of the main organisations operating in areas where they
were preparing policy, but did not believe their networking activities were the reason for
their successes. Rather, they believed that these were the easiest organisations to engage
with due to their previous experience and their ability to mobilise in line with policy and
timetables. One participant explained:
'Organisations that are easiest to work with do, / suppose, tend to be bigger
ones, because they are able to go at short notice a lot of the time. They have
the capacity and the experience.' Participant #30
There is therefore an indication from this extract, supported by other accounts from
participants, that these successful organisations were structurally embedded, having
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sustained a relationship over time, mobilised quickly as a result of having been informed of
forthcoming policy before other organisations, and repeatedly delivered on behalf of the
governing institution. The attraction was not therefore, in their tireless networking activity,
but in their track-record. Another participant noted:
'These ones tick all the boxes. We obviously wanted more partners but y'know,
WEFO intervened and we had to make it work with fewer partners. These ones
were able to work nation-wide and do a lot of work. They can also subcontract.
Yeswe have worked with a lot of them before and that's a good thing y'know.
We know they will do what they have agreed to do, and they will take care of
the finances.' Participant #2
The maintenance of good relationships through the consistent satisfactory execution of
commitments was therefore clearly emphasised by civil servants as the key to
organisational success in securing recurrent funding opportunities. This fits with the model
of successful organisations being structurally embedded, although the emphasis is on high
quality ties through delivery, rather than through networking. Those organisations that had
a lot of high quality links with other organisations and were able to provide high volume
outcomes were much more likely to be structurally embedded than organisations with few
links or low volumes of outcomes. Figure 6.5 demonstrates how this operates.
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Figure 6.5 Ties & Outcomes
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The networking activity was nevertheless very present in all of the successful organisations,
and considered to be extremely important, with multiple staff members engaging in
interlocking and networking activities not only with governing institutions but within the
network in order to keep abreast of all relevant developments. This demonstrates that
organisations that were structurally embedded exhibited a high volume of high quality ties
to the network and to governing institutions, and were more likely to engage in policy,
partnership and service delivery activities than those organisations that were not
structurally embedded.
Considering the discussions in this chapter concerning characteristics of organisations
successful in becoming project partners and receiving funds, the below points provide a
summary of the common attributes held by successful organisations:
• Large «£500k turnover + at least 10 staff members)
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• Established in it's field (at least 10 years of operation OR only organisation in a
specialist field)
• At least 30%of funding from WGor linked statutory sources
• Staff dedicated to management/policy/fundraising
• Staff havegood relationships with WGemployees
• National remit
Whilst this is not an exhaustive list, it does highlight the key common elements of the
successful partners, and provides a profile of organisations most likely to be successful in
similar endeavours.
The concept of structural embeddednessdiscussedin this section demonstrates the extent
to which relationships between the governing bodies and the network were
institutionalised, and that this awarded a certain amount of power to those organisations in
securing funds or partnership places in contrast to those organisations that were not
structurally embedded. This answers the second key research question stated in the
introductory chapter, which asked how the relationships between governing entities and
the network operated, and demonstrates that the way in which they operate provides
structurally embedded organisations with advantagesin securing funding.
6.7 Summary
This chapter has drawn out the institutional factors uncovered through the research that
have shaped the programme structures and influenced which organisations would
ultimately be able to compete for the funds. This section has focused upon answering the
first two of the four key researchquestions listed in the introductory chapter, namely:
- 240-
5. How did institutions and power shapethe structures of the Welsh ESF
programmes?
6. What kind of relationships exist between governing entities and the network and
how do they operate?
The first of these questions required an in-depth investigation into the various institutional
processes that impacted upon the development of the programmes. This investigation
demonstrated that the EC,through a model of MLG,wielded significant agenda-setting and
environment-changing power over the Welsh Government, and this shaped the Welsh
Governments perception of how it should conduct the programmes. The Welsh
Government duly assigned value to actions and perpetuated norms that oriented its
programmes towards the perceived needs of the EC, rather than towards the needs of
those organisations that would need to deliver on the policy aims. In addition to this, the
bureaucratic processesinstitutionalised within the Welsh Government as part of the focus
on pleasingEuropeserved to delay the programmes and further increasebureaucracy.
Retention of power over the programmes was essential to ensure the programmes were
delivered successfullyin line with the Welsh Governments vision, and that the ECcontinued
to be pleased with Wales' work. In order to retain control over the programme funds,
whilst conforming to requirements for programmes to fund strategic projects, the
governing entities structured the programmes in such a way that largely exclude voluntary
sector organisations from becoming project leaders. The principles of trusteeship were
evident in the governing entities' centralisation of power both in bringing WEFOinto the
Welsh Government and in designing the programme requirements to ensure only the
largest and most reliable organisations would be able to lead projects. Power conferred on
large projects to further distribute money therefore reduced risk, as the only organisations
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eligible to become project leadswere likely to be state organisations. This answers the first
question 'how did institutions and power shape the structures of the Welsh ESF
programmes? and demonstrates clearly how process became prioritised over eventual
outcomes.
The second question was largely descriptive, but necessary to uncover the existing
relationships between the governing entities and the network. It was relevant to this study
as any institutionalised relationships between the two environments would be likely to
grant an advantage to organisations that were involved. The section on structural
embeddednessdemonstrated clearly that there did indeed exist relationships between the
government department leading the project and organisations within the network, and
showed that those organisations that were structurally embedded in the network were
more successful than non-embedded organisations in gaining entry into the project
partnership studied. This section demonstrated how the structurally embedded
organisations were able to perpetuate their relationships with the Welsh Government and
retain their positions as leading delivery agents. This answers the second question 'what
were the relationships between the governing entities and the network and how do they
operate? This section also raised the issue of homogeneity in structurally embedded
organisations, with these organisations displaying similar characteristics. This raises
important questions for organisations developing funding programmes around genuine
accessibility, and provides the potential for a less diverse and pluralistic voluntary sector
network.
Institutional factors and power in various forms impacted significantly upon the
development of, the programme structures. Certain organisations were structurally
embedded in service delivery roles for the governing entities in Wales, and were
disproportionately successful in becoming partners in the case study partnership. This is
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however, only half of the story, and the investigation of the network context will explain
why it is that other organisations were not able to overcome their lack of structural
embeddednessto be successfulin joining this partnership and receiving ESFfunds.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
7.1
Analysing the Network Context
Introduction
This second analysis chapter focuses on the network context that shaped the distribution of
ESFfunds in the Welsh network. It specifically examines the processes at work within the
network which worked for and against individual organisations attempting to secure funds
or places in project partnerships, and applies the theoretical framework described in
Chapter Three to explain the features of the network that dictated which organisations
would be able to attain places within project partnerships. The theories used in this chapter
are shown in relation to the funding distribution process on the next page as Figure 7.1.
This chapter will seek to address the third and fourth key research questions, which were:
7. How do decision-making processes in networks influence how organisations are
selected for funding?
8. How does organisational dominance in the network shape the distribution of
funding?
This chapter begins by discussing the influence of bounded rationality in the actions of
organisations in attempting to engage with the ESF funding process. This discussion
demonstrates that organisations act according to their own perceptions of the network and
programme structures, but that the limits of their knowledge of the variables affecting the
environment push them into making increasingly defensive decisions. This encompasses a
consideration . of Transactions Cost Economics (TCE) which contributes to rational
organisational decision-making.
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The chapter then progressesto consider the outcomes of rational decision-making in the
network in the form of games, and the use of power within these games to achieve
organisational ends. This section identifies those structurally embedded organisations
within the network that formed an upper tier that was consistently more successful at
engagingin government funding programmes.
Finally, this chapter observes the downward forces acting upon the network from the
governing entities. It considers how the network was subject to governance and strategic
bridging models utilised by governing bodies and which monopolised funding distribution
activity - ultimately selecting the organisations that would be successful.
- 245-
Figure 7.1
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7.2 Transaction Costs and Bounded Rationality
The testimonies collected in this research pointed to considerations of the organisational
cost and likelihood of success as key in organisational decision-making relating to
engagement with the ESFprogrammes. There is therefore, a need to explore themes of
bounded rationality within a TeE framework that may explain how these considerations
positioned certain organisations to be better able to join the project partnership and thus
secure ESFfunding.
The project examined by this case study suffered something of a false start in the initial
stages of its development. The project became increasingly more formalised in response to
the large number of parties interested in becoming project partners, the complexity of the
project, and ESFplanning and monitoring requirements. These factors caused a contraction
in the number of proposed partners. Initially there were approximately 90 organisations
interested in becoming partners, and in the early stages of project development, the
government department leading the project was willing to accommodate all organisations.
Following several project development meetings, the prospective number of partners had
fallen to approximately 42. This decrease was a result of organisations being unable or
unwilling to devote significant time and effort to the partnership, and being unhappy with
the lack of genuine timescales available for actually receiving funds. Of the organisations
still involved at this point, most were still disappointed not to be leading their own projects,
but were content to at least be part of a project that they considered likely to be funded.
Whilst network theorists posit that interdependence characterises a network (Klijn, 2008;
Provan & Kenis, 2007), it has also been demonstrated that organisations generally strive for
autonomy in order to operate independently and reduce their vulnerability to market
conditions (Galaskiewicz, 1985), Within this study, all of the participants from voluntary
sector organisations admitted a preference for delivering services, projects and applying for
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grants or funding independently, as opposed to being part of a partnership or with a
necessity to sub-contract further services. This was because organisations felt that the cost
of partnership or sub-contracting to the organisation was felt to be too high as to be
beneficial. One participant explained:
There were initially lots of open meetings all across Wales. Then quite a few
more specific ones once the project had been a bit more planned. One was over
two days in Aber, so I had to stay overnight. I felt I had to go to them all to keep
us in the loop and to make sure we weren't forgotten about. There was also a
bit of paperwork. Not much at first, but more later, and I began to get the
feeling that paperwork and endless partnership meetings were going to suck
up more and more of my time. At that point, I had to think quite long on how
much this was going to cost because going to lots of meetings all around Wales
is expensive and time consuming, and we didn't really have the money to pay
for me to keep doing all that.' Participant #18
Participants in this study, pointed to the imbalance between the work required to engage
and the perceived benefits as a key factor in dropping out of the process. Several
participants also pointed to the procurement models of application in the 2007-2013
programmes as much more difficult to process than the grants-based system of the
previous programmes, and were described as time-consuming and difficult. This raises the
issue of transaction cost economics.
The literature describes transactions costs as those costs incurred in the development,
measurement and enforcement of agreements or contracts (North, 1993) or the costs of
doing business (Arrow, 1974). Within this case study, these costs would be incurred mostly
through administrative expenditures on staff resources as a result of initial project
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development activities, research, networking and drawing up project plans. All staff time
committed to engagingwith this project partnership was time that staff members were not
spending raising money elsewhere. Therefore, the high transactions costs associatedwith
engaging with this project and other similarly structured and managed projects directly
affected the ability of organisations within the network to access ESFfunds. Many
organisations simply could not justify the cost of the gamble on securing entry into ESF
projects.
The transactions costs associatedwith these sorts of activities were generally judged by the
research participants as greater than the perceived benefits, and often left the
organisations at a monetary or capacity deficit. Due to the incomplete level of information
they held concerning their likelihood of success,organisations had to judge whether they
could afford to risk carrying out significant work on attempting to gain entry to a project
partnership at the expense of pursuing other funds. This supports the TeEmodel of North
(1993) which suggests that transactions costs govern the ability of organisations to
participate in transactions with other entities.
The participants in this research that were successful in gaining entry into the project
partnership all indicated that they not only had previous experience in delivering for the
state, but that this activity was of such importance to them that they concentrated a lot of
time and resource in preserving the arrangement. Several participants indicated that
income from, and delivery for, government was a key part of their operation, and that their
internal structures were developed over time to best serve the kinds of contracts they were
delivering. This evolution of internal processes to accommodate state funding contracts
served to reduce the transaction costs associatedwith renewing those contracts or bidding
for others, as the state's methods of procurement were generally standardised. One
participant explained:
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'Once you are set up for procurement it mokes things easier because contracts
mostly have the same requirements. When we started winning contracts it was
difficult because they were asking for stuff we didn't normally collect, but we
made sure after that our standard systems collect the right information for
bidding and reporting so it's much quicker for us to manage.' Participant #7
Transactions costs associatedwith bidding and contracting, as well as administering them,
were therefore lower for organisations that were already experienced in delivering services
for governing entities. Theseorganisations had taken the rational decisions" to orient their
systems to collect information necessary for statutory sector bidding processes and to
retain expertise in this, and therefore these organisations were able to put together bids
and applications quicker than organisations that were not oriented in this way. A
contrasting perspective from an unsuccessfulorganisation demonstrates this:
'We got a bit lost with all the forms and the frameworks. There were bits I
didn't really understand, and at that point there wasn't anywhere to go for
help. It took me ages to put all the bid stuff together as well, because I wasn't
even sure how to estimate beneficiary numbers . . . because the kind of
breakdowns the frameworks had were different ta how we normally keep track
of our young people . . the categories and splits were different. I couldn't go
back and look at last year's figures because we didn't have those kinds of
figures. I had to guess in the end. ' Participant #23
This testimony clearly indicates that a lot of time was spent attempting to complete the
required paperwork for entry into the partnership. This illustrates how the transaction costs
of merely putting a bid together were higher for organisations not normally oriented
19 Rational choice theory states that an individual will act in a manner suggesting they are balancing
costs and benefits to deduce the best strategy for achieving the biggest gain (Friedman, 1953)
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towards delivery of state services.Whilst these transaction costs had not been an issue in
the grants-based distribution frameworks of the previous ESFprogrammes in Wales in
which most organisations had expertise, the 2007-2013 programmes proved different.
These new frameworks meant that procurement models were being used, and that a
number of organisations trying to apply would spend much more time on this than they
would havedone on the previous application system.
Considerations of transactions costs also emerged in conversations concerning the
calculations of delivering the policy outcomes required. It was discovered through this
research that organisations had vastly different costs to deliver policy outcomes based on
the amount of funding already secured by eachorganisation. The discussion in the previous
analysis chapter concerning the enhanced abilities of certain organisations to apply for
funds due to their receipt of core grants to support a fundraising employee demonstrated a
clear imbalance.
Organisations with different levels of funding for certain items such as fundraisers,
administrative assistants, etc. had different costs associated with these posts. An
organisation that already had a supported or partially supported fund raiser post for
instance, would not need to claim for their time from another project they may be working
on, aswould an organisation that had a fundraiser that was not supported. Therefore, the
costs to organisations of engagingin a project would be different dependent upon the kinds
of funding they were in receipt of. An organisation receiving £40,000 per year for a
fund raiser, the overheads associated with the fund raiser post and a certain number of
hours of administrative support would be able to quote less to deliver a project than an
organisation that, must rely solely on income from delivering projects and charging each
project for the time of a fundraiser proportional to the time spent on each project (a model
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known as 'full cost recovery' to voluntary organisations in Wales). A simplified example of
this is shown in Table 7.2.
Table 7.2 Comparative Operational Costsof Engagement
Core govt. Project - 520 hrs of youth work Project cost
grants to org.
received
• Project application, partnership &
management activity by fundraiser
on £10 per hour @ 4hrs per week
per year = £0 (this post already fully
funded) ~
£40k p.a. for • Administration of project @ 2.5hrs
Organisation
fund raiser,
per week per year = £0 (this post
1
overheads and
already fully funded)
£5,720
lO%ofadmin
assistant
Delivery of youth work hours 520 @•
£7 per hour = £3,640
• Overheads for 520 youth work
hours @ £4 per hour = £2,080
• Project application, partnership &
management activity by fundraiser
on flO per hour @ 4hrs per week
per year = £2,080
• Administration of project on £5 per
Organisation
hour @ 2.5hrs per week per year =
2
None £650 £8,450
• Delivery of youth work hours 520 @
£7 per hour = £3,640
• Overheads for 520 youth work
hours @ £4 per hour = £2,080
Table 7.2 clearly shows that any organisation receiving a grant for certain core functions
required to execute complex projects and serve on partnership groups is at a clear
advantage. This is because their project costs are much lower than those costs calculated
by an organisation that must recover their full project costs through the project funds
awarded. This adds another dimension to the assertion of these organisations being
structurally embedded, as these organisations are establishing themselves as cheaper and
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more effective than their competitors, when in fact they are able to present an appearance
of value whilst receiving money for the same costs that others request through a different
funding stream not taken into account at the time of assessment. One participant
explained:
'Our unit cost is lower than quite a few other organisations because some of
our posts are already fully funded. I suppose I do have to admit the money's
really coming from the same place, but it's coming from different departments
so you can't assume that it's coming via a back door or it's unfair at ali.'
Participant #9
When questioned about the possibility of unit costs for projects not taking into account
other funding already received, the fund administrators were less concerned with the
uneven calculations, and were happy for organisations to operate in this manner as long as
no funding was duplicated. One participant explained:
'There will of course be lots of organisations that have Welsh Government
grants, but these will be from different departments for different things, but as
long as the rules on match funding and duplicate funding are observed, there's
not really a problem. I guess you could say that some organisations might be at
a disadvantage in their costing's, as you say, if they have to use a full cost
recovery model, but it's not, we can't really go into all that. We have to take it
at face value what their calculation for the project is and whether it's
competitive. We can't choose projects that appear vastly more expensive
unless the,re is a clear and valid reason why. ' Participant #30
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Assessment of transactions costs was therefore more important to organisations that
lacked funding for core or support activities involved in engaging with projects, as it was
these organisations that would expend resourcesthey did not have on applying to become
part of the partnership project.
7.2.1 Responding to the competition
Transactions costs were not the only consideration that the majority of participants in this
research cited as determining their strategy for engagement. Participants also explained
that they would assessthe likelihood of other organisations being successful, and would
basetheir strategies on what they knew of other organisations project proposals and which
individuals they believed they needed to talk to in order to enhance their chances of
acquiring membership to a partnership or funding from one.
These decisions reflect the relatively rational choices made by individual actors within the
network, but demonstrate the limits to rationality that exist with regard to the incomplete
nature of the information concerning the transaction available to each individual actor and
the cognitive limits of each individual to be completely rational in decision making. This
'bounded rationality' has been discussed by several authors going back to the 1960's
(Braybrooke & Lindblom, 1963; Klijn & Teisman, 1997; Lindblom, 1979; Pressman &
Wildavsky 1984), and suggeststhat it is impossible for any actor to possessfull information
on any given situation, and that they will need to make their decisions based upon the
incomplete information available to them. Equally, individuals have limited ability to
process the large volumes of information relevant to the issues in question, and will be
influenced by m~re than stark figures, but also by personal preference. This relates to
Table 3.3 on p 102 that sets outs the trade-off between opportunisms and bounded
rationality
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In the Welsh context of this ESF project partnership, each actor representing their
respective organisation made rational decisions to either continue engaging or to withdraw
from the partnership formation process based on the limited information that was available
to them, and their ability to fully anticipate the implications of it. For many participants, the
final decision to continue or discontinue engaging was mainly influenced by the costs of the
project development process and the perceived end benefits, as well as their perception of
their own and other organisations' probability of success. Decision-makers contrasted this
with their individual and organisational experience and confidence in their ability to carry
out the necessary work. One participant that chose to disengage voluntarily from the
project partnership development explained:
(Itjust became too hard to continue without any guarantees. Yes, the money
would have benefitted us if we had ever gotten it, but between the amount of
fairly complicated paperwork and the distant prospect of getting money, we
just thought we would pull out and stick to what we know. ' PartiCipant #23
In contrast, another participant that was successful gave the following account:
(We just had to persevere with the bureaucracy because we knew it would be
worth it. We had all the right pieces in the right places, and there wasn't a
moment when I let myself think we weren't going to get the funding.'
Participant #9
In the fullness of time, those organisations that withdrew in the early stages realised that
they had saved themselves a significant amount of wasted time and effort given the large
contraction in the size of the final partnership. The limited information available to each
organisation to make decisions was however, integral in shaping the eventual partnership.
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Each organisation attempted to make rational decisions, however these often appeared
irrational to others that possessed different facts and perceptions. One participant
explained:
'I thought [voluntary organisation] were mad for dropping out so early, but in
hindsight, we should have done the same. Instead of trying to carry on as part
of the partnership after it was reduced in size, we should have cut our losses
and looked elsewhere.' Participant #18
There were a number of participants that expressed disappointment with the lack of
information originating from the government department leading the project, especially at
the point when the partnership was reduced from approximately 40 partners down to only
10.At the point of this contraction, there was an indication that the 10 partners would sub-
contract further works from unsuccessful organisations. The unsuccessful participants
agreed that if they had been given more information on how the changes in the projected
partnership size were progressing, they could have acted sooner in seeking funds from
other sources to support the work they were doing. Instead, several found themselves in
financial difficulties as a result of the delays associated with the programme as a whole
opening, and the project itself applying for funding.
This section has shown that rational decision-making within the network prompted
embedded organisations to orient themselves towards delivery services for the state,
setting them apart from the rest of the network and reducing the transaction costs
associated with delivery. Rational decision-making also prompted certain organisations to
disengage from the programmes based on a lack of information that would indicate
success.The result of these decisions was that only a small pool of organisations were left
that could deliver outcomes for a competitive price and that could mobilise effectively and
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quickly. Further barriers were discovered to be the cost to organisations of delivering
outcomes. Structurally embedded organisations had lower transaction costs, and lower
costs to deliver outcomes, as they were already in receipt of funds to cover many of their
core costs. This provides in part, an answer to the third key research question.
7.3 Games and Shocks
In addition to the individual scope and limitations for decision-making discussed in the
preceding section, the organisational decision-making processes and strategies involved in
the construction and implementation of policy have been referred to by several authors as
'games' with actors being described as 'players' (Allison, 1971; Klijn & Teisman, 1997; Klijn,
2008; Kenis & Schneider, 1991; Lynn, 1982; van Bueren et ai, 2003). This is generally agreed
as a consequence of the complexity of interactions and negotiating patterns characteristic
of networks, and encompasses the strategies used by different actors with different
motivations, based on the model of rational decision-making discussed in the preceding
section. Van Bueren et 01 (2003) described policy network games as 'a series of interactions
between actors that focus on influencing problem formulations, solutions and procedures
regarding an approach to a specific policy issue' (van Bueren et al, 2003 p19S). The 2007-
2013 programmes in Wales would therefore constitute a 'game' in which the organisations
within the network would compete for resources.
The 'new game' of the new funding programme was very different to those that had gone
before, and required a greater level of commitment and attention in the early stages to
understand the parameters for play and the strategies to employ. One partiCipant noted:
'It was all change. It was like they wiped the slate clean and started again from
scratch, and all that we did in the last round didn't count for much. We felt we
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had to get up to speed pretty quick to stand any chance of getting some
funding.' Participant #34
The proposed changes were not met with enthusiasm by many actors in the network.
Indeed, the majority of participants in this study competing for funding explained at length
how much the initial proposals were disliked in the voluntary sector in particular, but also
amongst the wider statutory sector that operated on a local level. Thiswas due to the move
away from a structure that mirrored the grant funding application processes toa
hierarchical procurement model that represented a lot of unknowns to the voluntary
sector. The majority of voluntary sector participants in this study noted that they had
limited experience or understanding of the processesto acquire funding that were being
proposed by WEFO,and expressed concern that this would have a negative outcome for
them in terms of securing similar volumes of funding to the previous programme rounds.
This lack of expertise within the network caused concern amongst a number of
organisations and their decision-makers, but to a small number of organisations this proved
to be a positive prospect, as their experience in procurement and participation in large
government-led partnerships would provide them with an advantage over other
organisations in the sector and allow them opportunity to expand into areas that were the
domain of other organisations in the past. One participant noted:
'We saw this as a good opportunity. Wealready havepeople here in Walesand
a big support team in England that are good with procurement and big
partnerships like this, so we think we are in a good place to do all the
paperwork and suffer the long waits you get with this kind of thing. It's
unfortunat~ for the smaller charities, but we will be looking to take on some
work that maybe was done by [voluntary sector organisation] in the past. It
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makes sense for us to do it, and I don't fancy their chances of getting money
this time round anyway.' Participant #12
This participant highlighted one of two conflicting views that were provided by participants
of this research, and suggested that there was a split in the network between those that
felt they had the necessaryexpertise to gain funding, and those who felt they had been put
at a disadvantage because the new processesrequired a suite of skills uncommon within
the voluntary sector. The new rules of the game therefore, in the views of some
participants, put some organisations disproportionally at a disadvantage.
As well as demonstrating the conflicting views within the network, Participant #12 also
highlighted the strategy taken by some organisations to attempt to increase their areas of
operation. This was clearly at the expense of other organisations in the area that were
considered less likely to secure funding. A number of testimonies collected for this study
alluded to organisations wanting to increasetheir income and geographical area of delivery
directly through this project partnership. These decisions were taken rationally by the
organisations basedon the risk of securing funds and the perceived pay-offs of success.
Some organisations felt that designing large, national projects with a high volume of
outcomes would ensure their places at the partnership table, as they would represent all
eligible geographical areas and offer a range of activities. This echoes the prisoner's
dilemma (Rapoport & Chammah, 1965), as shown in simple terms in Table 7.3. Whilst in
reality there were multiple players approaching the competition for funds in a boundedly
rational manner, a majority acting collaboratively rather than competitively could
theoretically ha~eforced the project lead to completely reject a partnership model and act
solely as a procurer. Within this study, the evidence collected shows that the majority of
organisations acted competitively, designing large project bids.
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Table 7.3 Outcomes for Competing Voluntary Sector Organisations
Player A
Player
B
Small Project (existing Large Project (new
expertise, local, low- expertise, national, high-
volume high-quality volume low-quality
outcomes outcomes)
Project lead is forced either
Small Project
to include multiple local
(existing expertise,
partners or reject a
local, low-volume
partnership model and Player A's bid is chosen over
high-quality
contract individual Player B
outcomes
organisation to provide
low-volume high-quality "
outcomes
Large Project (new Too many potentially
expertise, national, Player B's bid is chosen attractive bids. Project lead
high-volume low- over Player A chooses most structurally
quality outcomes) embedded partners
The competitive organisations perceived the concept of the single organisation directly
carrying out a range of tasks nation-wide as more attractive to the project leader than the
prospect of enlisting a large number of smaller organisations to carry out similar projects in
multiple localities. This was borne out in interviews with the project leaders, who stressed
that a small number of large bids was more manageable and more likely to be what WEFO
wanted to see. Some participants did, however, admit that it may have been easier to start
from scratch in a procurement-only role when the need arose to reduce the partnership
from approximately 40 down to 10. This option was not taken, as it was felt that there was
no real option to admit failure.
This section has demonstrated the resources and limits that bound the ability of
organisations to act in a rational manner. Organisations, in competing for funding, attempt
to make rational decision based on what they know about the environment, their
competitors and, what their own goals are. Regardless of competition, however, in such
funding circumstances there would still be a requirement for a certain amount of
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collaboration in developing the project in the first instance, and this requires a further
examination of the network and the gamesand relationships there-in.
Collaboration between organisations has been regarded as a necessary evil, to be
conducted in situations where an individual organisation does not possess all of the
resources required to operate with autonomy (Huxham & Vangen, 2005). It has been
proposed by authors that a logical organisational response to any kind of environmental
uncertainty may be to increase inter-organisational relationships and to increase resources
in order to protect the organisation from negative occurrences arising out of the perceived
uncertainty (Benson, 1975; Galaskiewicz,1985; Huxham & Vangen, 2005; Oliver, 1990; van
Bueren et at, 2003). Several of these authors have also proposed strategies or behaviours
that organisations would exhibit as a result of this uncertainty. Some of these proposed
strategies and behaviours are quite similar, others not so, however there is a general
agreement in the literature that uncertainty prompts organisational action. This was
evident from the information collected as part of this study, with participants indicating
that they became much more active in networking activities and attending events when it
was first rumoured that the new ESFprogrammes would be significantly different to the
previous ones.
Any form of collaboration would require a certain level of give and take and of negotiation,
and the necessity to appeal to the interests of others to secure the items necessaryfor an
organisation collaborating has been considered by numerous authors including Huxham
and Vangen (2005) and Granovetter (1985). Galaskiewicz (1985) recognised that
organisations had a reluctance to cooperate meaningfully without serious incentive, and
discussedwhich forces would be strong enough to induce organisations to cooperate, such
as resource scarcity or dependency. This is echoed by Biermann (2008) who notes that
organisations generally have a preference of autonomy, and that the majority are reluctant
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to give any of this up through substantial cooperation or collaboration. He similarly notes
that 'strong forces are needed to overcome this reluctance' (Biermann, 2008 pp154) These
forces need to be strong enough to trigger changesin working strategy and preferences. In
this casestudy, it was considered that the significant change in the ESFfunding structures
administered this powerful incentive. The introduction of new funding rules into the
network provided a 'shock' to the network that caused a ripple of reaction amongst its
members. This shock was sufficient to impress upon organisational decision makers the
need to radically alter their strategy for securing ESFfunds, and their attitudes and
expectations in this process.Biermann stated:
'The more intense the shock is, the more it causes cognitive dissonance,
discredits prevailing beliefs, gives rise to alternative conceptions of reality and
motivates new political behaviour.' Biermann (2008, p161)
The large scale changes in funding practice provided a moderately intense shock to the
network. The evidence gathered as part of this study shows that the shock was large
enough to prompt a significant increase in networking activity concerning the ESF
structures amongst the voluntary and wider statutory sector. Whereas in the previous
2000-2006 programmes, organisations would act individually seeking out information and
advice on an individual basis, and doing much of the project development work internally,
completing all application materials themselves and submitting these in line with their own
timetables, for 2007-2013 it was be very different. TheWales Council for Voluntary Action
(WCVA)was quick in understanding the need for collaboration for groups to secure funding
from the 2007-2013 programmes, and set up a seriesof information daysand workshops to
attempt to facllltate the development of partnership projects between the voluntary and
statutory sectors. It appeared from the information provided by participants however, that
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the shock to the network was not of sufficient intensity to cause wholesale changes in
organisational attitudes to cooperation.
For example, according to participants, several project development sessions, including
those held for the creation of the partnership, descended into irritable and uncooperative
stalemates. Several organisations were also very unwilling to share their project ideas with
others for fear of their ideas being poached by other projects or organisations, and there
was a common feeling of superficiality concerning the partnership principles of projects
that increasingly began to look very hierarchical and mandated.
However, the shock to the network in the change in funding structures provided the
environmental conditions for a new game to begin. This process involved each actor within
the Welsh inter-organisational network using their own strategies to position themselves
favourably and improve their chances of being confirmed as project partners, giving rise to
competitive behaviours and discouraging cooperation.
Games are not, however, conducted in an orderly linear fashion, and the norm would be to
have several different games in operation throughout the network at anyone given time,
with the actions occurring in one game affecting the actions and outcomes within another
game in the network (Klijn & Teisman, 1997). Even though organisations competing for ESF
funds generally assigned that activity a high priority, they continued to pursue other
funding possibilities in different games. Their strategies in these other games affected their
decisions in the ESFgame, which explained why some organisations dropped out of the ESF
partnership process, and why others invested a great deal in trying to become a partner in
the project. One organisation, for instance, was confident In its ability to secure funds from
a private donor that would require less paperwork than the ESF monies, so this
organisation was happy to exit the application process at a fairly early stage. A different
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organisation, however, felt it was unlikely they would receive funding from a lottery
application they had submitted, and therefore felt that the ESFpartnership was their only
hope of securing the funds they needed to retain their staff. Theseexternal considerations
shapedtheir attitudes to the ESFgameand again required rational, but ultimately bounded,
decision-making and assessmentof risk by eachorganisation.
Within the concept of games and the consideration of how the project was negotiated, the
prisoner's dilemma again emerges to show how competitive behaviours caused blockages
in the development of the project. Earlier it was demonstrated that the dilemma emerged
in organisations individually viewing the partnership as an opportunity to increase domain
and for the player to become more likely to be chosen over others. This involved
organisations designing bids basedon their perceptions of what others might do, and their
chance of success. Here, the dilemma emerged later, in the face-to-face negotiation
between organisations concerning how the project would be carved up, with players
concerned that others would steal their ideas to incorporate into their own bids. The
testimonies collected for this research highlight the strategies employed by organisations
during the development of first project. Initially, when the project lead was attempting to
negotiate a 40-plus partnership, there were three possible actions organisations could take
with three different outcomes. These are shown in Table 7.4, and confirm that the only
route to successfor all organisations was to shareand collaborate, to refrain from poaching
the ideas of others, and to trust that other organisations would not steal project ideas in
their own interests.
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Table 7.4 Deciding Whether to Collaborate
Player A Action Player B, C, 0 etc actions Result
Organisation Not all other players share their ideas & Organisations using stolen
shares its ideas & resources. Only a few competing ideas are successful in
resources organisations share their ideas. Some negotiating a partnership.
organisations steal those ideas to Victim organisations are
incorporate into their own project plans made redundant.
for the partnership.
Organisation All competing organisations share their Organisations negotiate a
shares its ideas & ideas, and refrain from appropriating large collaborative project
resources the ideas of others. partnership. All
organisations are included
Organisation Competing organisations withhold their No project can be built in
withholds its ideas ideas. the absence of project
& resources ideas. No partnership can
be agreed.
Lynn (1981) noted that within games, organisations would seek to constrain the activities of
other actors whilst maximising their own freedom to act. The desired outcomes of this
strategy are to enhance one's own organisation's ability to perform any given activity and
marginalise any other organisation's claims on it, improving one's organisation's chances of
being awarded a contract or funds over another. This behaviour emerged in the course of
developing the initial 40+ partner project. Participants in this study provided accounts of
actors refusing to cooperate, sharing ideas or committing resources to the proposed
project, as well as certain organisations incorporating the project ideas shared by others
into their own project plans, as shown in Table 7.2. These disruptive actions contrast with
the overall objective of the game being ultimately to collaborate in order to achieve the
policy goals of the programmes and the specific project targets. The initial competition
between the network's actors obscured the fact that it was the very dependence that the
actors had upon each other to deliver on actions that they were unable to deliver
themselves, that required the proposed cooperation to occur.
Van Bueren et 01 (2003) proposed four causes of impasses in network games, social where
there exists a lack of social knowledge or trust between actors, cognitive where there is a
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difference of belief in issuesand solutions, institutional where cultural differences exist in
which lie the potential for confusion or misunderstanding, and network management in
which the level of management of the process is lacking (van Bueren et al, 2003 p207).
Using this system, it was clear that in this case study, early difficulties in the project
development game were the result of institutional, social and cognitive impasses.Potential
partners in the project cited lack of shared aims and goals with other potential partner
organisations as a key difficulty, suspicion of other organisations 'stealing' their project
ideas,and noted this causeddelays in moving forward with project planning and design.
A further external shock to the network occurred in the advanced stages of the project
partnership formation, approximately 1 year into the planning process, when WEFO
indicated that partnership projects must have a limited partnership of approximately 6
partners. This imposed another hurdle which caused an impasse in proceeding with the
project development. Following the reduction of the project partnership to only 10
partners, the selection of partners chosen by the government department leading the
project exhibited some similar characteristics to each other, in particular, as noted
elsewhere in this and in the previous chapter, the historic relationships and financial ties
between the Welsh Government and the chosen partners. Those organisations that were
selected out of the 42 were those that were structurally embedded, with a long history of
receiving funds and delivering servicesfor the Welsh Government, and of being considered
to be reliable and in possessionof the necessaryexpertise.
This history of interaction in funding or contracting situations demonstrates a return to the
prisoner's dilemma game, but as a repeated experiment. Through repetition, as described
by Axelrod and Hamilton (1981), organisations learn to trust eachother. Through repetition
of the game and repetition of collaboration that results in positive outcomes for all players,
organisations learn to trust each other, and develop a preference for working with each
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other above other unknown organisations. This development of trust further reinforces the
structural embeddednessof the organisation.
Once the second shock was administered which required a significant reduction of project
partners, the organisations that were structurally embedded, and were institutionally and
culturally similar were those that were retained as partners. The institutional, social and
cognitive impasseswere therefore resolved through rejecting those organisations that were
culturally different as partners. The nature of these network games and resulting resolution
to blockages in progress demonstrates that these are network factors that ultimately
contributed to channelling the ESFfunds in Wales to a certain type of organisation and to
the exclusion of others.
This section, in addition to the discussion on bounded rationality and transaction cost
economics answers the third key research question: How do decision-making processesin
networks influence how organisations are selected for funding? The information presented
in this section demonstrated the model of the game within the network that begins in
response to a new governmental funding stream. Organisations made rational decisions
concerning their strategies to engagewith the partnership bounded by their assessmentof
the limited information they had on the situation. Someof those rational decisions resulted
in disruptive behaviours by organisations that felt they would only be successfulif they had
a unique project idea or if they were able to inconvenience another organisation that they
felt they were competing with. Some of those decisions led to organisations simply
following the instructions given to them and hoping this would demonstrate their
reliability. Other organisations saw this game as an opportunity to move into other
organisation's spheres of operation, potentially poaching beneficiaries and increasing their
power and influence in the future. Suffice to say, rational decision-making within the
network led to competition, conflict and impassesin this particular game.
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This section shows that in this case study, those organisations that were the most
ambitious in service delivery, and the most culturally similar to and structurally embedded
in the delivery activities of the Welsh Government were those that were ultimately
successful in obtaining project partners status and gaining ESFfunds. The shocks to the
network that created conditions for the games meant that these structurally embedded
organisations were more prepared for the new rules, and were better able to adapt to the
new system in comparison to those organisations that were not structurally embedded.
7.4 Power in the network
The discussion of power conducted in the first analysis chapter focused on the institutional
aspects of power in the structuring of the ESFprogrammes. This section investigates power
within the network, and identifies the dominant organisations and individuals that are able
to exert influence over the network and individual organisations within it. This will begin to
answer the fourth key research question, which asked: How does organisational dominance
in the network shape the distribution of funding?
Within this and the preceding chapter, the organisations within the network that were
shown to be structurally embedded were able to engage successfully in the ESFfunding
programme. This was more so than the organisations that were not considered to be
structurally embedded. Were the structurally embedded organisations considered to be
powerful within the network as well? Or did their institutional relationships with
government have no bearing on the power they wielded in the network?
Adding to the lntrlgue, there was at least one organisation identified that was successful in
becoming a partner that was not structurally embedded. How did this organisation gain a
seat at the table? And did power playa role in this?
- 268-
Participants in this study were asked a number of questions relating to how powerful and
influential they perceived other organisations in the network to be, and there was a general
consensus that the larger, nationally operational organisations were the most powerful.
This was because they could deliver high numbers of beneficiaries across all regions of
Wales. Organisations that were identified as having significant portions of their funding
from the Welsh Government were also considered to be powerful, as the government
would be less likely to allow organisations that they had pumped significant funding into to
fail. One participant explained:
The powerful ones are the ones with the longest and closest relationships I
guess. It's not that they are all powerful and can do whatever they want or just
demand a load of cash, but that I guess [the Welsh Government] has an
interest in keeping them going. [Project partner] for instance, doesn't do
anything really that a charity couldn't do, but its 100% funded by them as a
semi-independent organisation. They obviously have [the Welsh Governmentj's
ear.' Participant #31
These structurally embedded organisations that had long relationships with the Welsh
Government were therefore considered by actors within the network to be 'dominant'
organisations, and were perceived to wield more influence than other organisations in the
network that did not exhibit characteristics of embeddedness. In the early days of the
programme opening when project requirements were still uncertain, several participants
admitted to 'sounding out' the perceived dominant organisations to suggesta collaborative
project, where ,the dominant organisation would shoulder the risk and the lesser
organisation would carry out some of the less attractive or 'cheap' work for the project.
One participant noted:
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'It was just important to be in on a project even if you didn't really get to do
everything you wanted to do or get os much as you'd hoped for, or if you had
to work with the enemy and let them call the shots. Financially things were
tough, y'know, the lottery funds being taken by the Olympics, and the delays
between this [ESF]round and the last one. The most important thing was just
to get some funds in the bank for the next few years. ' Participant #22
This initial 'sounding out' activity enabled the embedded organisations to dictate the
project terms and enabled the lesser organisations to acquire some financial security,
whilst relinquishing the opportunity to carry out the portions of the proposed project that
would be considered more desirable. This would also have contributed to the rational
decision-making processesat work in competing for the funds, and in reducing transaction
costs.
The successfulorganisations were not, however, ultimately in a position to fully determine
their own destiny or to act as lead partners for projects. Voluntary sector organisations
were unable to design and lead a project themselves, due to the large financial risk
associated with leading strategic and high value projects. The structurally embedded
organisations, as well as the lesser organisations, were therefore dependent upon a
statutory sector organisation or government department to design a project in which they
could become a partner. Structurally embedded organisations were more likely to become
partners, and as such, would potentially make sub-contracting decisions, providing them
with a certain amount of power. However, the bulk of power in this situation was clearly
retained in a centralised form by the statutory sector, asshown in Figure7.5.
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Figure 7.5 Thefunding hierarchy
Public Sector
Project Leaders
Structurally Embedded
Organisations
Non-Structurally Embedded
Organisations
Figure 7.5 demonstrates the tiers of MLG operating within the context of this study, and
also clearly shows how the trusteeship principle is used to endow certain organisations with
the power to utilise resource.
The dominant organisations in this process quickly became statutory and government
bodies, and the civil servants became the individuals to know and influence. Power was,
therefore, entrusted to the public sector, and it was the public sector that would have the
necessary dominance to determine the financial fates of a number of voluntary sector
organisations. One participant noted:
'As soon as people got a whiff of {government department] being involved,
they were all in there clamouring for attention. Poor {civil servant] had a hell of
a time. {civil servant] came to a couple of events about the funds and didn't get
left _alone for five minutes because everyone was making their case to be
involved in this fantasy project that no-one even knew anything about yet.'
Participant #24
The purpose of this attention was the same as the approaches made by less embedded
organisations to more embedded organisations in the initial stages of the programme.
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When it became clear that it was the public sector, rather than voluntary sector, bodies
would construct these partnerships, organisations immediately began petitioning the
government department involved to become a named partner. This causedsome issuesfor
those actors designing projects, as they were presented with a wide pool of organisations
all vying to contribute, many of whom appeared to be carrying out similar work in similar
areas.This causedan increase in bureaucracy, as the project lead was required to review a
high number of bids.
In its first incarnation, the casestudy project had 42 partners in order to satisfy the desire
for so many organisations to be involved. The documentary evidence concerning the
original project proposals and plans20 provided a clear example of the initial project design
incorporating a large number of partners and taking a three tiered (local, regional and
national) approach to delivering outcomes. The project plans at this stage were not
completely favoured by any of the participants, as it meant a certain amount of
collaboration with other agencies, and sharing of the funding between organisations
carrying out similar activities. It did however, mean that organisations had some security in
getting funding, and this was more valuable to them than getting completely their own
way. One participant explained:
'It wasn't perfect by any stretch, and really we could have done a whole lot
more instead of them being all diplomatic and splitting the funds between
anyone that wanted to be in. But the main thing at that point was to get
funding confirmed. It wouldn't have mattered that [government department}
was calling the shots or that some of the other players were getting in on it too,
if we had gotten funding confirmed we could have lived with that.' Participant
#26
20 Supplied to this study under the Freedom of Information Act 2000
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This coercive action by the project lead to draw all organisations into one large project
demonstrates the power it had over organisations in the network, and the behaviours of
the organisations in attempting to become part of the project at the expense of their own
preferences confirms that powerful actors dictated not only the programme structures, but
the project structures too. As a result of this power imbalance, lesser organisations
attempted to conform to the structures imposed upon them, even where this was contrary
to their interests.
Huxham & Beech (2008) proposed three sourcesof power that exist in a network or inter-
organisational environment.
Table 7.6 The Three Sources of Power
1. Power is held where one organisation holds resources that are desired by others, and
from this the organisation with the resource possessesthe power to bargain and
power to control the award and destination of the resource in question.
2. Power occurs in more formalised collaborative or partnership networks in which there
is an imbalance in the dependency between organisations, possibly where one
organisation may have received the resources it desired at an earlier stage, has less
organisational risk associatedwith the outcome of the collaboration or has rule-based
assurances of provision, and therefore fails to assign equal significance to the
collaboration.
3. Power can be possessedby organisations placed at the centre of collaborations or
partnerships in a lead partner role, having power over other organisations in the
network to dictate all terms.
These are not discrete categories, and overlap is quite likely. In relation to the Welsh
network environment, the Welsh Government and its departments in particular held these
three sources of power within this case study context. They held valuable financial ESF
resources desirable to other organisations and were actively negotiating its distribution in
the network. Their bargaining power enabled them to draw in a range of organisations that
were interested ill delivering their outcomes through a rule based, contractual partnership
where the Welsh Government could substitute partners with relative ease if organisations
failed to deliver, and held financial but not significant reputational risk.
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As central actor, the government department leading the project was in a powerful position
to direct work through its selected partners and through their sub-contracted projects. This
is in agreement with Thorelli's concept of differential advantage (also discussed as
differentiation by Barman, 2002), in which he emphasises that the centrality of an
organisation places it in a position of disproportionate power. This power can be
strengthened:
1. proportionate to the number of alternative sourcesof supply,
2. the lessthe transaction costs amount to in moving between suppliers, and
3. the larger the central organisations share of the contracted organisations business
is
Source: Thorelli (1986).
Structurally embedded organisations strengthen their power in these ways, and retain their
key informational positions. This runs contrary to the rhetoric evident within this study
concerning inclusion of the network asa whole.
7.4.1. Consolidating a favourable position
Applying Thorelli's power-points to the Welsh context, the number of organisations
expressingan interest in becoming project partners and their domain overlap demonstrates
a marketplace of organisations providing similar services,from which the central actor the
Welsh Government could choose. Whilst all organisations were keen to emphasise their
uniqueness and difference from other similar organisations in the network in order to
increase their le~itimacy through possessingunique expertise (Barman, 2002), in reality,
according to participants within this study, many were viewed as essentially similar
organisations with similar domains. It is also clear from reviewing the annual audited
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accounts of the successful and unsuccessful project partners that a number of successful
organisations received significant portions of their annual budgets from the Welsh
Government or other related statutory sources. These organisations were therefore acting
in line with Thorelli's (1986) assertion that the greater the portion of the business that is
bought by the central actor, the more vulnerable to business is to the central partner's
decisions. One participant noted:
'We get a lot offunding from [government department] and so without that we
would be financially at risk. We thought it would be important to be in this
partnership in case some other charity came along and got into it doing the
same thing we do, and kind of, pushed us out. ' Participant #9
Organisations therefore felt vulnerable to any changes in the Welsh Government's
approach to delivering services, and were concerned that their historic funding would dry
up unless they went along with the government departments European funded projects.
Whilst it was clear early on in this research that the public sector wielded significant power
over the network and was able to influence it as a result, there remained power imbalances
between organisations in the network itself. The amount of power held by organisations
was also found to be influential in the final selection of partners, although in a more subtle
form, as was the power wielded by individuals in key positions at the interface between the
public sector bodies and the network.
Within a network, different spheres will have distinct areas of activity (Klijn, 2007) and in
large political and policy environments, these spheres of activity may be quite separate. It
was found in the course of this study, however, that the activity overlapped, and that
individuals would 'wear several hats' as one participant put it, directing service delivery one
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day whilst lobbying and consulting on policy another. Figure 7.7 provides a visual concept
on how the network in Wales is structured. Many organisations in the network operated
within only one sphere, focusing on policy activities, service delivery activities or
governance activities. However, the overlap demonstrates that some organisations
operated across these themes, performing functions under each theme. Organisations
falling within this overlap tended to be larger organisations with a number of staff
dedicated to each area, and managers working with an overview of these areas. These
organisations were more centrally located within the network with a higher number of links
and relationships, and were identified to be the structurally embedded organisations.
Figure 7.7 Structurally Embedded Organisations in the Network
organisations
Governance Service delivery
This research found that actors operating in these central and overlapping roles possessed
a higher degree of power and legitimacy than many of those in singular roles further out
from the centre. Based on this and other factors cited in the research, this analysis indicates
that it is this power and legitimacy of the structurally embedded organisations that
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influenced the decisions taken by the government department leading the case study
project in selecting its project partners. Through the course of this research, several
participants discussed their perceptions of actors within the network as 'having the inside
track', being 'the usual faces' or 'having friends in high places', and this would suggest that
these individual and organisational actors possessed a certain power and legitimacy.
The participants in this research each identified organisations within the network that they
believed were more powerful or dominant, and discussed features of this power as having
greater informal access to influential people outside of the voluntary sector network, such
as politicians and civil servants that were in key positions to influence policy or funding. The
perception on the part of the more peripheral organisations was that organisations with
this level of power could pick and choose which initiative or funding programmes to involve
themselves in, as they were not as desperate as organisations that did not have access to
these supposedly influential people. One participant explained:
'It's easy for {voluntary organisation} because they have the ear of the minister,
and I know those things aren't supposed to matter, but it's hard to believe that
they don't get any preferential treatment because of their connections. If they
turn up then they will get chosen over us any time. Same with {other voluntary
organisation}. They didn't even bother trying to part of this project because
they couldn't be bothered with partnering. When you've got a patron like
theirs, if they're feeling a bit broke, they can just throw a big fancy dinner with
him there and raise £1 million in a night.' Participant #19
This ability of powerful organisations to pick and choose which funding to pursue did
appear to be corroborated by a participant from the second organisation Participant #19
cited. They noted:
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'Well, I went to the first couple of meetings as you know, but you could tell it
was going to take ages and be complicated. We really didn't need the money
that much so we decided it wasn't worth our time to carryon with it. I'm sure if
we had wanted in then we would have been able to squeeze in, but it really
seemed more trouble than it was worth.' Participant #21
Power is not only an over-arching or macro level concept, but permeates the meso and
micro-levels of the network through individual actors. But it is a continuum rather than an
opposition between the levels. One aspect of micro-level power exhibited in this casestudy
that did not correlate with the macro level perspectives on power discussedearlier in this
section is that of individual power or authority evident at the micro-level. Participants
noted that one or two of the project leader's choicesof partner organisation appeared odd
or slightly different to expectations given the eventual apparent criteria used for selection.
These organisations did not quite fit the macro level power model of possessingone or
more of Huxham and Beech'sthree proposed sources of power, and did not appear to be
centrally located within the network. Instead individual actors within organisations
appeared to have possessedmicro-power, and had significant influence over the entry of
certain organisations into the partnership.
This micro-power is according to Huxham & Beech (2008, ppS67), 'available to those who
are involved in the setting up of an inter-organisational entity through who they choose to
invite and the way they ascribe identity to them'. This emphasises the fact that the
government department leading the project not only wielded power as a structural
governing entity, but that its individual civil servants held the power of agency in designing
the project and dlsperslng information about it to potentially interested parties. The civil
servant in charge of the project had the power to exclude organisations merely by
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designing the project to require only nationally operational partners, for instance, or by
forgetting to include a certain type of activity within the project brief.
Once the network is operational, micro-power is then available 'to those who arrange the
timing, location, format of and paperwork for meetings, to those who have been tasked
with carrying out a particular activity ... to those who have the authority to sign off
funding' (Huxham & Beech, 2008 pS67). This again reinforces the power individual civil
servants had over which organisations would be able to engage with the project
development. If all meetings were, for instance, held in Cardiff, this would be likely to have
excluded the majority organisations based in North Wales that may have been unable to
afford to send an employee down for several meetings. Similarly, if civil servants in these
positions did not particularly like certain organisations, they could merely 'forget' to put
them on an email distribution list that would keep organisations up to date about the
project development. There was no evidence that this was the case,however the possibility
of suchan act occurring remains.
Individual actors did, therefore, have significant power over the eventual choice of partners
through subtle mechanisms. This micro-power was certainly held by the main project
leaders, and to a lesser extent by individual actors in organisations within the network in
their ability to influence others with relevant power to influence the project design and
partner selection.
The micro-level power held by those organisations that were unlikely but successful
partners originated from the identities ascribed to them by the project leader, in which
they were selected on the basisof minor criteria becausethey possessedskills or expertise
that were unique within the network. As an example, this meant that Project Partner #4,
whilst perceived by participants to be on the periphery of the wider inter-organisational
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network, and largely focused around a completely irrelevant age group to the project, was
rewarded with a seat at the table. This was due to this partner possessinga rare store of
expertise in a very specific area relevant to the policy aims of the programme. It was the
only actor operating in its domain, and therefore had no competitors that may have
challenged its membership in the project. This casts a new light on the question of
organisational dominance influencing membership of the partnership. Whereas the
structurally embedded organisations were organisationally dominant within the network,
Project Partner #4 held complete organisational dominance over its domain. This, it was
clear from the evidence collected, was equally as important a factor in its receipt of a seat
at the partnership table.
This section has shown that the public sector held significant power over the voluntary
sector network in terms of being able to design projects and select partners. This power
was explicit and overt, and the structures implemented made it necessary for network
organisations to utilise their own power resources in order to be selected as a project
partner and thus be almost guaranteed funds. These elements of power used by the
network organisations tended to be more covert and subtle. Whereas the power awarded
to the public sector organisations was structural and hierarchical, the actions taken by
organisations in the network involved power being used in a more fluid way. Organisational
position and dominance in the network was inextricably linked with its structural
embeddedness,and individual actors used their personal and professional links to attempt
to influence decisionstaken by the public sector in choosingorganisational partners.
The information presented in this section provides a baseto answer the fourth key research
question, as it has ldentlfied the dominant entities and the network organisations with high
degrees of power, and has suggested that these dominant organisations were also the
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structurally embedded organisations with a high number of links inside and outside the
network.
7.5 Governance or Strategic Bridging?
In order to fully answer the fourth key research question, which asked how organisational
dominance in the network shaped the distribution of funding, it was necessary to
investigate how the project lead (a government department) inserted itself into the
network to design its project and select its partners. It was also necessaryto examine the
behaviour of partners in further procuring servicesas directed by the project lead, as the
behaviour of partner organisations further impacts if and how organisations within the
network that were not project partners were able to securefunds.
The influence of governing entities over network environments was discussed in the
literature review in terms of governance, network management and strategic bridging. This
section will demonstrate that whilst a model of governancewas detected within the wider,
more general network, it was in fact a model of strategic bridging that emerged as
structuring the project lead's approach to project design and partner selection. This
strategic bridging model went beyond the 'lighter touch' method of governance. The
government department leading the project became a direct dominant influence in the
fortunes of voluntary organisations due to its near-monopoly on ESFfunding for youth
activities and its ability to determine which activities would be funded, and which would
not. Organisations unsuccessful in joining this project did not have any easy alternative
routes to obtaining ESFfunds for their work.
As a department of government, the project lead had prior to the development of the case
study project, exhibited behaviours associated with governance. It had previously been
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involved in overseeing distribution of ESFmonies through the 2000-2006 programmes, and
was responsible for managing a wide range of programmes and initiatives for young people.
These activities bore the hallmarks of governance activity, as they served to exert the
government's authority and preferences beyond its organisational boundaries, and
institutionalised relationships through awarding funds and sustaining relationships. These
had historically however, been through procurement or grants streams, and had been
conducted at arms-length. Crucially, the difference in the project compared to the previous
methods of activity was the more direct interference within the network in attempting to
build a large number of organisations into one coherent project. One participant noted:
'[government department] have always been a big influence over the sector.
Grants programmes and the CYPPstuff and the like. There were smallish pots
of money here and there, and they would have different themes of work
running that different charities would consult on or get involved in. But this
time they didn't just have a call for proposals and whoever wants money
submits a proposal. This time they got stuck in and tried piecing all of us
together into one massive project even though we have all got different ideas
about the best way to work with young people ... and some of us don't even
want to work with each other. And I think personally, and this is just me, but it
felt like we were being rounded up and herded into one direction. I Participant
#28
It seems, therefore, that whilst there was a clear model of governance in place in the past,
the inception of the new project took the behaviours of the project lead beyond
governance into, a far more directing and hands-on role. The accounts examined in the
'Games & Shocks' section of this chapter alluded to the need for the project lead to assume
this more authoritative role in the network to draw organisations together, to determine a
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way forward, and to reduce disruptive behaviours. This highlights a tension in the way in
which the project was conceived and planned by the project lead - as inclusive and
participative, and how it came to be operationalized - as centralised and authoritative.
7.5.1 Strategically bridging?
The concept of a central broker, trustee, mediating entity or strategic bridging organisation
that exists not only manage or govern the interactions within the network, but to shape
activity and create the conditions for cooperation has been cited by a number of authors
(Brown, 1991; Gray, 1989; Lawrence & Hardy, 1999; North, 1993; Waddell & Brown, 1997;
Westley & Vredenburg, 1991). The centrality of any organisation acting as a strategic bridge
would logically be positioned by its activity in a wide variety of domains, and the strategic
bridge would need to exert sufficient power over the domain to be targeted in order to
coerce stakeholders into acting with it instead of against it (Lawrence & Hardy, 1999).
Brown (1991) has produced several papers on this theme, and provides the following
description and assessment of a strategic bridging organisation:
'As a central actor among diverse constituencies, the bridging organisation
potentially has great influence over events. It can be a conduit for ideas and
innovations, a source of information, a broker of resources, a negotiator of
deals, a conceptualizer of strategies, a mediator of conflicts. By the same
token, the bridging organisation is subject to many conflicting demands from
its diverse constituencies. Its central position is strategic for catalysing the
growth of new institutional arrangements, but the position also makes it highly
visible ane! vulnerable to political and economic pressures from constituents or
other actors.' Brown (1991, p5)
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The attractions of the strategic bridging model in developing a large and potentially multi-
party project are therefore numerous. In occupying this central role in which the strategic
bridge is afforded the power to broker effectively, they are able to use their considerable
influence to direct resources and institutionalise new or existing relationships. It was this
central directing role of the project lead coming from within the network that was
identified by participants in this research as far more intrusive than governing activity
normally conducted by this particular department. One participant explained:
'Theproject didn't reolly feel like our own. It was all coming from [project lead]
and it felt like we were square pegs trying to fit into round holes at same
points. I understand of course that all the ESFthis time was going to be
collaborative, but to be honest it felt more prescriptive. And becauseof that,
what we were putting forward felt more contrived. ' Participant #9
Another participant talked of the central role of the government department as the project
developed, and it's lead as 'stifling', noting:
'There was more direct involvement with [government department] this time,
definitely. They had a clear idea of how they thought they could crowbar
money into the sector, and theoretically all we had to do was sign up. It was all
top-down pressure though. There was nothing organic or innovative being
talked about, and the further along the process went, the more stifling it
became between paperwork, requirements, the extra guidance and
[government department] in the middle of it all calling the shots.I Participant
#17
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There was therefore, a clear intrusive dimension to the presence of the project lead
developing the project in far closer proximity to the network than had previously been the
case in its normal governing role. This 'stifling' environment created by the project lead's
need to design a large project with (initially) 42 partners within a certain time frame meant
that some organisations struggled to keep up. Three participants admitted to having a lack
of understanding of how the project was even going to operate, and a few more alluded to
having some concerns about what they were going to have to do. The organisations that
were successful in gaining entry into the partnership were, however, not amongst those
suffering confusion. These successful organisations did acknowledge the complexity of
paperwork and measuresfor the project, but did not admit to experiencing any difficulties
with it.
The role of the government department leading the project as a strategic bridging
organisation placed on it the responsibility for mediating between potential and eventual
project partners, defining the extent or domain of the project to encompass both the
interested organisations and the programme requirements, and facilitating the partnership
processfrom beginning to end, asdescribed by Brown (1983).Thiswas essentially a process
of creating institutional arrangements within the wider network and for the final project
partnership. The project lead, through its mediating and development position, was
responsible for creating norms within the network, for setting out rules of engagement and
for enforcing those for the overall good. This altered the attitudes, strategies and
perceptions of actors within the network, and had a long-term impact upon how
engagement with ESF was conducted.
With the government department leading the project acting as a strategic bridge, this
provided it with direct influence to determine spending a Significant amount of the ESF
monies that were to be distributed within Wales for activities for young people. It was not a
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monopoly, as other awards would be made to projects by WEFO, but it would have been
unlikely for other organisations to gain funds for alternative provision in this area. This
model is at odds with that proposed by Lawrence and Hardy (1999) who argued that a true
bridging organisation should be slightly outside of the central nucleus of multi-sector or
government activity, and that it is between the centre and the edge of a domain of activity
that the strategic bridge is required to be located in varying degrees. This may be true
within the international development and aid context of their research, however within this
study, the dual faces of the project lead as that of government departmen.~ and central
mediator or strategic bridge fits well when seen as an intermediary between WEFO and the
network.
Looking beyond the detail of the bridging status of the project lead, Lawrence and Hardy's
(1999) three-tier typology of bridging organisations can be used to understand how the
project lead operated. These consist of:
• a centre extension which is very much aligned with government norms and
structures,
• a border federation which is aligned closer to the edges of the targeted domain and
is less structured or hierarchical and;
• a pure bridge which is located mid-way between government and the edge of the
network and with a combination of features and an emphasis on facilitation and
mediation.
Source: Lawrence and Hardy (1999)
The centre extension type of bridge is defined by its proximity to government and its
bureaucratic nature. It is hierarchical with a strong focus on rules, structures and norms,
and is powerful enough to impose these norms on those engaging with it. This model shows
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that the government department leading the project was in its capacity as a strategic
bridging organisation, acting asa specific type of bridge that usesa certain languageand set
of procedures and processes. The more a bridging organisation resembles the centre
extension model, the more likely it will be to impose hierarchical and bureaucratic norms
and rules on the network. Within this research, it was clear that because of the project
leads status as a government department, there was effectively no distance between the
structures of government and the values and norms of the department.
lawrence & Hardy's model also proposes that whilst this organisation will have an
established legitimacy in terms of power and mandate, it will hold less legitimacy to act for
those organisations on the borders of the network, as these perceive it as inaccessibleand
unrepresentative of their needs or concerns, and will find it difficult to work with the
structures imposed. This was borne out in this study, with smaller organisations in
particular citing the sizeof the bureaucracy as 'out of touch' and 'failing to understand' the
realities of servicedelivery. One participant noted:
'We are smaller than a lot of the other organisations, and we are more
specialised ... Our kids might nat turn up. We might say we expect 50 per year
to do 20 hours with us, but they might only end up turning up for three or four
hours each. [Government department] doesn't understand that. These are
really the kids that they need to be working with, but because they don't fit into
these tidy boxes, we are unlikely to be able to get the funding because we can't
guarantee anything.' Participant #26
Another participant concurred, explaining:
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'[government department] did their best with the project, but it shaped up as a
fairly typical big project with partners that are essentially sausage factories.
We are more holistic, and hence, we didn't really see being involved as a viable
option. It would have been a lot of paperwork and stress, and it really wouldn't
have fit with our way of dOing things.' Participant #19
These testimonies demonstrate that Laurenceand Hardy's centre model was confirmed in
this case, and show that the project lead had weaknesses in acting as an .~ffective and
inclusive strategic bridge because it failed to accommodate the service delivery challenges
facing some network organisations. This failure can also be linked back to the earlier
assertions in this and in the previous chapter that these smaller or less central
organisations were not structurally embedded. As a result, these organisations lacked
"
institutional relationships with the project lead that would possibly have served to
overcome the lackof understanding exhibited.
One of the first actions the project lead took was to standardise processes, plans and
outcomes for projects across all those organisations that had submitted project ideas.
Many organisations operated very differently, with different age groupings, definitions of
outcomes.and standard hours, and these needed to be reconciled to develop a coherent
single project. In this way, the project lead structured a large and mostly inclusive
partnership in the first instance that would directly encompassall those actors within the
network that had an interest in becoming a partner and receiving ESFmonies.
Standardisation is a common tool used by hierarchical and bureaucratic organisations, in
particular to reduce risk or system instability (Lawrence & Hardy, 1999) but also is
perceived to be an efficient and economic strategy. Strategies of standardisation involve
the gradual institutionalisation of activities through placing value upon them that goes
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beyond technical or immediate value (Selznick, 1957). In order to plan and manage the
project, which in its initial stages was of considerable size and value, the project lead
organised the partnership into national, regional and local tiers, and required all interested
parties to attend project planning meetings and to complete project planning forms,
consisting of one brief project plan, and later an extensive project plan and budget. Copies
of these items21 and show that the project lead required all potential partners to break
down their project into objectives, targets, activities, tasks and to break down projected
budget costs over 3 years. The requirements were for a standardisation of project activities
across the partnership that would require common monitoring, measurement,
management and accounting activities within each organisation. One participant
highlighted the importance of this to the bureaucracy:
'It's a massive praject. Especially in the beginning when there were so many
partners. I know organisations grumbled about having to fit their activities into
different categories and whatever, but when you've got 40-odd organisations
all doing things differently and submitting forms with different measures and
age ranges and whatnot, you need to find some way of bringing it all together
so we can actually know what we are planning on doing and how we will
manage and monitor it all. Otherwise it would have been an almighty mess.'
Participant #4
This importance attached to standardisation is another key feature of the centre extension
form of strategic bridge, and this testimony demonstrates the way in which institutional
and bureaucratic values and norms were incrementally embedded within the project
structures and requirements.
21 Released to this study under the Freedom of Information Act 2000
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The final reduction in partner numbers to 10 from the 42 that continued to be interested,
as detailed in the previous chapter, was carried out as a result of both the complexity and
difficulty of managing such a large project, coupled with new guidance and restrictions on
partnership sizes imposed by WEFO. As described in earlier sections of this chapter, this
provided a secondary shock to the network and changed the game from one with purely
collaboration-related competitive considerations to one where collaboration was
essentially removed in favour of a hierarchical model, and where less than one quarter of
interested actors were able to participate.
This meant that the majority of organisations within the network would miss out on gaining
funding directly from WEFO. The project lead was careful to point out that there would be
opportunities for sub-contracting works directly from the partner organisations once the
funds had been provided, and that in this way the ESFmonies would still theoretically filter
down to the local and regional organisations within the network. At this point, the project
lead was very specific about its wish that no organisation would be hurt by their lack of
partnership status, and that organisations missing out on partner status would in all
likelihood be able to carry out their work as a sub-contractor rather than as a partner. One
participant explained:
'It was important that the third sector still got a bite of the apple, even if we
couldn't gather them together as project portners as such. We were aware we
had raised some hopes with the original project design, and we couldn't be
seen to be turning our backs on people. That's why it became mandatory for
partners to contract some of the work they were taking on out to smaller
organisations. 50 that they still got somemoney.' Participant #30
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It was, therefore, not lost on the government department leading the project that a certain
amount of disappointment would arise out of the failure of the initial project partnership,
and it was clear that they intended to develop an additional structure through which ESF
monies would filter to smaller organisations through procurement by project partners. How
then, did they determine which organisations would be partners, and which organisations
would have to wait for the procurement opportunities to arise?
7.5.2 Defendingthe criteria
The final choice of partners was made by the project lead without representations from
interested organisations. Participants indicated that those selected were chosen because
they had national remits, had relevant expertise necessary for the project and were able to
produce high outputs. The assertion of the project lead was that the selection was in no
way subject to favouritism or due to certain organisations having more dominance or
importance. Participants from the project lead rejected any suggestion of making strategic
choices with regard to wanting to direct money to certain organisations. One participant
explained:
'There was no conspiracy, we just looked at the options on the table, and
decided which were a good fit with the slimmed down version of the project.
We needed organisations that could work on a national basis, thot could
handle the paperwork and the finances, and that could bring something foirly
unique to the table in terms of expertise ... The national aspect was key really,
as there were no other organisations that were truly nationo/. ' Porticipant #4
The 'national' element was important, as this helped to keep partner numbers down. If one
organisation could achieve outcomes in its domain across the whole of Wales, this meant
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that only one partner was needed for that particular outcomes, rather than three or four
that operated on a local or regional basis. This rationale was however, challenged by
several participants that were unsuccessful,and who argued that the partners chosenwere
not at the time 'truly national' at all. One participant argued:
'[project partner] for instance isn't national at all. They have one centre in
cardlff, and a smaller one up in North Wales. How does that make them
national? Oh they say that in the project they will hire lots of people to be a
travelling circus around all the Welsh counties, but they will still be based in
those two centres. How does that make them more national than us, when we
have three centres around Wales in which we serve individuals from lots of
surrounding counties?' Participant #22
Another reinforced this, saying:
'There are at least two partners who have nowhere near a national remit.
Nowhere near. Now, I know in their project applications they said they wanted
to be operating nationally, but they don't right now. And that's where the
greatest unfairness is. If we had known when we were developing our project
ideas that only the national ones would go through, well we would have
designeda praject with more outreach to make it national. It would have been
easy to do.' Participant #32
There was therefore, some conflict between the perception of the project leader of the
remit of partner organisations, and the perceptions within the voluntary sector. The non-
national status of some of the partners was identified in the research preceding the
interviews, and this was raised in conversation with the participants from the governing
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department leading the project. These participants explained that the organisations chosen
were considered the most suitable and sound to entrust the delivery of the project aims to.
Oneexplained:
'The point with these is that the projects were going to be national, and these
organisations seemed realistic and low risk. These organisations of course have
a lot of experience between them, and have the match funding as well. A lot of
these lot we have worked with before, and as Welsh Government, we think we
can safely say that these are the right ones for the job. ' Participant #6
The requirement for 'national' projects and the decision on 'the right ones for the job'
demonstrates a clear membership strategy employed by the project lead in defining the
domain for the project and determining in the medium term which the key organisations
operating in those areaswould be. The project lead was able to exercise its own legitimacy
in deciding who these key actors would be ('as Welsh Government, we think we can safely
say that these are the right ones for the job'), and in turn this legitimised those key actors
to act in the targeted areas,asasserted by Lawrenceand Hardy (1999).
As explained by participant #30 in an earlier quotation, those organisations chosen as
partners were advised that, due to the project leads desire for a certain amount of
inclusivity with the wider network, all project partners would be required to have an
element of procurement written into their projects. In theory, this would mean that the
sums partners would be allocated would not be 100% theirs. They would have to use a
portion to procure servicesfrom smaller organisations.
The organisations'successful in becoming a project partner were therefore entrusted with
the further distribution of this funding, and placed in a very powerful position. The
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legitimacy bestowed upon them by their selection, coupled with the significant injection of
funding they would receive as partners, solidified their status as key players and dominant
organisations within the network and granted them the power to influence the distribution
of their share of the ESF.This goes beyond the governance principle of drawing in external
organisations at arms-length, as relationships were institutionalised, centralised and
'locked-in' to the partnership in order to exert power beyond the defined parameters of
government. The procurement principle does, however, provide an example of a
governance model, as the activities of non-partnership organisations are influenced
through sub-contracting. Through this cascadeof funds, a lower tier of governed network
emerges beneath the project partners. The dominant organisations that are partners were
awarded power and influence over the fortunes of smaller organisations through their
decisions on how to use and/or procure with their portions of ESFgrant. As a result, the
influence of government stretched down through the structurally embedded project
partners to the smaller organisations below.
7.5.3 Thedriver oj retaining resources
Whilst the procurement principle was described as a non-negotiable feature of becoming a
project partner, in reality, none of the partners took this principle to heart when re-drafting
their project plans. All of the participants in this study admitted to being quite tokenistic in
'bolting-on' a small amount of procurement to their projects, and this reinforces the view
that it was dominant organisations that ultimately decided which organisations would be
successful in gaining ESF funds - even where those organisations were not in the
partnership. One participant admitted:
'We did the 'absolute bare minimum in planning jor procurement. At the end of
the day, we want to keep as much funding in house and deliver these outcomes
- 294-
ourselves because this money keeps us going. I mean why would we want to
go giving out hard won funding to organisations that we compete with? We
essentially just bolted-on a small amount of donkey work to procure. At this
point we are only just getting going so that may even fall by the wayside at a
later date if we are lucky.' Participant #8
This testimony clearly suggeststhat dominant organisations, reinforced in their positions in
the centre of the network asa result of their partner status, were not intending to carry out
the activities they had been empowered to undertake. Whilst not all of the partners
explicitly stated their plans for procurement, all of the interviews with partners indicated
that they were not terribly enthusiastic about procuring work from other organisations. The
principle of entrusting large sums to organisations to cascadedown through the network
was clearly not fully monitored (at this stage of the project at least). Evenwhere projects
where procuring, they were procuring token pieces of work or 'donkey work' that would
not necessarilybe worth the time it took smaller organisations to bid and win the contract.
The lack of scrutiny of these procurement plans meant that organisations were unlikely to
be pro-active in distributing their portions of funding further down the food chain. The
project partners used the power they had over the funds to retain them, rather than
disperse them, and this was another example of dominant entities ultimately determining
the success(or failure) or organisations in gaining ESFfunds.
This section contributes to the previous section on power in answering the fourth key
research question, which asked how dominant entities ultimately determined the success
of organisations in gaining ESFfunds. This section used themes of governanceand strategic
bridging in order to understand how the project lead, a government department,
conducted itself in developing its large project. It was identified that, as a strategic bridge,
the project lead behaved very much in line with its institutional norms and values, and
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begana processof centralising, structuring and standardising to build the project it wanted.
This eventually led to the rejection of smaller or more holistic organisations in favour of
structurally embedded organisations with similar values and institutions already in place.
The project lead was the dominant entity in this process, and therefore ultimately
determined the successof those organisations that would definitely receive ESFmonies.
This section explained that following the confirmation of 10 project partners, the project
lead made a clear effort to find ways of channelling funds to organisations outside of the
final partnership, and relied on its partners to do this. The partners however, proved
reluctant to procure outcomes they believed they could deliver themselves, and these
decisions meant that ESFfunds were not likely to cascadefurther down the network to
other organisations.
7.6 Summary
This chapter has shown that there were a number of factors at work in the network
involved in this case study that created an environment in which only a small number of
organisations were able to become partners in an ESFfunded project or to receive funds
from the 2007-2013 programmes in Wales.
The chapter beganby askingthe following key researchquestions:
3. How do decision-making processes in networks influence how organisations are
selected for funding?
4. How does organisational dominance in the network shape the distribution of
funding?
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The third researchquestion was considered using bounded rationality and transaction cost
economics to explore how organisations viewed their environment and planned their
strategy around this. An exploration of the information collected using the concept of
gamesand shocksto the network also reinforced the processesof rational decision-making
in the network and demonstrated how impasses in the development of the project
occurred. Finally, the evidence collected showed that it was the organisations that
possessed institutional links to governing entities, were larger, were able to wait for
impasses to be resolved, to absorb shocks and to respond to government requirements
that were the organisations best placed to compete for ESFfunds.
In answering the fourth research question, the power held by the project lead and the
dominant organisations within the network was explored. It was clear that the government
department had a near-monopoly on distributing funds for this particular area of work, and
so was in the most powerful position to coerce network organisations into complying with
its plans. Dominant network organisations further attempted to assert themselves through
any influential channelsthey had.
Whilst the initial inclusive project plan would have seen the funding distributed quite
widely within the network, the shocks applied to the network by WEFO in the form of
partnership size limitations meant that the organisations successful in becoming project
partners were drawn from a small pool of trusted organisations with similar characteristics
and values. The same organisations in fact, had existing relationships with the Welsh
Government and had the capacities and expertise to engage in this process with relative
ease, in comparison to smaller or less centrally located organisations that have a higher
proportion of non-statutory funding. The conditions imposed on the network and the
eventual selection of partners with existing institutional ties to the Welsh Government
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demonstrated that it was the project lead, as the main dominant entity that ultimately
determined which organisations would be partners and would be guaranteed a share of the
projects funds awarded. Further to this, the duty placed on each partner to procure a
portion of outcomes afforded the partners dominance within the network. Their use of this
power to retain the bulk of funding for themselves again demonstrated how dominant
entities influenced the process of funding distribution, and ultimately determined the
successor failure of organisations in gaining ESFfunds.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Overview and Implications
The purpose of this concluding chapter is firstly, to review the questions asked in this study
and demonstrate clearly how they have been answered using key theoretical ideas, such as
MLG, institutional theory and network theory. The first part of this chapter will briefly
review the details of the case findings, will consider the relative importance of the themes
used in the theoretical framework, and will reflect on the contributions of the studv to the
academic field.
Secondly, and most importantly, this chapter considers the implications of the research
conducted and its findings. There are three main implications for this study - policy
implications, implications for further research, and implications for developing theory and
contributing to the literature on MLG, institutional systems, structural embedded ness and
strategic bridging. These are considered individually and demonstrate how this study raises
a number of questions in all three areas.
8.1 Summary and Overview
This thesis has presented a case study of the development of a funding programme and a
voluntary and public sector project partnership constructed for an ESFfunded project in
Wales. The analysis of the case shows that the manner in which the funding instruments
were constructed had a clear impact upon how well organisations were able to access the
funds, and dominant organisations in the public and voluntary sectors were shown to
ultimately dictate the successes of certain organisations in gaining funding.
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8.1.1 Reviewing the arguments
This thesis was divided into two main parts. The first part, chapters 1-5, set out the
theoretical framework usingthe researchquestion:
'How do institutional factors and network context affect funding distribution
and the composition of partnerships? How can this be demonstrated using ESF
in Walesasa CaseStudy?'
This first part of the thesis provided an overview of the literature on MLG, institutions and
networks, and identified a lack of a suitable single theory that would model the processes
influencing the eventual destination of funding originating from governing organisations.
Whilst MLG, institutional theories and network theories were useful in attempting to
understand specific piecesof the processbeing studied, gapsbetween the themes existed,
making it difficult to understand processesthat spanned several themes. Overlapping the
literature helped to shape the study, provided a theoretical and contextual basis for the
research to be carried out, and supported the rationale and procedures involved in the
methods chosen.
The second part of the thesis, chapters 6-7, analysedthe evidence collected, and aimed to
answer the research questions using the empirical evidence collected. A key finding
highlighted in chapter 6 was the emergence of institutional behaviours and bureaucratic
rationale as a basis for shaping funding programmes, with the main government
organisational focus being oriented towards increasing legitimacy, which meant that
development of programme structures to achieve policy aims became secondary. This
chapter demonstrated The analysis that structural embeddedness characteristics such as
relational ties and informational links (Kenis& Oerlemans,2008) were key in organisational
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success in securing funding, thus supporting the theoretical framework used to analyse
the interface between the state and the network. This mainly evidences correlates with the
expectation in literature, such as Hager et 01 (2004), that structurally embedded
organisations would have an advantage, but the trusteeship principle clearly emerges here
too, demonstrating how programmes could be restricted to organisations with the
perceived ability and reputation to deliver. Further analysis demonstrated the operation of
game theory and bounded rationality in determining organisational engagement with
funding streams, and determined that the largest and most structurally embedded
organisations were the most resilient to competition and blockages in the network, which
in part supports the findings of Hager et 01 (2004) in confirming structural embeddedness as
a key to success. The analysis also established a point at which traditional notions of
governance as described by Rhodes (2996) and Stokes (1998) no longer held true to the
case, and the activities recorded clearly manifested as a strategic bridge role, with the
government directly involving itself in the network and dictating partnership membership.
The account and analysis in Chapter 7 demonstrated how, through structurally embedded
and mandated positions, dominant organisations ultimately dictated which organisations
would be successful in gaining funding.
8.1.2 Answering the researchquestion
The analysis carried out has answered the four key research questions noted in the
introductory chapter. It is now time to turn to the over-arching research question, and
show that the answers to these four questions have provided the knowledge necessary
to answer it as well. Figure 8.1 shows a final version of the theoretical systems and ESF
funding process diagram that has been built throughout the thesis. This diagram exposes
the complexity of 'the process studied, and clearly shows how institutional and network
factors overlap to influence funding distribution, demonstrating this in the context of
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ESFin Wales. Importantly, it shows the full breadth of MLGwhich affects every stage of
the funding process, right down to the local level, which is rarely picked up in key MLG
works such asHooghe and Marks (2001) and Gualini (2004), with Bache(2008) being an
exception, but not addressingthe issuedeeply. The diagram illustrates a vital overlap in
institutions, structural embeddedness and bounded rationality/games, which creates
favourable conditions for structurally embedded organisations, but contributes to
creating a barrier to non-embedded organisations. This conforms with Kenis &
Oerlemans' (2008) assertion that ties between organisations in structural positions
perpetuate between each other, and builds on Hager et at's (2004) findings, which
suggested that multiple areas of embeddedness in the network and with government
would improve organisational survival. Importantly, the diagram identifies a barrier in
the cascade of ESF funds to the wider network of non-structurally embedded
organisations, highlighting the importance of strategic bridging, trusteeship and network
games in building this barrier, and identifying an area in which there has been little
exploration in the literature. Westley and Vredenburg (1991) indicated that strategic
bridging only occurred when motivation to collaborate was low, however the analytical
framework in Figure 8.1 goes some way to contesting this in light of the mandate the
state had to proceed, and the bottom-up interest from the voluntary sector identified in
the analysis. Indeed, the diagram illustrates how key strategic bridging activity can be in
determining organisational successin gaining funds from government when put side-by-
side with the effects of structural embeddedness. This diagram also highlights the
relative importance of the institutional systems, which permeate through the entire
process, and contrasts this with network themes, which occur only towards the end of
the process, and are potentially less influential in determining the final destination of
funding.
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Figure 8.1 Network & Institutional Themes and Barriers in the Funding Process
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The main researchquestion was:
'How do institutional factors and network context affect funding distribution
and the composition of partnerships? How can this be demonstrated using ESF
in Walesasa CaseStudy?'
Using the case study, this thesis has shown that institutions embedded in public sector
organisations shape the development of funding programmes, with state organisational
norms and values rooted in funding design. This influence serves to make funding
programmes inaccessible to many voluntary sector organisations, and is a key cause of
competition and state interference in the form of strategic bridging in the network. The
same institutional pressures also cause state funding programmes to become difficult to
reconcile with voluntary sector practices and service delivery values, and this results in
organisations feeling disengaged from state funding programmes such as ESF.The logic
model shown as Figure 8.2 illustrates the inputs, outputs and outcomes of the process,
demonstrated by this case. With the state, the network and the funding requirements
acting as the three 'Inputs' into the model, it could be argued the diagram should next
display actions related to partnership and collaborative theory, examples of which have
been discussed by Huxham & Vangen (2005) and shown to be problematic in a delivery
phaseof collaboration. However, under the 'Outputs' heading, activity can clearly be seen
to be problematic in the design and implementation phase too, constricted by the
institutional and network factors drawn out in this study, demonstrating power held by one
'Input' can clisproportionately affect the progressof others. This diagram illustrates how the
mandated dominance of the state to distribute funds narrows the process of engagement
for voluntary sector organisations, and importantly, demonstrates the result of this is that
'Outcomes' will then be negative for the majority (85%) of voluntary sector organisations
originally interested.
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Figure 8.2 Outcomes of the Implementation of the Funding Structure
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In this particular case, the games played, and the necessity for a strong organising entity
within the network, affected the course of the funds from the bottom-up. This evidenced
and reinforced the competitive and disruptive behaviours described in the game and
network literature, and echoes the resource dependency arguments of Benson (1975),
Galaskiewicz (1985) and Oliver (1990). However, the causes of this overlapped with the
bounded rationality concept. The course of rational organisational decision-making to
achieve optimum ends, as described by Williamson (1985), was shown to cause disruption
in the network in attempting to develop a project beyond the individual orgenlsattonal
strateglzlng associated with resource dependency theories. This in turn caused a social,
cognitive and lnstitutlonal impasse in the network, and as shown by Westley and
Vredenburg (1991), the only way forward in such a situation is for a strong authority to
intervene and direct activity itself as a strategic bridge - a concept that goes further than
the traditional notions of governance described by Rhodes (1996) and Stoker (1998). This
- 305-
finding suggestsa need to re-evaluate ideas of governance by the state, to consider how
such activity is reconciled with the current understanding of the boundaries between the
state and the voluntary sector. Reinforcing the importance of ties and informational links
highlighted in the structural embeddedness literature (Hager et a', 2004; Kenis &
Oerlemans, 2008), the case demonstrated that the retention of structurally embedded
organisations in partnership by the government came at the expenseof organisations with
low levels of ties and relationships. This thesis has shown that the structure of funding
programmes - impacted as they are by institutions, and competition within t~~ network -
unbalanced it is by the dominance of public sector and structurally embedded
organisations, serves to direct state-distributed funds firstly to dominant organisations
(primarily public sector), and secondly, to dominant voluntary sector organisations. In
practice, this means that partnerships will be largely led by public sector bodies, and that
partners will be structurally embedded, established organisations, with existing
institutionalised ties to government.
8.1.3 Reflections & Contributions
The useof the multi-theory framework in building and conducting this study provided for a
number of overlapping ideas to be considered. Keythemes were MLG, institutional systems
and network systems, and underneath these, a number of linked ideas relevant to specific
activities within a funding process,such as transactions costs and strategic bridging. Whilst
the use of these ideas was rationalised and justified within the literature review and
theoretical framework, not all theories of the framework contributed equally to the
understanding of the case. Reflecting on the theoretical ideas used to conduct this study,
the analysis conducted demonstrated the greater significance of institutional and MLG
factors in determining funding, in comparison to the network factors studied, such as the
game theoretical concepts. The network themes were very useful in viewing the process
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through another lens, and highlighted key factors such as how bounded rationality explains
organisational approach to funding, and how strategic bridging enables the state to reach
more deeply into the network. However, the institutional themes provided a greater
contribution to the literature, on MLG and institutional theory in particular, in illuminating
the operational difficulties embedded in state funding to the voluntary sector. For example,
the shape of funding programmes was shown to have resulted from institutionalised
norms, rules and relationships, with the direction of pressure operating hierarchically from
the state downwards. This finding complements the arguments made by Hooghe and
Marks (2001) for type II MLG as a fluid, policy-focused pressure. Additionally, bureaucracy
was a particular influence on the shaping of programmes, and this supports the assertions
made by du Gay (2000) in this being a key driver for hierarchical control.
Themes such as governance and strategic bridging were shown to reinforce and perpetuate
these institutions, and this is evidenced in the comparative importance of structural
embedded ness in determining organisational dominance and success in gaining funds, over
purely network considerations such as competitive games. Indeed, this case has illustrated
longevity of relations with the state as a key feature of successful structurally embedded
organisations, disputing the work of Hager et 01 (2004) who proposed that organisational
state funding receipts were not a factor in organisational longevity. Similarly, the
overarching concept of type II MLG proved highly relevant in explaining and assigning
importance to institutional behaviours within government that would impact funding
distribution in the network much later in the process. This highlights an important point for
policy-makers in targeting funds, in particular, funding from supra-national sources, as this
study suggests that the institutions and values of intermediate organisations may warp the
path of funding. Very little exists in the literature that explores this from an
institutional/MLG perspective, and this case highlights the need for such exploration to take
place.
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One of the key contributions this thesis has made is to demonstrate that the final
destination of large funds is likely to be largely determined long before the funds are
released into the network and that this is related to MLG and institutional factors. In
contrast to a perceived and desired impact of network participation by the voluntary sector
in Wales, this thesis has shown how type II MLG is a much greater influence in the
distribution of funding, and that current understanding of the effects of type II MLG may
need to be expanded and further investigation carried out to identify whether the findings
of this caseare replicated. Although the findings from the thesis come from a single case,
they suggestthat the institutions developed to facilitate funding to the voluntary sector are
affecting the network in a detrimental way, e.g. through structurally favouring a certain
type of organisation. This thesis also contests the view of Hooghe and Marks (2001), who
suggest that MLG is at its weakest in implementation phasesof European programmes of
activity. Indeed, this study demonstrates that MLG is very strongly exhibited in the
implementation activity of programme design through institutionalised channelsand in line
with organisational norms and values. This is evidenced by this case's identification of
organisational legitimacy as a driver for structuring implementation programmes, and
highlights the need to reconsider how MLG is currently accepted to affect national and
regional implementation processes.
Another key contribution this thesis makes that clearly supports the governance and
strategic bridging literature, is to highlight a grey area between the two concepts. This
thesis identified activities conducted by the state that clearly went beyond what would
traditionally be considered to be 'governance' activities (Rhodes, 1996; Stoker, 1998).
Thesewere intrusive activities within the network, and the state clearly acted in a directed,
specific and authoritative capacity, characteristics of mandated strategic bridging as
described by Brown (1989) and Westley and Vredenburg (1991). However, an argument
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could be made that strategic bridging is simply a more aggressive form of governance by
the state, and this thesis suggests it may be necessary to expand current notions of
governance to encompass this.
These contributions have a number of implications for the future use and development of
theory in these areas, and these will be further considered in section 8.2.3.
Finally, this research has provided a detailed and critical study of a distinctive case. The
situation of the case in the Welsh context provided not only a rich description and analysis
of a policy-focused funding process, but it also allowed for key insights into how a sub-state
nation acts in a regional capacity in a supra-national framework. Whilst an identical case is
unlikely to be found elsewhere, similarities could well be found in other regions and sub-
state nations in Europe and internationally. The effects of MlG on regional/sub-state policy
implementation discussed in this study would be particularly relevant to such other
contexts.
8.2 Implications
This research has a number of implications not only for policy in the way in which funding is
targeted and distributed, but also for how organisations in the wider network are engaged
in policy and delivery activities. There are also implications for further research in this area,
and for the development of theory as a result of the theoretical framework used within this
study.
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8.2.1 Policy Implications
The findings of this research concerning funding distribution have serious implications for
policy makers and programme development teams, as they suggest that funds are not
being fully oriented towards achieving the policy goals they are set up for as a result of
institutional pressures. This research is relevant, in particular, to other nations in receipt of
ESF funds. This thesis clearly showed a dysfunctional attitude within the Welsh
Government towards the EC which impacted upon the development of ~.he funding
instruments. The Welsh pre-occupation with its status and stature within the EU displaced
the focus of the ESFprogrammes, and it is quite possible that this has occurred in other EU
regions. Writing in 2012, the crisis in Greece suggests similar, if amplified, dysfunctions
between the front a state presents to the EU and the reality of its ability to deliver tangible
outcomes. Greece may be an extreme example, but it is clear how state ambitions can
spiral out of control, and this research shows perhaps a first step in that process which
should act as a warning to the Welsh Government.
Further, this research highlights the complexities of the funding requirements set by the EC
and the difficulties in interpreting those requirements at the level the funding programmes
are developed and managed. It is unlikely that Wales is the only region in which funding has
appeared to be channelled to a certain type of organisation, and it is quite possible that
similar structures are in operation in other EU countries. This research could illustrate the
areas in which difficulties may be experienced and highlight potential behaviours that may
be exhibited by organisations attempting to engage in the distribution of ESF funds.
Ultimately, if similar dynamics are occurring in other regions of Europe, then a wholesale
exclusion of key areas of the voluntary sector is occurring, and with that, the Fund is
alienating the very 'organisations that are key to achieving the policy outcomes of the ESF.If
this is indeed happening, and if it has been for a long period of time, then this may indicate
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one of the reasons why many ESFrecipient regions are unsuccessful in pulling themselves
above the 75% average GOP threshold for receiving the funds.
This research is also relevant to the Welsh Government's strategy in dispersing funds to
achieve policy goals. The issues experienced by WEFO and the institutions shaping the
programmes served to direct the funds towards a very specific type of organisation in
Wales, and these organisations in turn, deal with very specific types of beneficiary. This
research found that organisations dealing with beneficiaries that had higher than usual
support needs were more likely to be excluded from the programmes due to their higher
unit costs, their lack of structural embedded ness and their inability to guarantee a certain
volume of outcomes.
Exclusion of organisations dealing with the hardest to reach beneficiaries that are the target
of such funds, suggests that policy aims will experience failure, as those most in need are
not reached. Regardless of how high level policy is worded, if the institutional culture
funnels funding towards a particular type of organisation, and this organisation in turn
recruits a particular type of beneficiary in order to achieve its contractual aims, other
organisations and the beneficiaries they serve will fail to benefit. This means that the ESF
programmes in Wales are more than likely to experience some failure, meaning over £1
billion in ESFfunding has been used ineffectually.
This research should highlight to the Welsh Government, in its structuring ESFand other
funding distribution programmes, that greater consideration should be given to how
organisations can access funding. No organisation has a right to funding, but organisations
delivering high-quality outcomes may become marginalised or cease operations if they are
structurally excluded from receiving funding that could support and increase the outcomes
they achieve with their beneficiaries. Better drafting of policy documents, programme
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funding requirements and monitoring and evaluation measurescould alleviate barriers to
engagement, and increase the quality and diversity of work being delivered in the wider
statutory and voluntary sectors.
Final implications of this research for the Welsh Government, National Assembly for Wales
and related Welsh bodies are those that point to their somewhat 'self-conscious' culture. It
is difficult to argue with the Welsh cultural desire to be well-regarded amongst its peers in
Europe. However, the extent to which this emerged as a preoccupation has been shown
here to have very wide-ranging effects upon the policy aims of the programme. In
particular, organisations operating with a different culture were not able to engage with
the funding. This is despite some of those organisations reporting very positive long-term
outcomes with the target beneficiary groups. Conversely,some organisations churning out
a high level of potentially lower-quality outcomes were found to engage better with the
funding distribution structures.
At the time of writing, Wales appears to be on course to receive another tranche of
Structural Fundsfor 2014-2020. This indicates that the alms of the programmes were not
fully achieved, and that two ESFprogramming rounds totalling 13 years of funding for
Wales had not successfully addressed the social and economic disadvantages in the
country. Considering this lack of achievement, and the inability of certain organisations to
engage with the process, it could be argued that the programmes have not, thus far,
directed funds to where they would achieve the best, long-term outcomes. This research
should serve to warn the Welsh Government against a repetition of the programmes
developed for 2007-2013.
It is outside the scope of this research to answer whether funding directed towards other
organisations would achieve better programme aims. It is possible to propose, however,
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that the Welsh administrations should take a longer-term view in terms of impressing
Europe, and focus on getting the best long-term outcomes, rather than having the most
attractive short-term paperwork. Surely, the most impressive action the Welsh governing
bodies could take in Europe would be to pull the region's average GDPabove 75% of the
European average, demonstrating the programmes had worked and that the funding was
no longer required?
8.2.2 Further Research
The findings of this study have implications for further research, and prompt consideration
of a number of areas that are worthy of investigation. The further research discussedhere
would strengthen the findings of this case study and provide a deeper understanding of
how the systemsstudied work and what pressuresact upon them.
The choice of a single case study method to investigate a complex, vertical process
spanning two different environments meant that this research lacked a genuine
comparative element (Yin, 2009). In order to strengthen the findings of this research, a
comparative study would provide a clearer picture of the institutions governing the funds
and the competitive environment in which dominant organisations are able to secure the
funds. A study of two other partnership projects in this programming period in Waleswould
provide a solid base for proving the assertions made in this thesis, whilst a comparative
study that included partnership projects from other regions would be fascinating in
highlighting the differences and similarities in approach to the same overarching policy
requirements. Another comparative approach would repeat this research under the next
programming period of 2014-2020 and identify how structures and approaches change or
remain.
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One interesting point detected in this researchwas the ethical considerations surrounding
the position of a government department as a strategic bridge. In looking at the field of
new institutional economics, North (1993) noted that mediating entities can facilitate the
development of rules for interactions in the network. In this case study, the government
department leading the project was located in the centre as a strategic bridge between the
bureaucracy of WEFO/ the Welsh Government and the network of organisations. This
situation posed some ethical dilemmas. The government department leading the project
was not a neutral actor in this network, it was aWelsh Government department, It already,
to a certain extent, governed all activity in this area.Was it right for it to then be placed in a
position where it was able to monopolise funding that historically by-passed it and went
directly to organisations that perhapsworked outside of its favoured policy areas?
Gray (1989) proposed that such a central broker or mediator should be a neutral actor, but
did accept that mediators are not necessarily completely disinterested parties, and that
they may have something to gain from their participation. Westley & Vredenburg (1991)
alternatively proposed that the central broker could be purposefully motivated or lack
neutrality whilst still maintaining effectiveness, and that they may become a strategic
bridge to forward their own agendas. It would be interesting to study the ethical
considerations of this strategic bridge position further, and to investigate whether the
strategic bridge or its favoured partners would benefit disproportionately from its position
as decision-maker. This research would investigate whether the acquisition of ESFfunds
and partnership project was a vehicle for gaining funds for an existing policy area that
would not fall foul of additionality requirements. This would also investigate whether the
funds acquired and distributed to organisations replaced core or similar grants historically
awarded to them by the Welsh Government. The findings of such research would cast
further light on how Structural Fundsare spent, how they support the policy aims of the
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government, and whether they are genuinely additional or whether they are simply
absorbed into planned activity.
Another area holding the potential for further research centres around the increases in
bureaucracyfor dominant organisations, and how this increasemay lead to them becoming
uncompetitive over time as their procedures are institutionalised and transaction costs
increased. The partners within this study were required to standardise their outputs and
outcomes for monitoring purposes, and this process of standardisation, centrellslng and
streamlining project activities demonstrates the institutionalisation of the partnership
within the network. Whilst in the early phases this provides the chosen partners with
stability and funding, the pressures placed upon them by the Welsh Government, WEFO
and the project lead concerning the execution of their areasof the project meant that each
individual organisation's bureaucracy was noted to have increased to meet the
requirements. Where this occurs, some authors (e.g., Parsons, 1954; Thorelli, 1986)
propose that this will negatively affect their competitive advantage, leading to a cyclical
arrangement of the network, where different organisations enjoy success periodically
before being relegated for becoming too expensive, allowing a smaller and more agile
organisation to take their place. It would be interesting to return to this partnership two to
three years after the initial data collection to uncover how the burden of bureaucracy
attached to the project hasaffected the partners, and examinewhether this has resulted in
an increaseor decreasein their transaction costsand competitiveness.
Consideringthe Europeandimension to this study, further researchto discover whether the
Welsh findings are replicated in other similar European regions would not only be very
interesting to conduct, but would be important in discovering whether other countries
experience similar issues.This form of comparison could strengthen findings in this study
concerning the institutional context in particular, and would uncover whether the ESF
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regulations were interpreted and implemented similarly in other regions. Examination of
other regions would possibly produce a less parochial view of ESFfunding distribution, and
would remove some of the 'noise' associated with studying a small, interwoven community
in which a short period of research cannot possibly uncover all of the allegiances or historic
issues. This research would conduct similar studies in other regional administrations to
uncover differences or similarities in the programme development and funding distribution
processes. Should the Welsh findings be replicated, the data would support a powerful
argument for reform of the administration of one of Europe's most signifi~~nt funding
mechanisms.
The political dimension associated with this study would provide another rich area for
exploration into the influences acting upon the distribution of ESF funds in Wales. The
complexity of the process of the negotiation and development of the ESFfunds in Wales
relevant to this case meant that the significant political elements having a bearing upon this
research were not able to be taken into account in this study. This study was not able to
take into account the political negotiation of the funding programmes at supra-national
level, nor was it able to delve into the political dimension at regional/national level
between the UK government and the National Assembly for Wales. However, research in
this area using approaches such as paradiplomacy (Aldecoa, 1999) to further explain the
themes of power and legitimacy identified in this study as significant in shaping the
distribution of funding could produce an extremely interesting dimension to this issue.
8.2.3 Theoretlca/lmplications
The development of the complex theoretical framework for this study, as a result of a
paucity of other obvious frameworks, in addition to the findings of the research, prompts a
considered discussion of the theoretical implications of this study. This case has highlighted
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a gap in the theoretical landscape to sufficiently understand processes of funding
development and distribution, in particular in an MlG context, and provides a first step in
attempting to fill that gap.
Following a review of a wide range of literature, no existing framework for investigating a
process such as the one studied emerged as an obvious solution. As such, this research
chose to knit together a number of theories to illustrate the institutions and bureaucracies
that shaped the programmes and the institutionalised relationships between the public and
voluntary sector. This was a very complex, multi-theory solution to the process being
examined, and prompts the questions 'could there have been a simpler method?', 'how did
the method used contribute to theoretical knowledge?' and lif there was no simpler
method, shouldn't the study have focused on only one aspect of the process?'
In answering the first of these questions, the literature review of this thesis should
demonstrate the difficulty of finding a single theory to encompass the development and
distribution process of ESFfunds. Concepts such as governance could have been argued to
provide a better single model to understand the case studied. The difficulty with
governance was considered to be in its lack of ability to explain an institutionalised focus,
and its inability to illuminate the themes of power and legitimacy that were evident in the
development of the funding structures. This difficulty with governance as a single
explanation was further highlighted in the more direct and hands-on approach taken by the
project lead, that went beyond the accepted definition of governance. An argument cou1d
be made that this was simply a more aggressive form of governance, however, the aspects
of programme development and the institutional aspects of the study should refute such an
argument. A more effective method was to utilise a number of overlapping theories to fully
understand the process.
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Consideringthis refutation, and the secondquestion concerning this thesis' contribution to
the theoretical debate, it is logical to ask whether this study actually challenges the
established parameters of governance. The findings of this study should provide food for
thought. Governance,as described by Rhodes(1996),Stoker (1998), and Kooiman (2003) is
arguably the closest model to explain many of the themes in this study, in particular the
blurred boundaries between government and the network, and the notion that interactions
between government and civil society are fluid and participative. The findings of this
research should prompt some debate about the accepted boundaries of governance and
whether these need to be expanded to give greater consideration to the institutions
shaping active governance. Expansion of these parameters could produce greater
understanding of vertical processes between government and the network, and could
illuminate how institutional pressures impact governance activity several steps removed
from those pressures.Thiswould build on the work of Ansell (2008), Borzel & Risse(2004),
and Leach et 01 (2002) in illuminating the interface between state and network, and in
identifying how intrusive governance activity could affect individual organisations and the
plurality of the voluntary sector.
Continuing the consideration of this thesis' contribution, the research required a certain
level of innovation in bringing a range of concepts together, and has made links between
some of these concepts that are not apparent in the literature at the time of writing.
Notably, this study has shown how MLG and strategic bridging are related vertically
through a funding distribution process, and that MLG, through strategic bridging activity,
not only affects the actions of state bureaucrats, but the successesof organisations
attempting to engage with state funding programmes. Whilst this is only one case, this
finding has implications for how strategic bridging activity is conducted in environments
affected by MLG, and revisiting categories of strategic bridging such as those put forward
by Lawrence and Hardy (1999) in the context of MLG environments would further our
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understanding of local consequences of supra-national policy. Other questions raised by
this research concern the discreteness of strategic bridging in relation to governance. An
overlap in the concepts was identified in this study, and their characteristics are similar
enough to question whether strategic bridging is merely another form of governance.
To answer the third question, it is necessary to ponder more on the purpose of research.
Should a process or phenomenon be avoided simply because it is very complex? Scholarly
and academic investigation and debate have always involved complex problems and
complex solutions. If something is worthy of investigation, the complexity of the thing
should not be considered a barrier to this. It was clear from a very early stage in the
literature review that no individual aspect of the process or single theory would be
sufficient to understand what was occurring at anyone point. The complexity of the
processes and the diagram shown previously in Figure 8.1 should serve to highlight both
how the development process and the distribution process are inextricably linked, and how
those processes cannot be seen through a single lens. Rather, theories were seen to
emerge in several areas, and systems operating at each point of the development and
distribution process could be anticipated to overlap and interact in uncertain ways.
Rather than select one aspect of the process which would perhaps be manageable, but less
useful, the decision was made to attempt to use multiple theories to understand the whole
issue. If such difficult questions are not explored, and if new theoretical frameworks are not
constructed to address these questions, the acquisition of knowledge will be limited. The
theoretical framework and subsequent analysis contained in this thesis should demonstrate
this method was difficult, but effective, in examining the processes studied. This thesis
demonstrates a clear, unique solution to the problem of investigating complex systems,
however, this is limited due to the context in which the study is embedded. The framework
developed for this study was designed specifically with the Welsh context in mind, and is
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unlikely to be completely suited to a different environment. Further work is required in this
area in order to develop simplicity in the solution developed in this thesis, and to enable
replicability of the framework to other environments. This thesis provides a solid basis for
pursuing this activity.
8.3 In Conclusion
This thesis has produced a unique critical narrative of the development and dlstrlbution of
ESF funding in Wales. It has shown that seemingly fair and transparent programmes
developed to target some of the most socially and economically disadvantaged people in
Wales did not disperse funds to all of those voluntary groups that may work with these
individuals. Government preoccupation with power and legitimacy served to influence the
development of funding structures in such a way as to exclude organisations that did not
have institutional links and which were not dominant in the network environment. Instead,
organisations that had consistently worked with the Welsh Government in the past were
once again awarded a seat at a table from which they would benefit financially and through
further strengthening their ties with the dominant entity.
Funding decisions then, are not merely made on the basis of an application form, but are
affected by the structures put in place before the application form is even developed, and
organisational success can be judged before a project idea is even conceived. Ensuring all
organisations have access to the application materials, and that they are in English and
Welsh, does not necessarily make the process 'fair' or 'transparent', as the need for good
relationships with other organisations was paramount in even getting a project idea off the
ground.
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Ultimately, institutional factors and the competitive network environment had a far greater
impact upon a voluntary organisations ability to engage in the ESFprogrammes of 2007-
2013 than any efforts to make the programme materials accessible. It will be interesting to
see the next incarnation of funding programmes in 2014-2020 in Wales, and to observe
how the structures change again. Most of all, it will be intriguing to observe which
organisations are awarded funding in these new programmes, and whether this next
programming period will be the last for Wales as a recipient of the greatest level of support
from the ESF.
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Appendix 1
A History of the ESF
The European Union (EU) has its origins in the post-war years of the 1950's, and its initial
goals centred around free trade in coal and steel. Its policy making activities have however,
grown to encompass agricultural, monetary, regional, environmental, immigration, security
and social policy areas (Bomberg et al, 2008) in the years since. The EU is organised into
four main institutions, the EC, the EU Parliament, the EU Court and the EU Council. Whilst
the aims and priority areas of the EU are guided through the Parliament and Council, it is
the responsibility of the ECto develop, implement and build on broad on-going policy aims
such as growth and development throughout the territory. The Commission's main roles
are to:
• set objectives and priorities for action
• propose legislation to Parliament and Council
• manage and implement EU policies and the budget
• enforce European Law (jointly with the Court of Justice)
• represent the EU outside Europe (negotiating trade agreements between the EU
and other countries, etc.)
Source: European Commission (2011a)
The ECis currently split into 44 directorates and service departments. The Structural Funds
are policy tools to implement cohesion policl2 with an aim of developing the regions
22 EU cohesion policy is an investment policy. It supports job creation, competitiveness, economic
growth, improved quality of life and sustainable development. Regional policy aims to reduce the
significant economic, social and territorial disparities that still exist between Europe's regions.
leaving these disparities in place would undermine some of the cornerstones of the EU, including its
large single market and its currency, the euro. During the period 2007-2013, the EUwill invest a total
of (347 billion in Europe's regions.
- 323-
within the EU that suffer from economic or social disadvantage. There are three main funds
that make up the European Structural Funds
• The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) which has a focus on improving
physical infrastructure and private economy
• The Cohesion Fund which focuses on stabilising economies and developing trans-
European infrastructure and transport
• The European Social Fund (ESF),which has a focus on improving economic activity
through addressing underlying social barriers
The responsibility for the European Social Fund sits within the Directorate for Employment,
Social Affairs and Inclusion.
The European Social Fund was born in 1951 after a treaty was signed in Paris to create the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). One outcome of the ECSCTreaty was the
establishment of the ECSCFund for the Retraining and Resettlement of Workers, which
would form the basis for the ESF. Six years later, the Treaty of Rome established the
European Economic Community (EEC) and implemented the wider goal of improving
economic opportunities through promoting employment skills and encouraging
geographical and occupational mobility among workers. Through the 50's and 60's, the ESF
was used primarily to address national needs, as the absence of an overarching EU strategy
to direct the funds meant cross-territorial issues or comparative measures and award of the
funds were rarely taken into account.
The ESFwas reformed in 1971 to target specific groups, areas and industries, with these
groups diversifying and increasing in another revision to the ESFin 1975 when the ESFwas
split into two, and the resulting ERDFwas created. Both funds became known as the EU
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Structural Funds. This division provided greater focus to the ESF,which could now be better
focused on social issues, and funds were quickly targeted at women in the workplace, youth
unemployment and older and disabled workers, all of which were areas where new policy
and social development was required across the member states. As a result of this
improved targeting, the ESF began opening up the funds to non-governmental
organisations, which had previously been ineligible to receive them, as these organisations
were recognised as better able to engage with the target groups in certain areas of policy.
The most significant changes to the ESFcame in 1988 when the budget was increased, the
programme was refocused on the poorest regions of the EU, and the EC decided to
delegate programme authority to each member state. Until 1988, member states had
applied to the ECfor individual projects however the 1988 amendments meant that multi-
annual programmes themselves were to be agreed with member states in the form of a
block grant, and these member states would manage individual projects from there. This
change also contained a new element of partnership agreement between the EC, the state
and other interested organisations, requiring states to provide more evidence of
collaboration in the delivery of projects. The regulations agreed as part of this reform
introduced a new framework to structure how the funds would be delivered and targeted,
and in effect doubled the real term resources being spent (Rodriguez-Pose et 01 2004,
Sutcliffe, 2002).
The funding programme in the 1988 reform was split into 5 'objective' strands.
Table 1
Objective 1 Promote the development and structural adjustment of underdeveloped
regions
Objective 2 Regenerate regions affected by industrial decline
Objective 3 Combat long term unemployment
Objective 4 Focus on getting young people into work
Objective 5 Reform agricultural policy and improve rural areas
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Objective 1 was allocated the bulk of the ESFfunds, with two thirds of ESFbeing directed to
these areas (Rodriguez-Pose et a/ 2004), and only regions with a GOP of less than 75% of
the average of the EU would be eligible to receive these monies. The Objectives were
designed to increase subnational involvement in the funds through the partnership and
administrative development elements of the programmes. The Objectives were also
designed to encourage government departments to work together across themes, rather
than within institutionally rigid sector silos (Payne et 0/, 1997). Within the confines of the
overarching programmes, member states were able to develop their own strategies for
funds distribution and implementation. In line with these principles, EU legislation does
not, and did not, dictate the delivery models for the programmes, nor did it prescribe the
structure of implementation or which organisations should be involved (Ferry et ai, 2007).
- 326-
Date
1999
2000
2005
2006
2006
January 2007
Spring 2007
October 2007
January 2008
August 2008
December 2008
January 2009
January 2009
February 2009
April 2010
Appendix 2
Timeline of Events
Event
Certain powers handed to devolved Welsh Government
Beginning of 2000-2006 ESFprogramme
ESFmonies for 2007-2013 programmes agreed
End of 2000-2006 ESFprogramme
Start of development of 2007-2013 programmes within WEFO
Scheduled opening of 2007-2013 ESFConvergence programme-
delayed to September 2007
Welsh Government Department disseminates call for interest in
involvement in the project. A series of project development events are
held between Spring 2007 - Winter 2007
Welsh Government Department requests formal expressions of
interest in the project
Welsh Government Department requests more detailed applications
from organisations to be partners in the project
Welsh Government Department notifies unsuccessful organisations
that they have not been selected and that the partnership will be
smaller than planned
Partnership decreases from 10 to 9 partners
Project officially awarded ESFfunding from WEFO
Project officially launched
WEFO publishes guidance on partnership composition & procurement
First ESFmonies paid to successful partners
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Appendix 3
Research Participant Profiles
Participant #1 European Commission
Participant #2 Welsh Government
Participant #3 Third Sector Network
Participant #4 Welsh Government
Participant #5 Welsh Government
Participant #6 Welsh Government
Participant #7 Partner
Participant #8 Partner
Participant #9 Partner
Participant #10 Partner
Participant #11 Partner
--
Participant #12 Partner
Participant #13 Partner
Participant #14 Welsh Government
Participant #15 Partner
Participant #16 Partner
Participant #17 Partner
Participant #18 Third Sector Network
Participant #19 Third Sector Network
Participant #20 Welsh Government
Participant #21 Third Sector Network
Participant #22 Third Sector Network
Participant #23 Third Sector Network
Participant #24 Third Sector Network
Participant #25 European Commission
Participant #26 Third Sector Network
Participant #27 Third Sector Network
Participant #28 Third Sector Network
Participant #29 Welsh Government
Participant #30 Welsh Government
Participant #31 Third Sector Network
Participant #32 Third Sector Network
Participant #33 Partner
Participant #34 Partner
Participant #35 Partner
European Commission 2 Participants
Welsh Government 8 Participants
Partners 13 Participants
Third Sector Network 12 Participants
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Appendix 3
Interview Questions
The following questions were used in the semi-structured interviews. This is an illustrative
but not exhaustive list, and some questions may have been phrased differently to fit with
the direction of the interview. These questions were used as prompts, and not every
question was used in every interview.
Participants involved in the development of the programmes
• How were the 2007-2013 programmes negotiated?
• Could you give me an idea of how the 2007-13 programmes were developed?
Which organisations/departments/individuals were involved?
• What was your role?
• How long was the process? Were there delays? What caused those delays? How
were they resolved?
• How were the 2007 programmes different to the previous programmes?
• Why were the programmes changed?
• Which policies/frameworks did you need to apply/work within when structuring
the programmes? Did any of these constrict what you were trying to do?
• What were you trying to achieve by changing the programmes from 2000-06?
• What impact upon the voluntary sector do you think the new programmes will
have?
• What feedback was there from the voluntary sector?
• Was there anything that you think should have been done differently? Were other
options considered but discounted?
• Who were the key players in the process? What influence did they have?
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• What kind of working culture do you have in your organisation? Do the
organisations you work with have similar cultures?
• What is important in your workplace?
• What is your relationship with Europe like? Is Europe quite detached from the work
you do or does it have some influence on how you do things?
Participants involved in the project partnership process
• Could you tell me from your perspective how you came to become involved in the
partnership, from when you first heard about it to when your bid was
approved/rejected?
• What kind of involvement have you had with the Welsh Government in the past?
Have you had grants or contracts from them? What about with other public sector
bodies?
• Have you received funding, been on a steering group or been involved in lobbying
with the Welsh Government or other public sector bodies?
• How did you approach developing your project? What considerations did you have?
Did you consider what other organisations might be doing?
• Which individuals were you most in contact with when the bid was being
developed?
• What kind of relationship do you have with them now that the bid has been
agreed?
• Do you have good working relationships with anyone in the Welsh Government?
• Were there any barriers to you being able to participate in the funding process?
• How did the Welsh Government decide who was going to be a partner?
• Why do you think your organisation was selected/not selected over organisations
that have similar aims or expertise?
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• How involved are you in the Welsh voluntary sector environment? Do you have
links with other organisations or work together with other organisations?
• How do you feel about the demands and processes involved in the
application/formation process?
• How did you interpret the ESFrequirements? Did you have any support to do that?
• How different are the programmes this time to last time?
• What are the effects of these changes on your organisation?
• How is your organisation funded?
• Do you have full-time people who focus on funding or policy matters?
• What involvement do members of your board have in funding processes?
• What were the implications of the project partnership outcome for your
organisation?
• Which organisations do you perceive to be the most dominant in the network?
How do you think your organisation compares in terms of gaining funding and
delivering outcomes?
• Are you competing for funds, domain or beneficiaries with other organisations in
the network?
• What was [Welsh Govt Department]'s role in developing the project?
• What are your opinions on how that process was developed and managed?
• Could they have done anything differently to have made the process easier or more
effective?
• How effective do you think the project as it is now will be in achieving the policy
goals attached to Priority 1?
Triangulating questions
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• It's my understanding that the programmes were heavily influenced by civil
servants in the European Commission. Was that your experience?
• I have read that all of the partners have Welsh Government funding in common,
received prior to the partnership project, was that a consideration in selecting
them? What was?
• I read in the guidance that projects are supposed to procure instead of have a very
large partnership, is that the plan with this project? What is?
• I heard that the delays occurred because of bureaucracy and lots of people being
copied into things, was that your experience? What was?
• Some have said that there was a preoccupation with impressing Europe with
paperwork. What do you think about that?
• Thinking about the paperwork and complexity of the programmes, is there a risk of
alienating some organisations that would be good at achieving the policy aims?
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Bureaucracy
CaseStudy
Civil Society
Code
Coding
Glossary
An abstract form of organisation designed to deliver its masters goals
efficiently
A research method (or design) focusing on the study of a single case.
Usually it is not designed to compare one individual or group to
another. Though it is possible to conduct a series of case studies, each
study would not be designed specifically to enable comparison with
others. Sometimes a case study may be included in comparative
analysis as a key or illustrative example.
Civil society has not been commonly defined, however it is generally
held to mean the arena outside of the family, the state, and the
market where people associate to advance common interests. It is
sometimes considered to include the family and the private sphere,
and elements of freedom and independent judiciary characteristic of
modern democracy.
A term that represents an idea, theme, theory, dimension,
characteristic etc. of the data. Passages of text, images etc in a
qualitative analysis study can be linked to the same code to show that
they represent the same idea, theme, characteristic etc.
The action of identifying a passage of text in a document or an image
or part of an image that exemplifies some idea or concept and then
connecting it to a named code that represents that idea or concept.
This shows that it shares the characteristics indicated by the code
and/or its definition with other similarly coded passages or texts. All
the passages and images associated with a code can be examined
together and patterns identified.
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Comparative
Analysis
Convergence
Programme
Data
Devolution /
Devolved nation
Elite
Empiricism
Analysis where data from different settings or groups at the same
point in time or from the same settings or groups over a period of time
are analysed to identify similarities and differences.
Close to the previous "Objective 1", programme, aims to help the
least-developed Member States and regions catch up more quickly
with the EU average by improving conditions for growth and
employment. It covers the Member States and regions whose
development is lagging behind.
Items or units of information generated and recorded through social
research. Data can be numerical (quantitative) or consist of words,
images or objects (qualitative). Naturally occurring data are those that
record events that would have occurred whether a researcher was
present or not. Data are the product of the research itself and are
determined by the research process.
The statutory granting of powers from the central government of a
sovereign state to government at a subnationallevel, such as a
regional, local, or state level. Devolution can be financial, e.g. giving
areas a budget which was formerly administered by central
government, or it can include the power to make legislation.
A small group of people who control a disproportionate amount of
wealth and/or political power.
The notion that knowledge comes through factual research based on .
direct experience gathered through the senses (such as visual
observation). More loosely, it has been used to describe research that
contains little in the way of reflection or theory, preferring to report
'facts' as they appear to be.
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Epistemology
Ethics
EC
Facts
Freedom of
Information Act
2000
Funding
Instrument
Gatekeeper
Homogeneity
Implementation
Institution
The philosophical theory of knowledge, that addresses questions about
how we can know what we know, and whether this knowledge Is
reliable or not.
A branch of philosophy and a field of everyday thinking that deals with
questions of what is morally right and wrong.
The European Commission is the executive body of the European
Union. The body is responsible for proposing legislation, implementing
decisions, upholding the Union's treaties and the general dav-to-dav
running of the Union
True statements about reality. Facts are supposedly neutral with
regard to whether such things are morally right or wrong.
The Freedom of Information Act 2000 provides public access to
information held by public authorities. Public authorities are obliged to
publish certain information about their activities, and members of the
public are entitled to request information from public authorities.
The means by which funds are directed towards resolving a policy issue
People associated with a research setting whose support enables the
researcher to access those they want to research. Gatekeepers may
hold relevant formal positions of responsibility and/or they may be
well connected and helpful 'locals' within the setting the researcher is
studying.
The property of a group of things of being similar and relatively
undistinguished from each other.
The execution of public policy
A custom, practice, relationship, or behavioural pattern of importance
existing between multiple individuals or organisations
- 335-
Interpretivism
Managing
Authority
Model
National
Assembly for
Wales
Network
Partnership
Policy
Procurement
Qualitative Data
Quango
Approaches that emphasize the meaningful nature of people's
participation in social and cultural life. Researchers taking such.
approaches analyse the meanings people confer upon their own and
others' actions, words, settings and contexts.
Organisation nominated by a Member State to develop the funding
distribution structures, inform potential beneficiaries, select the
projects and generally monitor implementation
A mapping device, often expressed in a chart or diagram, designed to
represent the relationship between key elements in a field of study.
Models may be predictive, causal or descriptive, and may be
discursive, mathematical or graphical.
The democratically elected body that represents the interests of Wales
and its people, makes laws for Wales, and holds the Welsh
Government to account.
An interconnected system of ties and relationships
A relationship, often solidified through contractual arrangements,
between individuals or groups that is characterized by mutual
cooperation and responsibility, as for the achievement of a specified
goal
A principle or rule to guide decisions and achieve rational outcomes.
Procurement is the full range of activities related to purchasing goods,
services and works.
Information gathered in non-numeric and often textual form about
meanings, intentions, actions, behaviours and events.
An organisation that is funded by taxpayers, but not controlled directly
by central government
Quantitative Data Information gathered in numeric form.
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Rationality
Region
Research
Question
Rhetoric
Sampling
Semi-structured
interview
Single
Programming
Document
Snowball
Sampling
Social
Constructivism
The exercise of reason
a territorial authority existing at the level immediately below that of
the central government, with its own political representation in the
form of an elected regional assembly.
A clear statement in the form of a question of the broad issues that a
researcher wishes to answer in order to address a research problem. A
research problem is an issue that lends itself to systematic
investigation through research.
The use of language to persuade or influence people and the study of
such methods. It involves linguistic strategies used by speakers or
authors of texts to convey particular impressions or reinforce specific
interpretations.
The process of selecting a subgroup of a population to represent the
entire population.
Interviews that use open-ended and often relatively unstructured
questioning to explore a topic in significant detail from the
interviewee's perspective.
Sets out directions for the allocation of EU aid and the national co-
financing requirements
The process of selecting further individuals to provide their views
based upon the recommendations of research participants
The epistemological view that the phenomena of the social and
cultural world and their meanings are not objective but are created in
human social interaction, that is, they are socially constructed. The
approach often, though not exclusively, draws on idealist philosophy.
Social Structures An architectural/biographical metaphor that highlights the ordered
interrelationships that are characteristic of particular societies or the
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Statutory sector
Structural Funds
Supra-National
Theoretical
Framework
Theory
Third Sector
Transcription
Triangulation
Validity
objective constraints imposed upon individuals by social institutions.
Organisations that are set-up, funded and controlled by government
such as Councils, NHS Health Trusts, Police
ECfinancial tools created to implement Cohesion Policy.
A type of multi-national organisation, confederation or federation
where negotiated power is delegated to an authority by governments
of member states
The conceptual underpinning of a research study which may be based
on theory or a specific conceptual model.
In its most general sense a theory describes or explains something.
Often it is the answer to 'what', 'when', 'how' or 'why' questions.
Organisations occupying the space between the state and the private
sector, comprising non-profit organisations and groups. Also referred
to as the voluntary sector
The process of transferring audio or video recordings of speech or
hand-written notes into a typed or word-processed form. In some
cases special characters may be used to indicate aspects of how words
were spoken.
The use of a variety of data sources or methods to examine a specific
phenomenon either simultaneously or sequentially in order to attempt
to produce a fuller or more accurate account of the phenomenon
under investigation.
The extent to which an account accurately represents the social
phenomena to which it refers. In realist research it refers to the degree
. to which the research provides a true picture of the situation and/or
people being studied and is often referred to as internal validity.
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External validity refers to the extent to which the data collected from
the group or situation studied can be generalised to a wider
population.
Wales Council for The umbrella organisation representing the voluntary sector in Wales
Voluntary Action
WEFO A department within the Welsh Government, WEFO is the 'Managing
Authority', administrator or manager of European Funding in Wales.
Welsh
Government
The First Minister of Wales heads the Welsh Government. Together
with Welsh Ministers and the Counsel General they form the Cabinet.
Civil servants based in offices throughout Wales support them in
developing and delivering their work.
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